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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This thesis deals with situations in which a set of individuals consider form-
ing a joint venture, such as the construction of a communication network
or the operation of a production facility. By cooperating, they may realize
cost savings (or increased revenues), hence cooperation is beneficial for the
collective of agents. Whether cooperation will take place or not depends on
whether the participants manage to share the cost in a manner such that
every individual finds it worthwhile to take part in the joint venture. It is
the problem of allocating the joint cost among the agents that is the subject
of the thesis.
A cost allocation method is a mechanism that solves the cost allocation
problem, and could be anything from a mathematical formula to a procedure
such as a competitive market or a court trial. In all the problems studied
in this thesis we implicitly assume that the information needed to compute
allocations is known by all participants, and that binding agreements can be
enforced. These assumptions leads us to model the situations as cooperative
games, and the focus is on finding an appropriate formula for making the
allocation. If these assumptions were not valid, the focus should be on
designing a procedure, and non-cooperative game theory has a role to play.
In spite of the relatively primitive assumptions used, the problems that we
study are complex. Sometimes, as in Chapter 7, complexity stems from a
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relatively rich description of the technology embedded in the joint venture.
Also, the ability of dissatisfied individuals to break out of the agreement and
form coalitions, i.e., subgroups establishing their own joint venture, adds
further complexity to the models, since the number of coalitions grows ex-
ponentially with the number of players. Complexity is clearly a constraint
when suggesting solutions to allocation problems, since excessive compu-
tational requirements or non-transparency of cost allocation methods may
prohibit their use in practice.
There exist an abundance of solution concepts for cooperative games. Al-
though words such as fair or just are used to describe all of them, it is clear
that the theory does not offer an unambiguous answer to the question of
how costs should be allocated. The most widely used solution concept is the
core. A solution belongs to the core if no individual, or group of individuals,
can lower their cost by breaking out of the agreement and forming their own
(reduced) joint venture. The core will be used extensively throughout this
thesis. Since the core is a convincing solution concept in most applications,
other solution concepts, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus, are
often evaluated in relation to it. Much of the literature! on cooperative
games focuses on describing solution methods in terms of certain axioms
that may be perceived as fair in certain settings. An example is population-
monotonicity, which is used in Chapter 4, and in Chapter 3 we make use of
the consistency axiom.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
All the chapters of the thesis, with the exception of Chapter 6, deal with
applications of cooperative game theory. The games studied in chapters
2-4 have relatively simple structures, and we can therefore focus on pro-
viding nice descriptions of core allocations. In the remaining chapters, the
games studied are more complex, and we therefore need to focus more on
computational issues.
In Chapter 2 we study the standard fixed tree game, for which we generalize
lSee Moulin (1988).
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the intuitive painting stories of Maschler et al. (1995). In Section 2.4 we
study the weighted down-home allocation rule, and we show that any core
point can be obtained as a weighted down-home allocation by appropriately
choosing the weights. Moreover, we give expressions that can be used to cal-
culate these weights. This result is used to show that the core equals the set
of weighted down-home allocations. By relating the weighted down-home
allocation to the weighted Shapley value, we give a constructive proof of
the result inMonderer (1992), where it was shown that the core equals the
set of weighted Shapley values for the class of convex games. The weighted
neighbour-home allocation, in Section 2.5, differs from the down-home allo-
cation in the type of social obligations that it imposes on the players, and
has the nucleolus as a special case. The results of Section 2.5 are analogous
to those of Section 2.4, i.e., we show how any core point can be obtained as a
weighted neighbour-home allocation by appropriately choosing the weights,
and we give explicit formulas for the weights.
In Chapter 3 we relate two well-known problems to each other. The flow
sharing problem allocates the maximal flow of a capacitated network among
its terminal nodes, and the bankruptcy problem allocates the worth of an
estate among a set of claimants. The literature on the former problem has
focused on egalitarian solutions, e.g., the lexicographically optimal solution,
while many types of solutions have been proposed for the latter problem.
Section 3.2 introduces the bankruptcy problem, and Section 3.3 shows how
the flow sharing problem may be seen as a generalization of the single-estate
bankruptcy problem. In Section 3.4 we form reduced two-person flow sharing
problems, which can be interpreted as single-estate bankruptcy problems.
By requiring that the solution to the n-person problem should be consistent
with the solutions to every two-person problem, we get unique solutions to
the former problem. Two such solutions are studied, the contested garment
(CG) consistent solution and the constrained equal award (CEA) consistent
solution. The latter is similar to many of the solutions of the flow sharing
problem that are known from the operations research literature. In Section
3.5 we formulate the flow sharing game, which is a generalization of the
bankruptcy game of Aumann and Maschler (1985). The set of maximal flows
of the flow sharing problem corresponds to the core of this game, and the CG-
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and CEA-consistent solutions of Section 3.4 coincide with the nucleolus and
the constrained egalitarian solution, respectively, of the game. Section 3.6
describes two transfer schemes that converge to the two solutions of Section
3.4. Section 3.7 generalizes the CEA-consistent solution by assigning weights
to the players, and we also relate this solution to the lexicograhica1ly optimal
solution of the flow sharing problem.
In Chapter 4 we study a cost allocation problem arising in connection with
a bank ATM network, where the member banks seek to allocate the trans-
actions costs. The cost allocation problem is equivalent to a cost savings
allocation problem, where the banks owning ATMs provide cost savings to
the (customers of) other banks. The problem is thus how to divide these
cost savings between the bank(s) owning the ATMs, and the "owners" of
the transactions that are processed by the ATMs. The game is defined by
aggregating over the locations (of the ATMs), and Section 4.3 investigates
the properties of single-location games, which are shown to be a special case
of the information market games of Muto et al. (1989) and Potters and Tijs
(1989). If only one bank has ATMs in a location, the core is relatively large,
and several well-known solution concepts coincides with a central point in
the core. According to this allocation, the cost savings are split equally be-
tween the bank owning the ATMs, and the banks whose transactions need
to be processed by the ATMs. If several banks have ATMs in a location,
the core consists of a single point. In Section 4.4, we combine allocations for
the single-location games, and two allocation rules are studied. The equal-
split rule splits cost savings equally whenever possible, and corresponds to
the r-value of the cost savings game. It yields core points, as does the
transaction-based rule, where no splitting of cost savings is performed, but
the latter rule has the additional advantage of being population-monotonic,
i.e., no member bank looses as a result of the inclusion of new member banks
in the network.
Chapter 5 is about linear production games, in which a set of agents own the
input resources to a production process that can be described by a linear
programming problem. It is known from Owen (1975) that a subset of the
core can be obtained from the solution of the dual corresponding to the
grand coalition, but there is no readily available description of the rest of
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the core. In Section 5.3 we provide lower (upper) bounds on the values of the
game by aggregating over columns (rows) of the LP-problem. By choosing
aggregation weights corresponding to optimal solutions of the primal (dual)
LP-problem, we can create new games whose core form a superset (subset)
of the original core. In Section 5.4 we show how one can obtain an estimate
of the resulting error, in terms of and e-core, by solving a mixed-integer
programming problem, and suggest an iterative procedure for improving the
bounds. In Section 5.5 we investigate, using a set of numerical examples,
how the performance of the aggregation approach depends on the structure
of the problem data.
Chapter 6 is a note on the computation of the pre-nucleolus. The LP-based
procedure of Kopelowitz (1967) requires, in every iteration, the identification
of active constraints, and we show, via an example, that using an interior-
point method for solving the LP-problem reduces the number of iterations
needed, compared to using an extreme-point method.
Chapter 7 deals with cost allocation in an electricity network. Producers
and consumers inhabit the nodes of the network, and have to cover the fixed
cost of the transmission facilities. In Section 7.2 we introduce a model of
a network connecting a set of regional electricity markets. The network is
considered fixed, i.e., no lines are added/removed, and the inhabitants of
each node can choose whether to make use of the network or not. The
consumers and producers inhabiting the nodes are described by demand
and supply functions, and the network is described by the reactances and
thermal capacities of the existing lines. Given that a certain subset of nodes
choose to connect themselves through the network, equilibrium quantities
and prices will be determined as a result of these parameters. In Section 7.3
we formulate the cost allocation problem and the corresponding cooperative
game. The value of a coalition, forming an upper bound on the cost that
can be assigned to its members, is defined as the increase in total surplus
(excluding the surplus of the network owner) that occurs when the coalition
starts using the network. The main result of Section 7.3 is that the core will
be nonempty if the grand coalition is not constrained by the line capacities.
In Section 7.4 we discuss briefly how the network owner may handle the
problem of an empty core. Section 7.5 illustrates, using examples, how
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cost allocation methods based on observed quantities may fail to yield core
allocations. However, by combining several methods, as shown in Section
7.6, core points may in many cases be obtained. An LP-based procedure for
finding such combinations is discussed.
1.3 Cooperative games with transferable utility
We will denote the set of players by N := {l,... ,n}. A subset S ~ N will
be called a coalition, and the set of coalitions will be denoted by 2N. The set
N will sometimes be referred to as the grand coalition. To every coalition
we assign a value, given by the characteristic function c : 2N ~ R 1, and
in most cases it will be convenient to refer to games by their characteristic
functlon.P A game c is said to be sub-additive if
c(S UT) ~ c(S) + c(T) for all S, T ~ N such that S n T = 0. (1.1)
For an additive game, the inequality in (1.1) holds as an equality. The game
c is concave if
c(S UT) + c(S n T) ~ c(S) + c(T) for all S,T ~ N. (1.2)
It is easily seen that concavity implies aub-additivity.'
A solution of a game is given by an allocation vector X E R", where Xi is
the amount allocated to player i E N. For a coalition S ~ N, we define
the total amount allocated to the members of S as x(S) := :EiES Xi. We
shalllet XS := {Xi hES refer to the restriction of X to the members of S.
In this chapter we define three solution concepts that are used in several
of the chapters. These are the core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus.
Other solution concepts, such as the r-value (Chapter 4) and the constrained
egalitarian solution (Chapter 3) will be defined in the respective chapters
where they are used.
2Problems where a positive value (revenue) is to be allocated, such as in chapters 3
and 5, could be fitted into this framework by letting c take negative values. Instead
we shall follow the conventional approach and let the coalition values be given by the
(non-negative) characteristic function ti : 2N -+ RI. This means that the definitions of
sub-additivity and concavity, as well as the definition of the core and the nucleolus, must
be changed accordingly.
3The corresponding properties of a revenue game ti, super-additivity and convexity, are
obtained by reversing the inequalities of (1.1) and (1.2).
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The set of pre-imputations is defined as
J*(c) := {x ERn: x(N) = c(N)},
i.e., the set of solution vectors such that the entire cost corresponding to
the grand coalition is allocated. By adding the requirement that the solu-
tions should be acceptable to individuals (individual rationality), we get the
imputation set, i.e.,
I(c) := {x E Rn: x(N) = c(N), Xi ~ c(i) Vi EN}.
The core is obtained by adding a stronger requirement, that of group ratio-
nality, i.e.,
C(c) := {x E J*(c) : x(S) ~ c(S) VS eN}. (1.3)
Bondareva (1961) and Shapley (1967) show that the core of a game is
nonempty if and only if the game is balanced, i.e., iff
L ASC(S) ~ c(N)
SeN
(1.4)
for any set of non-negative weights {AS} SeN such that L:S3i As = 1 for all
i EN. The core is used in all the chapters of this thesis." In Chapter 5 we
also use the concept of strong e-core'' With respect to the game c, this is
the set
Cf(c) := {x E J*(c) : x(S) ~ c(S) - f. VS E 2N \ {N, Ø}}. (1.5)
If e ~ 0, we have C(c) ~ Cf(c).
In order to define the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) of c, let e(c, S, x) .-
c(S) - x(S) denote the excess of coalition S, given the allocation x ERn.
Then, let
8(x):= {e(c,Sl,x),e(c,S2,X), ... ,e(c,S2"-2,X)}
denote the vector obtained by sorting the excess values for all the 2n - 2
nonempty coalitions, except N, in a non-decreasing order, i.e., such that
4For a revenue game v, the equivalents to (1.3), (1.4), and (1.5) are obtained by re-
versing inequalities.
5See Maschler et al. (1979).
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i < j =? e{c,Si, x) ~ e{c,Sj, x). The nucleolus is the unique element in I{c)
for which the vector of excesses is lexicographically maximal", i.e.,
NU{c) := {x E I{c) : 8{x) ?LEX 8{y) Vy E I{c)}. (1.6)
If, in the above definition, we replace I{c) by I*{c), we get the pre-nucleolus
NU*{c). The nucleolus, as opposed to the Shapley value, is always a member
of the core", ifthe latter set is nonempty. Hence, ifa game c has a nonempty
core, then NU*{c) = NU{c). The nucleolus is studied in chapters 2, 3 and
4, as well as 6 and 7.
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) can be defined'' as
cI>i{C) := ~ (ISI- l)t~~1 -lSI)! [c{S) - c{S \ i)] i EN. (1.7)
The Shapley value does not in general belong to the core. An alternative
definition, used in Chapter 4, expresses cI>{c) as the average of the marginal
vectors, and Shapley (1971) shows that for convex games, the core is the
convex hull of the marginal vectors, implying that the Shapley value is in
the core. In Chapter 2, a weighted generalization, due to Kalai and Samet
(1988), is analyzed in connection with standard fixed tree games.
Sometimes we shall draw pictures lllustrating'' solutions, e.g., the core, for a
specific game. For n = 3, the pre-imputation set I*{c) is a two-dimensional
hyperplane, as is illustrated in Figure 1.1. For every coalition SeN, the
set
Hs{c) := {x E I*{c) : x{S) = c{S)}
represents the set of points where coalition S pays exactly its stand-alone
cost c{S). In Figure 1.1, these hyperplanes are shown as dashed lines, and
the core is the grey area enclosed by all the dashed lines. Note that the
core contains points where some players are charged negative amounts, i.e.,
where they receive money for participating in the joint venture.
6The nucleolus of a revenue game v is obtained by minimizing the excess vector, where
this vector is sorted in a non-increasing order.
7See e.g. Maschler et al. (1979).
SIn contrast to the core and the nucleolus, the definition of the Shapley value does does
not depend on whether we are dealing with a cost game or a revenue game.
9See Maschler et al. (1979) and Chardaire (2001) for geometric interpretations of some
solution concepts.
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Figure 1.1: Graphical description of the core
Chapter 2
Weighted Allocation Rules
for Standard Fixed Tree
Gamest
2.1 Introduction
We consider cost sharing problems arising from standard fixed tree enter-
prises. There is a fixed and finite set of agents who are connected through a
fixed tree network to a special node called root. We seek to allocate the cost
of this tree corresponding to the maintenance of the different connections.
Many real-life situations can be modelled to fit in this general setting. For
instance, consider the problem of allocating the maintenance cost of an ir-
rigation network or a cablevision network, setting airport taxes for planes
or setting dredging fees for ships. In a natural way each standard fixed tree
problem gives rise to a standard fixed tree game, which relates each coalition
of agents/players to the minimal expenses for maintaining the connections
of all its members to the root. This makes it possible to investigate this
type of problems with techniques from cooperative game theory. The same
problem is studied in Megiddo (1978) , Koster et al. (1998) , whereas Granat
et al. (1996), Maschler and Granat (1998) and Maschler et al. (1995) study a
generalization, where more than one player is allowed to occupy each node.
A special case, where the underlying structure of the game is a chain, is
tThis chapter is based on Bjørndal, Koster and Tijs (1999).
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also known as the airport problem and considered by Littlechild (1974), Lit-
tlechild and Owen (1977), Littlechild and Thompson (1977), Dubey (1982),
Potters and Sudholter (1999) , and Aadland and Kolpin (1998).
In Section 2.3, we are concerned with the core of the standard fixed tree
game; essentially, this section is based on Koster et al. (1998) . Inspired by
the painting story presented by Maschler et al. (1995) we introduce, in Sec-
tion 2.4, the weighted down-home allocation in which each player is allocated
a share, corresponding to his relative weight, of the cost of each edge along
the path from the (local) root to his home. We show, by explicitly char-
acterizing the corresponding weight system, that each core element can be
obtained as a weighted down-home allocation. Especially, the core element
as determined by the Shapley value corresponds to the weighted down-home
allocation with equal weights to all players. Moreover, each weighted down-
home allocation is equivalent to a weighted Shapley value, and therefore our
results provide an alternative proof of the result in Monderer et al. (1992),
where it is shown that the core of a concave game (it is well known that
fixed tree games are concave) equals the set of weighted Shapley values. In
Section 2.5 we introduce the weighted neighbour-home allocation, a general-
ization of the scheme in Masch1er et al. (1995) for computing the nucleolus,
and show that the set of weighted neighbour-home allocations equals the
core. The weighted neighbour-home allocation is equal to the nucleolus in
the special case where all players are given equal weight.
2.2 The fixed tree maintenance problem: the model
and its game
In this chapter we consider afixed tree maintenance problem g:= (G,c,N).
Here G = (V, E) is a tree, i.e. a directed connected graph without cycles,
with node set V and edge set E. The set V contains a node which has a
special meaning. We denote this node by r and refer to it as the root. The
function c: E ~ R+, called cost function, associates with each edge e a cost
c(e). It can be interpreted as the cost to maintain e. At each node there is
exactly one player, the finite set of all players is denoted by N = {l, ... ,n}
for some natural number n. The objective of the players is to maintain
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sufficiently many edges such that by the corresponding network each finds
himself connected to the root. We address the problem of allocating the
total costs of the network among the players.
We assume, for simplicity, that the root is not occupied and that only one
edge is incident with the root". Then g is referred to as simply a maintenance
problem. In the sequel we identify nodes with players (V = NU {r}). For
any subgraph G' of G, we willlet E(G') and V(G') denote the corresponding
edge set and node set, respectively. Sometimes we will also denote the player
set corresponding to G' by N(G') ~ V(G'). For each node i E N there is
a unique path Pi from the root to node i. If V(Pi) consist of the nodes
io = r, il , ... ,iq = i , then iq-l is called the predecessor 7r(i) of node
i. We put N(Pi) := V(Pi) \ {r}. We denote by ei the edge (7r(i), i), and
we will sometimes write Ci := c(ei). The precedence relation (V,~) on the
set of nodes and/or players is defined by i ~i if and only if i E V(Pj).
Analogously we define the precedence relation (E,~) on the edges. In this
way, the edges are considered to be directed away from the root. A trunk
of G = (V, E) is a set of nodes T ~ N, which is closed under the precedence
relation defined above, i.e. if i E T and i ~ i, then i E T. Also, let the
followers of a node i be denoted by F(i) := {i EN: i :5 i}. A node i is
called a leaf if F(i) = {i}. If e = (i,i), then by Be we denote the branch at
i in the direction of i, i.e. the subgraph defined by V(Be) := {i} UF(j) and
E(Be) := {(k, i) E Elk, i E V(Be)}. The set N(Be) := F(j) consists of the
users of the edge e.
In this chapter we study the maintenance problem in the setting of coop-
erative game theory, by associating each maintenance problem with an ap-
propriate cooperative cost game. By a cost game we mean an ordered pair
(N, g) consisting of a finite set N of players and the characteristic function
g : 2N -+ R relating each coalition of players S ~ N to a real number g( S)
that is interpreted as the total cost of serving the collective S. Moreover, it
is assumed that g(0) = 0, i.e. serving nobody can be done at no cost. The
11£ more than one edge is incident with the root, then the cost game can be decomposed
by considering each subtree separately. As shown in Granot and Huberman (1981), the
core and nucleolus for the original cost game can be obtained as the cartesian product of
the cores and nucleoli of for the subgames. This property also holds for the (weighted)
Shapley value, because of the additivity of this solution concept.
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set of all cost games is denoted r, and the restriction to cost games with
player set N is denoted rN. Each maintenance problem g = (G, c,N) is
naturally related to the cost game (N, eg) Er, where the cost eg (S) of each
coalition S is defined as the minimal cost needed to maintain all connections
of the members of S to the root via a connected subgraph of (V,E), Le.
eg(S) = L c(e) for all ø i= S ~ N,
iETs
(2.1)
where Ts = {i EN: 3 i E S with i ~ i}, and eg(Ø) = O. Ts is the smallest
trunk containing S. Since i E Ts is equivalent to S n N(BeJ i= ø, we can
rewrite (2.1) as
cg(S) = L c(ei) for all ø i= S ~ N,
eEE
SnN(Be):f:Ø
i.e., the cost of an edge e should count towards the stand-alone cost of the
coalition S if any of the users of e, the set N(Be), are members of S. Let
(2.2)
the unanimity game (N, us) be given by
us(T) := {l if S ~ T
O otherwise,
for all T ~ N. The dual unanimity game (N, us) is then given by
us(T) = us(N) _ us(N \ T) = {l if S n~ i= ø,
O otherwise,
for all T ~ N. From (2.2) we see that the game (N,eg) can be expressed
(2.3)
(2.4)
using the basis {(N,us)}s~N of dual unanimity games, i.e.,
eg =L c(e)uN(Be)·
eEE
(2.5)
2.3 The core of a maintenance game
In this secction we will present some alternative characterizations of the core
of maintenance games. Given some cost allocation vector X E RN, we define
the overflow over the edge e as the amount that the users of e pay in excess
of the cost of the edges belonging to the branch Be, Le.
Oe(X):= L Xi - L c(J) = L (Xi - q).
iEN(Be) fEE(Be) iEN(Be)
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If e = (i,j), we will sometimes write 0i(x) instead of Oe(x), and it is easily
seen that
0i(X) = L (Xl - Cl) = (Xi - ci) + L Ol(X). (2.6)
lEF(j) lE1r-1 (j)
Characterizations of the core of the game (N, eg) are found in Koster et al.
(1998) and Granot and Maschler (1998). The following proposition summa-
rizes these results and adds a characterization of the core in terms of the
overflows.
Proposition 2.3.1 Let X E RN. Then the following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) X E C(eg).
(ii) x(N) = eg(N), X ~ 0, and x(T) ~ cg(T) for every trunk T.
(iii) x(N) = eg(N), X ~ 0, and Oe(x) ~ ° for all e E E.
(iv) There exist ye E Å(N(Be)) for all e E E, such that
Xi = L Yic(e)
eEE(Pi)
for all i E N.
Proof. These results essentially appear as Propositions 3.1 [(i) ¢:> (ii)], 3.2
[(ii) ¢:> (iii)], and 3.3 [(i) ¢:> (iv)] in Koster et al. (1998). O
Definition 2.3.2 A pseudo subtree of a tree G = (V,E) is a connected
subgraph G' = (V', E') such that there exists an r' E V(G') such that
(i) r' is the minimal element in V(G') with respect to :5,
(ii) there is exactly one node in V(G') that has r' as predecessor.
A pseudo subtree G' = (V', E') of G rooted at r' yields a restricted main-
tenance problem g' = (G', d, N') where d is the restriction of c to E', and
N' = V' \ {r'}. Let T' = (Gl, ... ,GP) be an ordered collection of pseudo
subtrees of G. Then T is said to be a partition of G into pseudo subtrees if
and only if
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(i) for all k = 1, ... ,p, there exists rk E V(Gk) such that Gk is the pseudo
subtree of G rooted at rk,
(ii) (N(GI), ... ,N(GP)) is a partition of N.
Given an allocation vector x, let E(x) := {e E E : Oe(x) > O}. The graph
(V, E(x)) contains p connected subgraphs, where 1 ~ p ~ n. For each of
these subgraphs, 1 ~ k ~ p, we construct a pseudo subtree Gk with player
set N(Gk). Let rk E V\N(Gk) be such that rk E V(Pi) for every i E N(Gk),
and rk = 7r(i) for exactly one i E N(Gk). Let V(Gk) :=N(Gk) U irk} and
E(Gk) := {e = (i,j)li,j E V(Gk)}. Then Gk := (V(Gk),E(Gk)) is a
pseudo subtree rooted at rk, and T(x) := (Gl, ... ,GP) is a partition of G
into pseudo subtrees. We will refer to T(x) as the partition of G induced by
x.
Figure 2.1: The maintenance problem of Example 2.3.3
Example 2.3.3 [Figure 2.1] Consider the maintenance problem g = (G, c,N)
described by Figure 2.1, where the edge weights are given by c(e) := 10 for
all e E E. The allocation x = (4,5, 15, 16) is a core element, and the
corresponding overflows are indicated next to the edges in the figure. By
removing all the edges with zero overflows, we obtain the partition of G into
the pseudo subtrees Gl and G2, where N(GI) = {1,4}, N(G2) = {2,3},
rI = r, and r2 = 1. <I
Let k(i) denote the index of the subtree to which i E N belongs, i.e., i E
N(Gk(i)). Let F(i) := F(i)nV(Gk(i)) be the local followers of i in his subtree
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Gk(i). Similarly, for e E E(Gk), for some subtree 1 :::;k :::;p, let Be be that
part of the branch Be that belongs to Gk, i.e., V(Be) := V(Be) n V(Gk),
N(Be) := N(Be) n N(Gk), and E(Be) := E(Be) n E(Gk). The overflow of
e, when restricted to the subtree c», is denoted Oe(x) := L:iEN(B
e
) (Xi -Ci)·
In an analogous manner, for 1 :::;k :::;p and i E V(Gk), define Pi.
Proposition 2.3.4 Let Y = (Gl, ... ,GP) be a partition of G into pseudo
subtrees, and let gl, ... ,gP be the corresponding induced maintenance prob-
lems.
(i) Then
PIIC(Cglt) ~ C(cg),
k=l
where (N(Gk), Cglt) is the cost game corresponding to the restricted
maintenance problem gk.
(ii) Let x E C(cg), and suppose that Y = (Gl, ... ,GP) :=Y(x). Then
P
X E IIC{Cglt).
k=l
Proof. These results appear as Proposition 3.4 (i) and (ii), respectively, in
Koster et al. (1998). We will give an alternative prove of (ii), thereby using
the core characterization in Proposition 2.3.1(iii).
Let 1 :::;k :::;p. Because x E C(cg) satisfies x(N) = cg(N), and since Y
has been constructed by removing only edges with zero overflows, it is clear
that x(N(Gk)) = cglt{N(Gk)). Also, xN(GIt) ~ Ofollows from x E C(cg) and
Proposition 2.3.1.
We will complete the proof by showing that
for all i E N(Gk), where the inequality follows directly from x E C(cg) and
Proposition 2.3.1(iii). In order to show the equality, note that, by (2.6) and
the construction of Y, Oi (x) = Xi - ei = Di(x) for any i E N (Gk) such that i
is a leaf in c», since imust either be a leaf in G, or we must have Dj(x) =O
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for every j E 7r-l(i). Then, for every i E N(Gk) such that i is not a leaf in
c-, Oi(X) = (Xi -Ci) +~jE7r-l(i)nF(i) Oj(X) = (Xi -Ci)+ ~jE7r-l(i) Gj(X) =
~~. O
2.4 The core and the set of weighted down-home
allocations
A well-known single-valued solution concept for cooperative cost games is
the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). For airport games and maintenance
games there exists a nice expression for the Shapley value (cf. Littlechild
and Thompson (1977), Dubey (1982), and Koster et al. (1998)). Roughly,
the Shapley value of a maintenance game can be obtained through a dynam-
ical process of uniformly distributing the costs of the edges from the root in
the direction of leafs. In this section we will show this procedure and that
by a simple adaptation of this algorithmic approach we obtain the class of
weighted Shapley values (Kalai and Samet (1988)). First we will develop the
dynamical approach that specifies a weighted down-home allocation. Then
afterwards we conclude that it represents no more than a weighted Shapley
value. Monderer et al. (1992) show, for the class of concave games, that the
set of weighted Shapley values equals the core. Here we show, in a construc-
tive way, that each core element of the maintenance game corresponds to a
weighted Shapley value.
Definition 2.4.1 Let g = (G,c,N) be a maintenance problem, and let
B(Q) denote the set of weight systems for g. Then (3 := (7,w) E B(Q) iff
(i) 7= (Gl, ... ,GP) is a partition of G into pseudo subtrees,
(ii) w ~ O,
(iii) w(F(i)) > Ofor all i E N such that Ci > O.
Consider a maintenance problem g = (G,c,N) and some weight system
(3 E B(Q). For each pseudo subtree c», interpret the nodes in N(Gk) as the
homes of the different players and the edges in E(Gk) as the roads to the
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community center (rk). The cost of a road is expressed as the number of
days it takes (for one person) to paint the stripes on the road. The work is
done by the players themselves according to the following rules2:
(i) Every worker keeps painting as long as the road from the community
center to his home has not been completed.
(ii) Every worker does his job on an unfinished segment between the com-
munity center and his home.
(iii) Every worker starts painting at the same moment.
(iv) Every worker i E N paints with velocity Wi.
(v) Each worker paints as close to the community center as the rules (i)-
(iv) permit him to.
We call the resulting allocation the weighted down-home3 allocation, and
denote it 813(g). It is given, for any player i E N, by
(2.7)
Note that worker i only contributes towards the cost of the edges of his own
subtree k(i), i.e., the edges belonging to the path Pi.
Example 2.4.2 [Figure 2.2] Let c(e) := 10 for every e E E. Also, let T:=
(Gl, G2), where N( Gl) := {l,2, 3} and N( G2) := {4}, and W := (1, 1,3, l)T.
For f3:= (T,w) we have 813(g) = (2,4!,23!, 10). Player 1 only contributes
to the cost of edge (r,l), so his total contribution is 10 . g = 2. Player
2 contributes to the cost of edge (r,l) and (1,2), with relative weights of
gand !, respectively, so his total contribution is 10 . io = 4 ~. Player 3
contributes at edge (r,l), (1,2), and (2,3), with relative weights of !, i,
and 1, respectively, hence his total contribution is 10· ~~= 23~. Player 4 is
2These rules are inspired by the painting story presented in Maschler et al. (1995).
3Koster et al. (1998) treat the weighted home-down allocation, which results by replac-
ing "the community center" in (v) by "his home". The resulting allocation is related to
a weighted version of the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989), see,
e.g., Koster (1999) or Hokari (1998).
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the only player in his pseudo subtree, and contributes the entire cost of the
edge that he uses, i.e. 10. <I
CD
I@ CD
V
Ic:
Figure 2.2: The maintenance problem of Example 2.4.2
From Proposition 2.3.1{iv) it follows that each down-home allocation spec-
ifies a core-element. But, as we are about to show, the converse also holds.
For each core element x there is a weight system /3 such that the correspond-
ing down-home allocation 8{3(g) equals æ. We will show how such a weight
system /3 is easily calculated for a given x E C{cg).
Suppose that x is a down-home allocation. First of all the partition of the
player set is derived from the partition of g into pseudo subtrees induced
by x; this can be done by considering the overflows in the tree. Next the
weights for the players are calculated for each separate subproblem. Since
the weights can be calculated for each subtree separately, we can assume
that the partition into pseudo subtrees of g with respect to x has only one
element, or, equivalently, all the overflows are positive except at the edge
that leaves the root. Then our objective is, if at all possible, to find a suitable
vector ofweights w such that for /3 = ({G},w) E B(g) we have 8{3(g) = x.
Without loss of generality we will assume that player 1 is the player directly
connected to the root. The cost of the corresponding edge el is covered
by the collective of players N. First of all, with the interpretation of the
weights as painting speeds, the edge el is painted in
c{et}
w{N) = c{et}
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units of time, if we assume that W is normalized such that w(N) = 1.
Moreover, each of the painting players is finished with el at the same time.
In particular, if player 1 is painting at all (in case Xl > O) then he is also
painting for c(el) units of time. On the other hand he must complete Xl by
himself, at speed WI, so we have the condition
Xl- =c(er),
WI
and thus
Xl
WI = c(el)"
Note that c(er) > O, since Oi(X) > O for all i E 7r-I(l). After having
calculated this first weight, we proceed by consecutively assigning weights
to each of the players in the sets 7r-1(1), 7r-I(7r-I(l)), ... , until even the
leaf players have a weight. Basically we repeat the above type of reasoning.
Consider a player i fl. 7r-1(1). Then, according to æ, his followers F(i)
contribute O;(x) > O to the maintenance cost of the path from the root to
his predecessor, player 7r(i). Recall again the painting story. The speed at
which the collective of players F(i) operates on the path from r to 7r(i) is
given by the aggregate of the weights w(F(i)). Then the time that the group
of players F(i) needs to complete Oi(X) is given by
Oi(X)
w(F(i)) .
Similarly, it holds that the followers of 7r(i), which include the followers of i,
contribute 07r(i)(X) to the path from the root to 7r(7r(i)) plus the full cost of
maintaining the edge (7r( i), 7r(7r( i))). The collective of players F( 7r( i)) paints
at speed w(F(7r(i))), which means that the time that they need to complete
their part of the path from the root to 7r(i) equals
07r(i) (x) + c(e7r(i»)
w(F( 7r( i)))
This expression indicates the time that each of the individuals in F(7r(i))
is working on the path from r to 7r( i), and especially each of the players in
F(i). But then we must have the equality
07r(i) (x) + c( e7r(i»)
w(F(7r(i)))
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This determines an iterative procedure for calculating all the weights w{ F{ i))
for each i E F{l)\{l}, since
w{F{i)) = w{F{7r{i))) O ( ~i{X) ( )
1I'(i) x + c e1l'(i)
for all i EN, and then we can use
Wi = w{F{i)) - L w{F(j))
jE1I'-1(i)
to calculate the individual weight for every i E N.
Example 2.4.3 [Figure 2.3] As in earlier examples the maintenance costs
of the different edges are all lO. Check that x = {5, 13, 12)T is a core
element for eg. The numbers at the edges in Figure 2.3 denote the overflows
corresponding to x. Firstly, observe that the partition T of g into pseudo
subtrees induced by x is trivial. Assume that x is a down-home allocation:
there is a vector of weights W with Wi > O for all i E {l, 2, 3} such that
t5f3 (g) = x for {3 = (T, w) E B{g). Recall the painting story for the weighted
down-home allocation. The players 1,2, and 3 respectively paint at velocities
WI, W2, and W3 at el as long as c{ed = 10 is not completed. Furthermore,
the contribution of player 1 and the overflows O2(x) and 03 (x) determine
the parts of c{ed that are individually covered by the players 1,2 and 3,
respectively. Given the velocities we can compute the time that the players
need to finish these parts in three ways, as
Xl 02{X) 03{X)--,----, or ----o
WI W2 W3
These numbers are equal by the fact that all the players will continue paint-
ing on el until it is finished, which implies that the finishing time of the
collective of players equals the individual finishing times.
Since we are completely informed about the individual contribution of player
1 and the overflows corresponding to each branch emanating from the node
of player 1, we must therefore have
5 3 2
- ,
WI W2 W3
and thus W = {WI, !WI, ~wdT. If W is required to be a vector in the unit
simplex, we get WI = ~and W = (~,l~' 120)T. The reader may verify that
indeed t5f3{g) = x for {3 = ({G},w). <I
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Figure 2.3: The tree of Example 2.4.3
Example 2.4.4 [Figure 2.4] All edges have equal maintenance cost 10.
Consider the core element x = (4,12,12, 12)T of the corresponding 4-player
maintenance game. The over:8owscorresponding to x are the numbers to
the edges.
Figure 2.4: The maintenance problem of Example 2.4.4
The partition into pseudo subtrees by x is trivial. Assume that x is a down-
home allocation, Le. there is a vector w E R4 with all positive coordinates
such that for (3 = ({G},w) we have c5Ø(g) = x. We will see that similar
reasoning as in the Example 2.4.3 leads to conditions that determine w.
Basically, the only difference with the situation in Example 2.4.3 is that it is
not directly clear what are the individual contributions of players 3 and 4 at
el. We are only able to monitor their aggregate efforts by means of 03(X).
The same considerations as in the above example lead to the conclusion
that players 1,2, and the collective of players 3 and 4 respectively finishes
in ~wx, °w2(x) and w03+(x) time units respectively. Since these numbers are all
1 2 3 W4
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equal we have
4 2 4
-=-
WI W2 W3 +W4
Therefore, at this stage we are able to express W2 and W3 +W4 in terms of
WI, i.e. W2 = ~WI,W3 +W4 = WI. If we require w(N) = 1, we get WI = ~.
This means that we only have to consider W3 and W4 since W2 = ~WI = !.
Consider the path from the root to node 3. The players 3 and 4 reach node
3 at the same time. The time they need to complete the path from the
root to node 3 equals the time for finishing el plus the time necessary for
completing e3, i.e.
At this precise moment player 4 has completed exactly 04(X). Using the
velocity of player 4, W4, the time that player 4 must spend equals 04(X), and
W4
thus
04(X) 03(X) + c(e3)
W4 W3+W4
This means that
2 14 = 35,=
W4 W3+W4
from which we see that W4 = i5 and W3 = WI - W4 = ~- i = ~. Thus
(2 1 12 2)TW = 5' 5' 35' 35 • <I
Now we will formalize the above ideas. For any core allocation x, we define
a weight system (3 E B(Q) such that x = c5/3(g). First, find the partition
r = (GI, ... ,GP) of G into pseudo subtrees induced by x. Then a weight
vector W can be found by first, for all i EN, calculating the sums
w(F(i)) = {1_ O;(x} w(F(1r(i)))
07r(i) (x) + Cn-(i)
else,
(2.8)
in a recursive manner, and then the individual weight for a player i E N is
given by
Wi = w(F(i)) - I: w(F(j))
iE7r-1(i)
(2.9)
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Proposition 2.4.5 Let X E C(cg). There exists (3:= (T,w) E B(g) such
that X = 8{3(g), where T = T(x), and w satisfies (2.8) and (2.9).
Proof. First we show the existence part. Observe that T(x) exists and
that if, for some i E N, we have IN(Gk(i))1 = 1, then (2.8) implies Wi = 1.
To prove existence for w, it is therefore sufficient to show that
Oi(X) + Ci > O for all i E N such that IN(Gk(i))1 > 1. (2.10)
Since Ci 2: O for all i E N, and since Oi(X) > O for all i E N such that
7r(i) ::f:. Tk(i), the only possible problem arises if Ci = O for a player i such that
7r(i) = Tk(i)' Suppose that this is the case. Then, since, by the construction
of T, x(N(Gk(i))) = Cgk(i)(N(Gk(i))), we must have Oj(x) = O for all j E
7r-l(i) n F(i), contradicting the fact that T is induced by æ.
(3E B(g): Clearly, T = (Gl, ... ,GP) is a partition of G into pseudo subtrees.
From (2.8), (2.10), and because Oi(X) > O if 7r(i) ::f:. rk(i), it follows that
w(F(i)) > O for all i EN. (2.11)
Also, for any i EN, we have from (2.8) and (2.9) that
- . Oi(X) + Ci - L:jEF(i)\{i} (Xj - Cj) (2.12)= w(j?(~)) _
Oi(X) + Ci
- . L:jEF(i)(Xj - Cj) +Ci - L:jEF(i)\{i}(Xj - Cj)= w(j?(~)) _
Oi(X) + Ci
= w(F(i)) _ Xi 2: O,
Oi(X) + Ci
where the last inequality follows from (2.11) and (2.10), and because Propo-
sition 2.3.1 and X E C(cg) imply X 2: O.
Finally we show that X = 8{3(g). For any i EN it follows from (2.12) that
Oi(X) + Cix· - w· --'-:----,- 'w(F(i)) . (2.13)
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For any j E V(Pi), let
tj := {~j(X} +Cj
w(F(j))
From (2.13) and (2.14) follows
if i = Tk(i),
otherwise.
(2.14)
Xi =Witi =Wi L (tj - t'IT(j))'
jEN(Pi)
(2.15)
Now note that, for any j E N(Pi),
C·
t· - t (') - 'JJ 'ITJ - w(F(j))
IT1f'(j) = Tk(i), then Oj(x) = 0, so (2.16) follows from (2.14). Else
t. -t . _ Oj(x) +Cj _ O'IT(j)(x) +C'IT(j)
J 'IT(J)- w(F(j)) w(F(1f'(j)))
O·(x)+c·-O·(x) c·_ J '3 J _ J
- - - - ,
w(F(j)) w(F(j))
(2.16)
where the second equality follows from (2.8). To complete the proof, we
rewrite (2.15) as
which is exactly (2.7). o
Theorem 2.4.6 The set of all down-home allocations equals the core of a
maintenance game, i.e. {8.8(Q) 1(3 E B(Q)} = C(cg).
Proof. That the weighted down-home allocations form a superset of C(cg)
follows from Proposition 2.4.5. To show the inclusion, suppose (3 E B(g).
The proof is complete by first noting that 8.8(Qk) E C(Cgk) for every k =
1,... ,p by (iv) in Proposition 2.3.1, and from Proposition 2.3.4(i). O
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We will now show that the weighted down-home allocations are related to the
weighted Shapley value, as defined byKalai and Samet (1987). In Monderer
et al. (1992), it is shown in a non-constructive way that the set of weighted
Shapley values equals the core for convex games. In order to define this
generalization of the ordinary Shapley value, we need to make the following
definition.
Definition 2.4.7 Call an S-weight system for the set of players N an
ordered pair f.t := (S, A), where S = (Sl, ... ,Sq) is an ordered partition of
the player set N, and ASt E R!t+ n ~(Sl) for all i = 1, ... ,q. Let M(N) be
the set of all S-weight systems for N.
Let f.t E M(N). Define for each S ~ N, m(S) := min{j : Sj n S =I Ø},
and let S := S n Sm(S). The most important players, Le. those in S, will
carry the entire cost. Then the weighted Shapley value4 corresponding to f.t
is determined as the linear operator~" : rN -+ RN such that for all S ~ N,
{
Ai ·f· S--_- IzE,
~r(US) = A(S)
Ootherwise.
(2.17)
In the unanimity game us, the importance of the players depend on how
they are "ranked", Le. where they are located in the ordered collection S.
In the case of our cost game eg, because of (2.5), we only need to consider
the (dual) unanimity games corresponding to users of edges, Le. the games
uN(Be) for all e E E. If, for some e E E and i E N, we have i E N(Be), we
say that i is a user of e. For some e E E, let
and if i E S(e), we say that i is a senior user of e. If i is a user, but not
a senior one, of e, there must exist some j =I i such that j E S(e), and we
say that i is dominated by j at e. The weighted Shapley value for the dual
unanimity game corresponding to edge e is given by
if i E S(e),
(2.18)
otherwise.
4The ordinary Shapley value is the special case of (2.17) where S = (N), and all players
have equal weights.
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Then, since the weighted Shapley value is additive, and because of (2.5), we
have
cpr(cg) =L cpr(UN(Be))·
eEE
CD S2 CD
............ ~ ..../
<0 Sl 0)}
....~ ..../ ....
CD
Ic:
Figure 2.5: The maintenance problem of Example 2.4.8
Example 2.4.8 [Figure 2.5] Let c(e) := 10 for all e E E. Also, let S :=
({2, 3}, {l, 4, 5}) and x := (i,~,~,h~f,hence J.t = (S,'\) E M(N). The
corresponding weighted Shapley value is cpl'(cg) = (0,15,15,10, lO)T. Player
1 pays nothing, since he is not among the senior users of any edge. Players 2
and 3 dominate all other players at edge (r, 1), and since they both have the
same weight, they both pay 5 here. Only player 2 uses (1,2), so he pays for
this edge alone. Since he does not use any other edge except (r, 1), his total
contribution is 5 + 10 = 15. Player 3 dominates all other players at (1,3),
and since he is not using any other edge except (r, 1), his total contribution
is 5+ 10= 15. Players 4 and 5 are dominated by other players at all edges
that they use, except at the edges e4 and e5, respectively, where they make
up the entire set of senior users, and therefore they contribute 10 each. <I
Theorem 2.4.9
(i) For any {3 E 8(9), there exists J.t E M(N) such that cpl'(cg) = 5/3(9).
(ii) For any J.t EM(N), there exists {3 E 8(9) such that cpl'(cg) = 5/3(9).
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Proof. (i) Let {3 = (7,w) E B(g) for some maintenance problem g. Note
that the elements of 7 = (Gl, ... ,GP) can be ordered arbitrarily without
affecting d13(g), and we choose an ordering such that k(i) < kU) ~ j fl.
N(Pi) for any pair i,j E N. Let, for every k = 1, ... ,p, Sk := {i E
N(Gk) I Wi > O} and Sp+k := {i E N(Gk) I Wi = O}. The ordered collection
(Sl, ... .s; SP+1, ,S2p) contains q nonempty elements, where p ~ q ~ 2p,
and let S := (Sl, ,Sq) be the ordered collection obtained by deleting the
emptyelements. Also, for every i EN, let
{
W(~: i) if Wi > O,
Ai := 1 ()
ISt(i)I otherwise,
where l(i) = l if and only if i E St. It is easily seen that I-' := (S,A) E M(N).
(2.19)
For any i E N, we have
~r(cg) = L A(:;e)) c(e) = L_ A(:;e)) c(e)
eEE eEE(P,)
S(e)3i S(e)3i
_ Wi _ Wi _13- L (S()) c(e) - L - c(e) - di (g).
_ W e _ w(N(Be))eEE(P,) eEE(P,)
S(e)3i
The first equality follows from (2.5), the additivity of the weighted Shapley
value, and (2.18). The second equality follows from the fact that we can
have i E S(e) only if e E E(Pi). Suppose, on the contrary, that i E S(e)
for some e E E \ E(P;). Since we can have i E S(e) only if i is a user of
e, we must have e E E(~), i.e., e is on the path between i and the global
root r, but does not belong to the local subtree to which i belongs. Then,
by the construction of S, we must have N(Be) n Sj i- ø for some j < l(i),
implying i fl. S(e), a contradiction. In order to prove the third equality, it
is sufficient to show that if i E S(e) for some i E N and e E E(P;) such
that c(e) > O,then Ai = w(.;'i(,)), and hence A(S(e)) = ::f~}~H.Suppose that
this is not true. Then Wi = Oby (2.19), and {3 E B(g) implies that there
exists some j E N(Be) such that Wj > O. Then, by the construction of S,
i fl. S(e), a contradiction. The fourth equality follows because, for any e E E
and i E N, i E N(Be) \ S(e) implies Wi =O (by the construction of S), and
hence w(N(Be)) = w(S(e)). The last equality follows from (2.7).
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(ii) Let Il- = (S,A) EM(N) for some maintenance problem g. We construct
T, i.e., a partition of G into pseudo subtrees, by applying Algorithm 2.4.10.
Algorithm 2.4.10
Initialization
Let S:n := Sm for every m = 1, ... ,q, W := A, and i := 1.
Main step
Repeat
For i E Sl do
For j E N(Pi) do
If iU) > i( i) then
St(i) := St(i) U {j}
Stu) := SlW \ {i}
Wj :=0
i:= i+ 1
until i> q
The algorithm will give as output the ordered set of coalitions S~,... ,S~.
Suppose that this ordered set has ri nonempty members. Delete the empty
members, and for every 1 ~ i ~ q', let GL... ,Gf
l
be the collection of
pseudo subtrees corresponding to maximal connected, with respect to G,
components of Sl. Clearly, the ordered set
is a partition of G into pseudo subtrees. Let p be the number of members
of this partition, re-index, and set T:= (Gl, ... ,GP). Since A ~ O,we have
W ~ o. Then it follows that /3 := (T, w) E B(g) since, for any i EN, Wi = O
implies, by Algorithm 2.4.10, that there exists some j E F(i) \ {i} such that
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Wj > O. Now, for every i E N,
t5f(Q) = L c(e) Wi_ = L c(e) A(; ))_ w(N(Be)) _ eeEE(Pi) eEE(Pi)
S(e)3i
~ ~ ~ Ai
= L- c(e) A(S(e)) = L- c(e) A(S(e)) = øf(cg).
eEE(Pi) eEE
S(e)3i S(e)3i
The first equality follows from (2.7), and the second equality follows from
the fact that Wi = O if i Ft S(e) for some e E E(Pi), and since w(N(Be)) =
A(S(e)) for everyeE E. To see that the latter equality is correct, con-
sider some e E E. After applying Algorithm 2.4.10, the nodes in N(Pj) n
N(Be) will be included in Siw for every j E S(e). Hence the node set
UjES(e)(N(Pj) n N(Be)) will be connected, with respect to G, and we must
therefore have S(e) ~ N(Be). Also, j E N(Be) \ S(e) implies Wj = O, and
j E S( e) implies Wj = Aj, hence we obtain the desired result.
(2.20)
The third equality in (2.20) follows because e E E(Pi) \ E(Pi) implies, from
Algorithm 2.4.10, that N(Be) n Sj f= ø for same j < l(i), i.e., i is dominated
by the members of Sj, hence i Ft S(e).
The fourth equality in (2.20) follows because e E E \ E(Pi) implies that i is
not a user of e, hence i Ft S(e), and the last equality follows from (2.5), the
additivity of the weighted Shapley value, and (2.18). O
Example 2.4.11 [Figure 2.2] Consider the maintenance problem in Exam-
ple 2.4.2, and the weight system {3 = (T, w) E B(Q), whereT = (Gl, G2) and
W = (1,1,3, l)T. Here, the corresponding J.L = (S, A) E M(N) is uniquely
given by S := ({l, 2, 3}, {4}) and A= (!,!,~,1f. <I
Example 2.4.12 [Figure 2.5] Consider the maintenance game in Example
2.4.8, and the weight system J.L = (S,A) E M(N), where S = ({2, 3},
{1,4,5}) and A= U,~,~,h~f.By applying Algorithm 2.4.10, we obtain
the partition S' = ({1,2,3},{4,5}) of the player set, and the weight vector
W = (O, ~, ~,i,~f.Note that player 1 has been absorbed by the partition
member containing 2 and 3, since 1 is dominated by these two players, and
that, accordingly, his weight is now zero. By taking maximal connected
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subsets of each partition member, we obtain a partition of G into pseudo
subtrees, equal to T = (Gl, G2, G3), where N(GI) = {l, 2, 3}, N(G2) = {4},
and N(G3) = {5}. <I
We now know, from Theorem 2.4.9, that our weighted down-home alloca-
tions are equivalent to weighted Shapley values, and, from Theorem 2.4.6,
that the set of weighted down-home allocations equals the core, hence the
following result.
Corollary 2.4.13 The core of the maintenance game (N, eg) equals the set
of weighted Shapley values, i.e. {~" (eg) I J.t EM (Nn =c(eg).
Monderer et al. (1992) show a more general result, that the set of all weighted
Shapley values equals the core of any concave cost game. However, in prov-
ing this they needed a fixed point theorem.
2.5 The core and the set of weighted neighbour-
home allocations
In the case of the weighted down-home allocation, the players have an obli-
gation to help their neighbours (predecessors), since they are required to
start working from the community center towards their own home. A less
extreme social obligation results by applying rules (i)-(iv) in Section 2.4,
as well as (v) and (vi) below. The resulting allocation will be called the
neighbour-home allocation.
(v) If, for any worker i E N, the road between Tk(i) and 7r(i) has not been
finished yet, then i is working outside his own edge ei.
(vi) Each worker paints as close to his home as the rules (i)-(v) permit him
to.
The algorithm in Maschler et al. (1995) returns a special case of the weighted
neighbour-home allocation, the nucleolus, where T' = {G} and Wi = I~I for
all i EN. We will show, analogous to the treatment in Section 2.4 for the
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weighted down-home allocation, that the set of weighted neighbour-home
allocations equals the core, when the weight systems vary over the set B(g).
In order to do this, we need to present the scheme implied by rules (i)-(v) in a
more formal manner, and this is done in Algorithm 2.5.1. Let /3 = (T,w) E
B(g), where T = (Gl, ... ,GP). The neighbour-home allocation, denoted
rl(g), is obtained by, for each of the restricted maintenance problems gk,
1 ~ k ~ p, applying Algorithm 2.5.1 to the restricted maintenance problem
gk.
Let x(e,q) E [O,c(e)] be the part of the cost of edge e E E(Gk) which is paid
before stage q. Let Eq ~ E( Gk) be the subset of edges whose cost is covered
at stage q, and let E(q) := Uj<qEj. Let e(i, q) be the edge to which player
i is contributing in stage q, and let S(e,q) := {i E N(Gk) I e(i,q) = e} be
the set of players contributing to edge e in stage q. Let Q(i) denote the first
stage in which i stops contributing.
Algorithm 2.5.1
STEPO
q:= 1
x(e, l) := Ofor all e E E(Gk)
E(l) := ø
(. 1)'- {e7r(i) if7r(i) i-rke z, .-
ei otherwise
STEP 1
For any e E E(Gk) \ E(q) such that S(e, q) i- ø, it would take
t( ).= c(e) - x(e, q)e,q. w(S(e,q))
units of time to finish paying for edge e. Thus, the first edge will be
finished after t(q) := min{t(e,q) leE E{Gk) \E(q) and S(e,q) i- Ø}
units of time. Then w(S(e, q))t(q) is the fraction of an edge e E E(Gk)\
E(q) which is constructed at stage q, and therefore x(e, q + 1) :=
x(e, q) + w(S(e, q))t(q). Let Eq := {e E E(Gk) \ E(q) I t(e, q) = t(q)}
be the subset of edges finished at stage q, and let E(q+ 1) := E(q) UEq
be the subset of edges finished before stage q + 1. Consider every
i E S( e, q) for everyeE Eq• If there exists an unfinished edge between
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e = e(i,q) and the root, i.e. f ~ e such that f E E(Gk) \ E(q + 1),
then choose such an f as close to e as possible, and set e( i, q+1) := f.
If such an edge does not exist, and if i's own edge is not finished, i.e.
ei E E(Gk) \ E(q + 1), set e(i,q + 1) := ei. Otherwise, set Q(i) := q
and "f(Q) :=L~l1t(q)Wi.
STEP 2
If E(q + 1) = E(Gk), terminate. Otherwise, set q :=q + 1, and repeat
step 1.
We will first demonstrate the algorithm by an example.
CD
I
@ 0
V
Ic:
Figure 2.6: The maintenance problem of Example 2.5.2
Example 2.5.2 [Figure 2.6] This example is identical to Example 2.4.2,
where {3 = ((GI, G2), (1, 1, 3, 1)), N(GI) = {l, 2, 3}, and N(G2) = {4}, and
we have rl(Q) = (4,4,22, lO)T. Player 4 is alone in his pseudo subtree G2,
so he will contribute the entire cost of the edge (1,4), i.e. 10. For pseudo
subtree Gl we apply Algorithm 2.5.1. Initially, e(l,l) = e(2,1) = (r,l)
and e(3, l) = (1,2). The first edge is finished after t(l) = mine~, ~O}=
l~ = t((l, 2),1) units of time, and the set of edges finished in the first stage
is El = {(1,2)}. Now e(3,2) = (r,l) and S((r, 1),2) = {l, 2, 3}, i.e. all
three players will be contributing to edge (r,l) in the second stage. Then
10- !Q.'(1+I) 2t(2) = t((r, 1),2) = 35 = 3' and E2 = {(r, l)}. Players 1 and 2 stop
contributing after the second stage, i.e. Q(l) = Q(2) = 2, and they each
contribute, in total, 1· e~+n = 4. Player 3 now starts contributing to
his own edge, i.e. e(3,3) = (2,3). He will finish this edge in t(3) = ~ units
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of time, and then stop contributing (Q(3) = 3). His total contribution is
3· (13° + i+ 13°) = 22. Since all the edges have been finished after stage 3,
the algorithm terminates. <l
Now we turn to the following question: Given a core element y, can we find a
weight system {j = (T, w) E B(g) such that y = rl(g)? It turns out that the
answer is yes, and proposition 2.3.4(ii) suggests that we choose T:= T(x).
We will now illustrate, using two examples, how the weight vector w can be
found.
Figure 2.7: The tree of Example 2.5.3
Example 2.5.3 [Figure 2.7] This example is identical to Example 2.4.4, and
the allocation y = (4,12,12, 12)T is a core element, since all the overflows, as
shown in the figure, are non-negative. The partition T(y) is trivial, since the
only edge with zero overflow is (r, 1). First, note that edge el will be finished
after ;1 units of time. Moreover, players 2 and 3 will be contributing at
this edge until it is finished, and will return home (to finish their own edges)
exactly when this is the case. In order to calculate how long 2 and 3 will
be contributing at edge el, we need to find their jar-away contributions, Le.
how much they contribute at edges other than their own. We will do this
by first finding their home contributions, Le. how much they contribute at
their own edges. Player 2's home contribution is obviously given by the cost
of his own edge, Le. 10, since he has no followers other than himself. Thus
his far-away contribution, Le. the amount that he will contribute at edge
el, is 12 - 10= 2. For player 3 the picture is more complicated, since he has
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a follower, player 4. Rule (vi) implies that if 4 contributes anything above
the cost of his own edge, this contribution will first be used to finish edge e3.
This is indeed the case, since player 4 contributes 12 - 10=2 in excess of the
cost of his own edge. The home contribution of player 3 will thus be only
10 - 2 = 8. Since he contributes 12 in total, his far-away contribution will
be 12 - 8 = 4. To sum up, we know now that players 1, 2, and 3 contributes
4, 2, and 4, respectively, at edge el. This implies
4 2 4
(2.21)-=-=-
Player 4 will be contributing at e3 until this edge is finished. His contribution
at this edge is 2, as we stated above. Player 3 will stop contributing at all
exactly when his own edge is finished, at which point he will have contributed
12. This implies
12 2
= (2.22)
A weight vector that satisfies both (2.21) and (2.22) is W := (4,2,4, !)T. <I
To formalize the notions of home and far-away contributions, let y = ",/3 (g)
for same weight system f3 E B(g), and let i E N(Gk), 1 ~ k ~ p. Note
that the contribution of the players in F(i) \ {i} at or below ei will be given
by what they contribute in excess of the cost of their own edges, Le. by
~jEF(i)\{i}(Yj-Cj). Because ofrule (vi), this excess contribution will first be
used at edge ei. Player iwill cover the remainingpart Ci- EjEF(i)\{i} (Yj-Cj)
of the cost of his own edge, if this expression is positive. Hence, player i's
home contribution is given by
hi(Y):= (c; - .L (y; -c) (~ L o.(y)\
jEF(i)\{i} )+ - - jE1I"-1(i)nF(i) 3 )+
and his far-away contribution is h{Y) := Yi - hi(Y). Next we will consider
an example where some players contribute nothing, which makes finding the
weight vector slightly more complicated.
Example 2.5.4 [Figure 2.8] A core element is given by y = (O,12, 16,O,16, 16)T.
We set the weights of players that does not make any contribution, to zero,
Le. WI := W4 := O. Player 2 has no followers other than himself, he will
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Figure 2.8: The maintenance problem of Example 2.5.4
have to contribute to the entire cost of his own edge e2, Le. ba (y) = 10. The
remaining 12 - 10 = 2 (= f2 (y)) that he contributes, will be towards the
cost of edge el. Player 3 will also contribute at this edge, but how much?
The answer can be found by noting that the followers of 3 (except himself),
Le. players 4, 5 and 6, contribute O+ 16 + 16 = 32, while the total cost of
their own edges is only 30. Hence we have h3{y) = 10 - (32 - 30) = 8 and
h{Y) = 16 - 8 = 8. Players 2 and 3 will return home at exactly the same
time, Le. when edge el is finished. This will happen after
f2{y)
=
2 fa{y)
-
8
(2.23)
units of time. Note that the weights of players 2 and 3 are not related to
the weight of the player in front of them, as was the ease in the Example
2.5.3.
We have h5{y) = h6{y) = 10, since neither player 5 nor player 6 have
followers other than themselves, and therefore f5{Y) = f6{Y) = 16 -10 = 6.
Because of rule (v), they cannot return home until the players in front of
them have all finished. The last such player to finish will be the closest one
that makes a positive contribution, Le. player 3, who finishes after li units
W3
of time. Our weight vector must therefore satisfy
6 6 16
(2.24)
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A weight vector that assigns weight zero to players that does not con-
tribute anything, as well as satisfies (2.23) and (2.24), is given by W -
(0,4,16,0,6,6)T. 4
For any i E N(Gk), let 7r+(i) be the first predecessor of i in Gk such that
Yi > O. If no such predecessor exists, let 7r+(i) := rk. Also, let N+(Gk) :=
{i E N(Gk) I Yi > O}. Note that if i E N(Gk) is such that 7r(i) =1= rk
and Oi (y) > 0, then he will contribute a nonzero amount to the cost of
the edges in E(P7r+(i»)' and will return home exactly when all the edges in
E(Pi) \ {ei} have been finished. Since f~~) is the total time that player i
spends contributing to edges other than his own, we have
Also, if a player contributes to the cost of the edges of his predecessors,
he will return home exactly when the last one of his predecessors stops
contributing, i.e.,
li (y) Y7r+(i)
=
Wi W7r+(i)
(2.26)
Let, for k = 1, ... ,p, Bk(x) := {i E N(Gk) : 7r+(i) = rk}, i.e., the set of
players who have no contributing players between themselves and the root.
Proposition 2.5.5 Let x E C(cg). Then there exists f3 := (T, w) E 8(9)
such that T = T(x), and W satisfies, for every k = 1, ... ,p,
(2.27)
Wi W·J
li (x) X7r+(i)
Wi W7r+(i)
Wi =0
Vi E N+(Gk) \ Bk(x),
Vi E N(Gk) \ N+(Gk).
(2.28)
(2.29)
Moreover, x = rl(Q).
Proof.
Claim 1: Existence.
Clearly, T(x) exists. Let 1 s k ~ p. In order to show that (2.27)-(2.29)
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have a solution, note that, for every i E N(Gk),
!i(X) = Xi - hi(X) = Xi - (Ci - _L (Xi - Ci)}
iEF(i)\{i} +
= Xi - (Ci + Xi - Ci - 4= (Xi - Ci))
iEF(i) +
= Xi - (Xi - Oi(X)) +
The construction of T implies, for every i E N(Gk), that Oi(X) > O if
7r(i) =1= rk, hence
(2.30)
A solution can be found by arbitrarily fixing Wi. > Ofor some i* E N+ (Gk) n
Bk(x). Note that, since the subtree Gk has exactly one node adjacent to
the root, 7r(i*) = rk implies IN+(Gk) n Bk(x)1 = 1, in which case (2.27)
places no further restrictions on the weight vector. If IN+(Gk)nBk(x)1 > 1,
we use (2.27) to determine wi for every j E N+(Gk) nBk(x) \ {i*}. For
the players in N+(Gk) \ Bk(x), we determine the weights from (2.28) in a
recursive manner.
In the rest of the proof we will use the following result. Let y := rl(Q).
Then, for i E N{Gk) and 1 ~ k ~ p,
Xi > O¢:> Wi > O¢:> Yi > O Vi EN, (2.31)
where the first equivalence follows from (2.30) and the construction of W
described above. Since y is a result of Algorithm 2.5.1, where only players
with positive weights have to pay anything, we have Yi > O => Wi > O.
Finally, Wi > Oimplies Xi > O,and from X E C(cg) and Proposition 2.3.1{iv),
there must exist some edge e E E{Pi) such that c{e) > O. Then, since y has
been constructed using Algorithm 2.5.1, we have Wi > O=> Yi > O.
Claim 2: f3 E B(Q).
Clearly, T = T{x) is a partition of G into pseudo subtrees. Also, X ~
O, together with (2.31), imply W ~ O. Let Ci > O for same i E N(Gk),
1 ~ k ~ p. Since XN(Gk) E C(Cgk) by Proposition 2.3.4{ii), we must have
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Oi(X) = ~iEfr(i)(Xi - ci) ~ Oby Proposition 2.3.1(iii). Since xi ~ Oand
ci ~ Ofor all j E F(i), there must exist some i E F(i) such that Xl > O,and
Wi > Othen follows from (2.31).
Claim 3: X = 1]f3(Q).
We have
(2.32)
for 1 ~ k ~ p, where the first equality follows from Algorithm 2.5.1 and
(3 E B(g), and the second from X E C(cg) and Proposition 2.3.4(ii). If
N(Gk) = {i} for some i E N, then Xi = Yi follows directly, so we will
assume in the following that IN(Gk)1 > 1. Suppose, contrary to our claim,
that xN(G") =1= yN(G"). By (2.32), there must exist i,j E N(Gk) such that
Xi < Yi and Xj > Yj'
Consider node i. We will first show that
'Vi E F(i). (2.33)
To prove (2.33), first note that Xl = O¢:} Yl = Ofollows from (2.31). Next,
note that W satisfies (2.27)-(2.29) with respect to x, by definition, and with
respect to y, since (2.27)-(2.29) follows from Algorithm 2.5.1. Also, because
of (2.31), we have Bk(x) = Bk(y), and the definitions of 11"+(.)and N+(Gk)
are unambiguous. Then (2.28) implies that Im(x) < Im(Y) for every m E
(1I"+)-1(i), so there must exist some i E F(i) \ {i} such that Xl < Yl. The
argument can be repeated for i = i, and by continuing in this manner, we
will eventually have shown that there is a leaf i E F(i) such that Xl < Yl.
Now we will show that Xl ~ Yl for every leaf i E F(i). Suppose, on the
contrary, that this was not true, i.e., there exists a leaf m E F( i) such that
Xm > Ym. Then it must be possible to find two branches Bpq and Bps, both
rooted at p E F(i), such that m E N(Bpq) and Xt ~ Yt for all t E N(Bpq),
and such that Xt ~ Yt for all t E N(Bps). In order to see that this yields a
contradiction, note that (2.28) and Xm > Ym implies
and that
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Now, since every l E F(i) such that l is a leaf of Gk satisfies Xl ~ Yl,
we can use (2.28) in a recursive manner to prove (2.33). Then Xi < Yi and
(2.33) together imply fi(x) < h(Y), which, by (2.28), implies X7I'+(i) < Y7I'+(i)·
Setting i := 7r+(i), we can successively repeat this argument until we have
i E N+(Gk) n Bk(x).
We have thus shown that there exists i E N+(Gk)nBk(x) such that Xi < Yi.
Using the same line of argument for node j, we can show that there exists
j E N+(Gk) nBk(x) such that Xj > Yj. If IN+(Gk) nBk(x)1 = 1, this is in
itself a contradiction, otherwise the contradiction follows from (2.27). O
In the same way that Proposition 2.4.5 enabled us to prove Theorem 2.4.6,
Proposition 2.5.5 enables us to prove that the set of neighbour-home alloca-
tions equals the core.
Theorem 2.5.6 For any maintenance problem Q the set of all neighbour-
home allocations equals C(cg), i.e. {rl(Q) I f3 E B(Q)} = C(cg).
2.6 Conclusion
We have shown that every core point can be obtained from weighted ver-
sions of the painting stories of Maschler et al. (1995), and we have given
explicit formulas for computing the corresponding weights. The alternative
description of the core provided by our results may be useful when choosing
between different core points.
The weighted down-home allocation rule corresponds to the weighted Shap-
ley value. We also know, from Maschler et al. (1995), that 11(T,w)(Q) is equal
to the nucleolus of Cg if we set T = {G} and Wi = Wr for all i EN. In
Yanovskaya (1992) , the weighted nucleolus is defined by replacing the or-
dinary excess function by a weighted excess function, and it is shown that
every point in the relative interior of the core can be obtained as a weighted
nucleolus. For the game (N,g), and some pre-imputation x, this weighted
excess function is given by, for any S =1= N, ø, €P(S,x) := ps(g(S) - x(S)),
where Ps > O. Let f3 := ((Gl, ... ,GP), W) E B(Q) for same maintenance
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problem g, and let k = 1, ... ,p. Suppose we set Ps := f{WN(GIc)) for all
S C N{ Gk) such that S f. ø, where f : RN(GIc) --7 R. An interesting open
problem is whether we can pick the function f such that r,t3{g), when re-
stricted to the members of N{Gk), is the weighted nucleolus of the game
Chapter 3
Bankruptcy and Flow
Sharing Problems
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to link two classical problems, namely, the
bankruptcy problem and the flow sharing problem. The former problem con-
cerns the allocation of an estate among several claimants, where the total
amount of the claims exceeds the value of the estate, whereas the latter deals
with the allocation of a network flow among the terminal (claimant) nodes
of a capacitated network. The situations motivating both problems! can
be characterized as emergency situations, arising in connection with, e.g.,
corporate bankruptcies, deaths, strikes or famines. In order to avoid damag-
ing conflicts in such situations, allocation rules, satisfying the participants'
notions of fairness, should be specified in advance.
In the literature on bankruptcy problems, many different allocation rules
have been suggested, some of which will be presented in the next section,
and the focus has been on characterizing these rules, such as in Aumann
and Maschler (1985), Dagan (1996), Dagan et al. (1997), Dagan and Volij
(1997), Herrero et al. (1999), Hokari and Thomson (2000), and Chun (1999).
The literature on the flow sharing problem, on the other hand, has focused
entirely on egalitarian solutions, and the challenge there has been how to
lSee O'Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985), and Brown (1979).
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compute the solutions. The papers on flow sharing differs slightly with
respect to what is meant by an egalitarian solution. In Megiddo (1974)
and Megiddo (1977), as well as in Fujishige (1980), an egalitarian solution is
found by maximizing, in a lexicographically manner, the vector consisting of
the (weighted) amounts received by the terminal nodes. Brown (1979) uses
a maximin formulation, while Ichimori et al. (1982) study the problem of
simultaneously maximizing the smallest (weighted) amount and minimizing
the largest amount received.
In this chapter, we will exploit the similarities between the two problems,
and show how the theory on one of them can be used in connection with the
other. First, flow sharing problems contribute to the theory on bankruptcy
problems in that a generalized bankruptcy problem, i.e., with more than one
estate, can be modeled as a flow sharing problem where edge capacities rep-
resent the size of claims. Second, the theory on bankruptcy problems will
be used to develop solutions to the flow sharing problems. We do this by
forming, in a natural way, a reduced flow sharing problem for every pair
of claimant nodes (Section 3.4). The reduced problems can be interpreted
as bankruptcy problems, and by assuming that every pair of claimants be-
lieve in some specific notion of fairness, as represented by an allocation rule
for their two-person bankruptcy problem, a unique solution to the n-person
flow sharing problem results. In the same manner as has been done for
bankruptcy problems+, we will also formulate a flow sharing game in the
form of a cooperative TV-game, and show that the unique solutions ob-
tained for the flow sharing problem correspond to important game-theoretic
solution concepts.
In Section 3.2 we give a formal introduction to bankruptcy problems involv-
ing a single estate, including some of the solutions that have been suggested.
Then, in Section 3.3, we introduce flowsharing problems, and show how they
are related to generalized bankruptcy situations. In Section 3.4 we formulate
reduced two-person flow sharing problems, and develop two unique consis-
tent solutions to the n-person problem by applying solution concepts from
Section 3.2. Then, in Section 3.5, we introduce the flow sharing game, and
show that important solution concepts for this game coincides with the so-
2Aumann and Maschler (1985).
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lution concepts of Section 3.4. In Section 3.6 we present transfer schemes
that converge to the solutions presented previously. Finally, in Section 3.7,
we generalize one of the solutions from Section 3.4 by introducing weights
for the claimant nodes.
3.2 Bankruptcy situations with one estate
In the bankruptcy problem, an estate with value E is to be divided among
n individuals with claims given by the vector d = (d1,d2, ••• ,lin). An
allocation for the bankruptcy problem (E, d) is given by a vector X E R"
such that O~ Xi ~ di for every i E N, where N := {l, ... ,n}. We shall say
that an allocation X is feasible if, in addition, LiEN Xi = E.
Numerous solutions to this problem have been put forward. In practice
the proportional rule, whereby the estate is divided among the claimants in
proportion to their claims, is commonly used. The constrained equal award
rule tries to give equal amounts to all claimants, subject to the constraint
that no individual should get more than his claim. Mathematically, the
amount allocated to claimant i is
CE~(E,d):= min{~,A},
where A is chosen such that the allocation is feasible. The constrained
equal award rule focuses on the amounts that the claimants are awarded.
In some cases, e.g., if the estate is nearly large enough to cover all claims,
the claimants may be more concerned with losses, i.e., the part of their
claims that are not covered. In such at situation, it may be sensible to
equalize losses instead of awards. The constrained equal loss rule does this,
by allocating to claimant i the amount
CELj(E,d) :=max{O,~ - A},
where A is chosen such that the allocation is feasible. A hybrid between
the constrained equal award rule and the constrained equal loss rule is the
Talmud rule3, where awards are considered when the estate is smaller than
3Aumann and Maschler (1985) attributes this rule to Rabbi Nathan, the author of
a particular passage of the Talmud, a 2000-yea.r old document that forms the basis for
Jewish civil, criminal, and religious law.
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one-half the total size of the claims, and losses are considered otherwise.
Mathematically, the Talmud rule is given by
if E s Ldi/2,
otherwise,
where>. is chosen such that feasibility is obtained.
Aumann and Maschler (1985) develop several interesting characterizations
of the Talmud ru1e. One of them has to do with the contested garment
principle, which is an allocation rule defined only for bankruptcy problems
with two claimants. In order to explain this principle, let (E, (dt,d2)) be a
bankruptcy problem with two claimants. According to the contested gar-
ment principle, claimant i shou1d concede
i.e., the part of the estate not claimed by himself, to j. If this applies to
both claimants, then the disputed (remaining) amount will be
which shou1d be divided equally among the two claimants. Hence, the
amount to be received by i will be
In the n-claimant case, the contested garment principle cannot be directly
applied. However, if X is a feasible allocation, we may apply the princi-
ple to the two-claimant problem (Xi + Xi, (di, di)) formed by picking two
distinct individuals i and [, Aumann and Maschler (1985) show that every
bankruptcy problem has a unique solution X such that (Xi, Xi) is the solution
to every two-claimant problem (Xi + Xi, (di, di)). This solution, called the
contested garment consistent solution, turns out to be exactly the Talmud
rule.
In Aumann and Maschler (1985), a cooperative game with transferable util-
ity is formulated, where
VE,d(S) := (E - d(N \ S))+
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is the value of coalition S ~ N. This value represents a pessimistic view
of how much the members of S could get, since the members of N \ S are
allowed to take as much as they want. Aumann and Maschler (1985) show
that the nucleolus of the bankruptcy game VE,d is precisely the Talmud rule
for the bankruptcy problem (E, d). The method of "recursive completion"
in O'Neill (1982) is the Shapley value of this game, and Curiel et al. (1987)
show that the r-value of this game coincides with an adjusted version of the
proportional rule.
3.3 Flow sharing problems and bankruptcy situa-
tions with more than one estate
The situation modeled by the bankruptcy problem of the previous section
is similar to those motivating the flow sharing problem of Brown (1979),
who studies the problem of allocating the (maximal) flow of a capacitated
network among its sink nodes. One of the real-world examples mentioned
by Brown concerns the transportation of coal from a set of coal mines to
a set of power producers. During a coal strike, only non-union mines will
be producing, and the limited production capacity of these mines must be
shared by the users of coal, i.e., the power companies. Each power company
"claims" an amount of coal equal to the amount used during normal (no
strike) times. The solution studied by Brown (1979) is one where the small-
est (weighted) amount of coal is maximized, subject to the capacities of the
coal mines and the transportation network. Another example is the distri-
bution of food during a famine, where the food supplies has to go through
a transportation network with limited capacities.
Both in the bankruptcy situation, and the situations underlying the :Bow
sharing problem, a limited amount of some resource has to be allocated
among a set of agents in an emergency situation, according to some pre-
specified rule. In the following, we will use a network approach similar to
that of Brown (1979) in order to model bankruptcy situations with more
than one estate. In the rest of this section, we will describe the :Bowshar-
ing problem formally. In order to stress the similarities with bankruptcy
problems, we shall show how the flow sharing model can be used to describe
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a bankruptcy situation with more than one estate. However, the model
can of course be used in connection with other situations where the tlmited
availability of a resource can be represented by a capacitated network."
In a bankruptcy situation with more than one estate, there may be several
types of interdependencies among estates:
(i) A creditor may have claims on several estates.
(ii) The estates may have claims on each other.
In order to model such interdependencies, we will use a network model. Let
the set of estates be given by M := {I, ... ,m}, and the set of claimants by
N := {I, . .. ,n}. The sets M and N will correspond to intermediate (estate)
nodes and sink (claimant) nodes, respectively, in our network model.I' The
entire set of nodes V := {s} UM UN also contains the artificial source node
s. The nodes are connected by a set of edges A ~ V xV. A directed edge
(i,j) is an ordered pair, and it has a finite capacity kij. In the network
model corresponding to a bankruptcy situation, an edge (i,j) may belong
to one of the following types:
(i) i = sand j E M, in which case (i,j) represents those assets of estate
j that are not claims on estates in M \ {i}. In order to make things
simple, we shall refer to such assets as cash, although in practice they
can take many forms. The value of these assets will be determined
exogenously, and is given by the edge capacity kij.
(ii) i E M and j E N, in which case ~j is the value of j's claim on estate
(iii) i E M and j EM, in which case kij is the value of estate j's claim on
estate i.
4The assumption of transferable utility, i.e., that a unit of the disputed resource has the
same value to every agent, limits the applicability of the model, especially if the disputed
resource is a physical one, such as in the examples mentioned by Brown (1979).
IIIn order to distinguish between estate nodes and claimant nodes in figures, we shall
denote the node of estate j by ei.
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Example 3.3.1 [Figure 3.1] In order to illustrate the above concepts, we
present the example with 2 estates and 3 claimants shown below. Estate 1
contains cash worth 40, while the cash amount in estate 2 is 60. In addition
to cash, estate 2 consists of a claim of 60 on estate 1. Consider a solution
Figure 3.1: Example 3.3.1
based on the proportional rule. Estate 1 would then be split according to
the vector
40· (1/5,1/5,3/5) = (8,8,24),
where the claim of estate 2 is awarded 24. The value to be shared by 2 and
3 in estate 2 would then be 84 (= 60 + 24), giving the allocation
84· (3/4,1/4) = (63,21)
The total amounts awarded to the three claimants is
(8,71,21)
In Figure 3.1(a), the divisions of the two estates are illustrated as flows
(numbers in parentheses) over the edges. <I
From Example 3.3.1 we see that an allocation of the bankruptcy situation
can be interpreted as a network flow. Mathematically, a flow is a function
f : A ~ R, where Iii is the flow from node i to node j. In order to deal
with network flows, we need to introduce a few concepts concerned with
networks. If P and Q are subsets of the set V of network nodes, let
(P,Q):= {(P,q) EA:p E P and q E Q},
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i.e., the set of edges going from P to Q. The case (P, V \ P) is of special
interest, and is called a cut. For a network How f, let the How from P to Q
be denoted by
f{P,Q):= L fpq,
(P,q)E(P,Q)
and the capacity k{P, Q) can be defined in an analogous manner.
The net Howinto a node i E V is given by
net(f,i):= f{V,{i}) - f{{i}, V).
In order for a How f to be feasible, it should satisfy
{
sO ifi = s,
net(f, i) ~ O ~ ~E N,
= O If, E M.
(3.1)
Le., the direction of the net How should be out of the sink node and into
the source (claimant) nodes. For the intermediate (estate) nodes, outflow
should balance inflow exactly. Moreover, the How should be nonnegative
(i.e., the How should not go backwards), and should not violate the edge
capacities, i.e.,
0< /.. < k··- JtJ - IJ (i,j) EA. (3.2)
In a model of a bankruptcy situation, where edge capacities represent the
size of claims, (3.2) implies that no claimant should get more than the size
of his claim. Let the set offeasible flows, i.e., those satisfying (3.1) and (3.2)
be denoted by F. Also, let
X:= {x E Rn: Xi = net(f,i) \:li E N, fE F}
denote the set allocations corresponding to feasible flows, For any set S ~ N
of sink nodes, let the total net inflow of S be given by
net(f, S) := L net(f, i) = f(V, S) - /(S, V).
iES
Then the set of maximal flows can be defined as
F* := {f EF: net(f,N) ~ net(f',N) \:If' EF},
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i.e., the set of flows for which the total net flow into the sink nodes in N is
maximal. The corresponding set of allocations is
X* := {x E R" : Xi = net(f, i) Vi E N, f E F*} ,
and a member of X* will be referred to as a feasible allocation, in line with
the terminology for single-estate bankruptcy problems. The total amount
awarded is maximal, given the restrictions caused by the limited amount of
cash available in the estates, and the additional restriction that no claimant
should be awarded more than the size of his claim. In Example 3.3.1, the
allocation (8,71,21) is a feasible allocation.
3.4 Bilateral comparisons and consistent solutions
The set of feasible allocations in a flow sharing problem can be quite large.
E.g., in Example 3.3.1, the allocations
(20,40,40) and (10,65,25)
are both feasible allocations, since they correspond to maximal flows in the
network of Figure 3.1. The former allocation seems to be an attempt to
equalize the amounts received by the respective claimants, given that the
allocation should be feasible. It may be argued that this allocation is unfair
to claimant 2, who gets no more than claimant 3, although his claims are
much higher. The latter allocation awards 2 a larger portion of his total
claims.
In this section we shall impose additional restrictions on the candidate allo-
cations by requiring that they should be considered fair by the claimants.
Fairness involves comparisons between distinct individuals, and we willlimit
ourselves to pairwise comparisons. We will make assumptions with regard
to what a fair allocation rule in two-person problems is, and develop a set
of equations that the solution to the n-person problem must satisfy in order
to be consistent with the solution of every two-person problem. Of course,
the resulting equation system may not be solvable, or have many solutions,
depending on the allocation rule that is used for the two-person problems.
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Consider same allocation X E X*. Pick twa claimants i and i, and assume
that the other claimants are awarded according to x, i.e., an amount of
Xi + Xj is to be shared by i and i.Will the allocation (Xi, Xj) be considered
fair by i and i? In order to study this question, we form a reduced flow
sharing problem for i and i by defining, for any subset SeN,
F(S, x) := {f EF: net(j, i) = Xi 'Vi ES}.
Then F(N\ {i,i},x) is the set offlows available to i and i, given that the
claimants in N \ {i,i} are rewarded according to x. The maximal flow that
i can receive in the reduced problem will be
dij(X) := max net(j, i),
fEF(N\{i,j},x)
which may be interpreted as i's claim in a two-person bankruptcy given by
(Xi + Xj, d(x)),
where d(x) := (dij(X), dji(X)). Note that
X E X* => max{~j(x), dji(X)} ~ Xi + Xj ~ ~j(X) + dji(X), (3.3)
where the first inequality means that neither i nor i claims more than the
value of the entire estate, and the second inequality says that they together
claim at least the value of the entire estate. As an illustration, consider
Example 3.3.1 when X = (10,65,25) is proposed for the entire problem.
Given that claimant 1 is awarded 10, claimant 2 can secure himself d23(X) =
90, and 3 can get d32(X) = 50. Other claims are d13(X) = d12(X) = 20,
d21(X) = 75, and d3dx) = 35.
Lemma 3.4.1 Let X E X*, and suppose y satisfies Yk = Xk for all kEN \
{i,i}, and that (Yi, Yj) is a feasible allocation for the two-person bankruptcy
problem (Xi + xj,d(x)). Then y E X*.
Proof. Consider the allocation xi, where claimant i gets his entire claim
dij(X), i.e.,
k = i
k=i
otherwise.
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10 90
(a) d23(X)
10 50
Figure 3.2: The reduced How sharing problem (X2 + X3, d(x)) in Example
3.3.1, when x = (10,65,25)
The allocation xi is obtained from x by increasing the net Howto i as much
as possible, and reducing the How to i accordingly. Let xi be defined in a
similar manner. Clearly, xi E X* and xi E X*, and, since X* is a convex
set, every convex combination of xi and xi must also belong to X*. Since y
is such a convex combination, we must have y E X*. O
Suppose the contested garment principle from Section 3.2 is accepted as fair
by both i and i- According to this principle, i concedes the part of the
estate not claimed by him, namely Xi +xi - ~i (x), to [, Claimant i. on the
other hand, concedes Xi + xi - dii(X) to i. The disputed amount is thus
and this amount should be shared equally. Thus, i should receive the amount
x· + x· - [x' + x· - d"(x)] - [x' + x· - d"(x)]+ d ( ) + I 1 , 1 11 1 1 11Xi xi - oji x 2
_ Xi + xi - dii(x) - dii{X)
2
Requiring that the contested garment solution should be consistent with x
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for claimant i means that
Xi + Xi - dii{x) - dii{X) ,I. ( ) d ( )Xi = {::? Xi - "'ii X = Xi - ii X .2
If X is consistent with the contested garment principle for every pair of indi-
viduals, we shall say that X is contested garment consistent6 (CG-consistent).
Formally, CG-consistency means that X must be a solution to the equation
system
{i,j} eN. (3.4)
In Example 3.3.1, a solution of (3.4) is X = (lO, 65, 25).
Theorem 3.4.2 Every flow sharing problem has a unique CG-consistent
solution.
Proof. In Theorem 3.5.4 we will show that (3.4) is exactly the equation
system describing the nucleolus of a certain cooperative TU-game. Since we
know from e.g. Maschler et al. (1979) that the nucleolus exists and consists
of a single point, the result follows. O
Another view of fairness, frequently advocated in discussions on e.g. income
distribution, is that every individual should get the same amount. By adding
a feasibility requirement, we get the constrained equal award solution from
Section 3.2. Consider twa individuals i and i. together receiving Xi + Xi.
The constrained equal award solution is shown in Figure 3.3.7
A requirement for X to be considered fair for the pair consisting of i and j
is thus
Xi =min{ max {Xi + Xi - dii{X), Xi; Xi} '~i{X)}.
If a solution X is consistent with the constrained equal award rule for every
pair of claimants, we shall say that X is CEA-consistent. Then X needs to
satisfy
min {max {Xi - dii{X), Xi; Xi}, dii{X) - Xi} = O {i,j} eN. (3.5)
6This term is borrowed from Aumann and Maschler (1985), and can be seen as a
generalization of the consistency requirement that is studied in their paper.
7Note that the case "'i;"'; > max{dij(X),dji(X)} is not ofinterest, because of (3.3).
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Case CEAj{Xi +xj,d{x))
x·+x· { ( )}~ ~ min ~j{x),dji X
() x·+x· ( )d·· x <::.!..!...:2 < d·· Xl' - 2 - '1
() x·+x· ( ),I .. x < ~ <d·· x'""'1 - 2 - l'
dji{x)
~j{X) æ, +Xj - dij{X)
Figure 3.3: The constrained equal award solution for the bankruptcy prob-
lem (Xi +Xj, d{x))
In Example 3.3.1, a solution of (3.5) is X = (20, 40, 40).
Theorem 3.4.3 Every flow sharing problem has a unique CEA-consistent
solution.
Proof. In Section 3.5.5 we will show that (3.5) is exactly the equation
system describing the constrained egalitarian solution of a certain cooper-
ative TV-game. We know from Dutta and Ray (1989) that, for convex
games, this solution exists and consists of a single point. Since Proposition
3.5.2 shows that the game in question is indeed convex, the result follows. O
3.5 Flow sharing games
Using the same pessimistic view of the situation as in Aumann and Maschler
(1985), we let the value of a coalition in the game (N, v) be given by the
amount that the coalition can secure for itself" without going to court" 8. In
order to define this value for an arbitrary coalition S ~ N, we first need to
define the maximal amount that can be taken by R =N \ S. This value is
given by9
m{R) ._ { O if R = 0,
.- max/eF net(f, R) otherwise.
8Aumann and Maschler (1985), Section 6.
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Since the total value of the bankruptcy (How sharing) situation is m(N),
the worst-case scenario for S is given by the value
v(S) := m(N) - m(N \ S).
It is easily checked that for a single-estate bankruptcy problem (E, d), we
have v(S) = (E-d(N\S))+. The values ofm and v are shown for Example
3.3.1 in Figure 3.4.
S m(S) v(S)
1 20 O
2 100 30
3 50 O
1 2 100 50
1 3 70 O
2 3 100 80
1 2 3 100 100
Figure 3.4: The game v for Example 3.3.1
Theorem 3.5.1 The core of a flow sharing gamelO is exactly the set of
9The function m : 2N ~ R is sometimes referred to, e.g., in Megiddo (1974), as the
characteristic function of the network. The characteristic function m can also be related
to flow games where the players control edges of the network, as studied by Curiel et al.
(1989). In their model, the controlover an edge e E A is modeled by a control game We,
where We(S) = 1 ifthe coalition S controls e, and we(S) = O otherwise. By extending our
network, and introducing control games for the edges, we can relate our network situation
to that studied in their paper. Let V' := V U {tl and A' := A U {(i, t) : i E N} be the
node and edge set that we get by adding the sink node t. Let the capacity of (i,;) E A
be given by
k~.. _ {kij
IJ·- 00
i,; E V,
iEN,;=t,
and the control game Wij be given by
i E NUS,; = t,
iEN\S,;=t,
otherwise.
The value m' (S) of the maximal flow from the sink s to the source t in the network
(VI,AI,k'), when only the edges controlled by S are used, satisfies m'(S) = m(S). In
Curiel et al. (1989), this value is interpreted as a profit, as opposed to a cost, implying
that e.g. the core C(m) of our flow sharing game (see Theorem 3.5.1) is the anti-core
of their flow game, where the anti-core is the set of allocations obtained by reversing the
direction of the core inequalities. It is easily seen from e.g. (1.4) that the anti-core is
empty if and only if the core is nonempty.
10A similar result is shown for single-estate bankruptcy games in Theorem 2 of Curiel
et al. (1987).
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feasible allocations for the flow sharing problem, i.e.,
C{v) = C{m) = X*.
Proof. The first equality follows from v{N) = m{N), and, for x E R" such
that x{N) = v{N), and P C N,
x{P) ~ v{P)
#x{P) ~ m{N) - m{N \ P)
#x{N \ P) ~ m{N \ P).
In order to show the second equality'! , we assume that x E X*, and will
prove that x E C{m). First note that x{N) = m{N) follows from the
definition of X*. It then remains to show that x{S) ~ m{S) for all SeN.
Since x E X*, we know that there exists f' E F* such that Xi = net (f', i)
for all i EN. Then we must have
x{S) =L net(f', i) s rna;:L net(f, i) = m{S).
iES fE iES
To complete the proof of the second equality, we assume that x E C(m), and
will prove that x E X*. Since x{N) = m{N), the proof can be completed
by constructing j E F* such that
xi = net(j, i) i EN.
In order to do this, form a new network (V', A', k') by adding a new sink
node t, i.e., V' = V U {t]. We also add an edge from every i E N to t, i.e.,
A' = A U {(i, t) : i EN}. The new capacities are given by
k~. = {Xi if i E N and j = t,
13 kij if (i,j) EA.
Let sand t be the single source and sink node, respectively, of the new
network.
liThe remaining part of the proof is, with the exception of differences in notation,
almost identical to that of Lemma 4.1 of Megiddo (1974). For the sake of completeness
we repeat the proof here.
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We will now show that (V, {t}) is a minimal cut separating sand t. In order
to do this, let P C V' be such that sEP and t E V' \ P. Then
k'(P, V' \ P) = k'(P, V \ P) + k'(P n N, {tl)
= k(P, V\P) +x(pnN)
~ m(N\P) +x(pnN)
~ x(N) = k' (V, {tl)·
In order to construct the flow j for the network (V, A, k), let f' be a maximal
flow for (V', A', k'). Then, since (V, {tl) is a minimal cut, we have fIt = Xi
for all i EN. Let j be the restriction of f' to A. Then, for any i EN, we
have
net(j, i) = f' (V, {i}) - f' ({i}, V)
= net(f', i) + fIt = fIt = æ,
o
Proposition 3.5.2 A flow sharing game v is
(i) monotonic:
s ~T => v(S) s v(T)
(U) convd2:
v(S UT) ~ v(S) +v(T) - v(S nT)
Proof. Both statements follow from Lemma 3.2 inMegiddo (1974), where
it is shown that the characteristic function m is monotonic and concave.
That v is monotonic if, and only if, m is monotonic follows immediately
from the definition of v. That concavity of m is equivalent to convexity of
v is shown in Lemma 3.5.3 below. O
12See Curiel et al. (1987) for a similar result for single-estate bankruptcy games.
58 Bankruptcy and Flow Sharing Problems
Lemma 3.5.3 A game v is convex if and only if its dual game13 v* is
concave.
Proof. Concavity of v* means that, for any S, T ~ N,
v*(S UT) ~ v*(S) + v*(T) - v*(S n T) (3.6)
Letting P := N \ S and Q := N \ T, we get
v*(S UT) = v(N) - v(N \ S \ T)
= v(N) - v(P nQ),
and
v*(S) + v*(T) - v*(S nT)
=v(N) - v(N \ S) + v(N) - v(N \ T) - v(N) + v(N \ (S nT))
=v(N) - v(P) - v(Q) + v(P UQ)
Hence (3.6) is equivalent to
v(P UQ) ~ v(P) + v(Q) - v(P n Q),
which means that v is convex. o
In Section 3.4, by specifying what is meant by fairness in the two-person
setting, we were able to develop a unique solution for the n-person How
sharing problem. We characterized two such solutions, the CG-consistent
solution given by (3.4), and the CEA-consistent solution given by (3.5). Note
that these two solutions for the How sharing problem were characterized
without any reference to game-theoretic concepts. However, as we show
below, they coincide with two well-known solutions for the How sharing
game. We first state the results, and then go on to prove them.
The nucleolus14 is defined via the excess values
e(v, S, x) = v(S) - x(S) SeN,
13For any S ~ N, the value of the dual game is v*(S) = v(N) - v(N \ S). Since
v*(N) = v(N), the relationship between the two games will be symmetric, i.e., the dual
of v* is v.
14See Section 1.3.
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and seeks to equalize these values by minimizing, in a lexicographical man-
ner, the vector of excess values.
Theorem 3.5.4 The CG-consistent solution for a flow sharing problem
coincides with the nucleolus of the corresponding flow sharing game.
The set of constrained egalitarian solutions, introduced by Dutta and Ray
(1989), assumes that equity is a desirable social goal, but recognizes that
private preferences may induce selfish behavior. In order to define this
solution concept, we need the Lorenz-ordering. Consider some set B C Rk
such that :E:=1 = b for any x E B, where b is a constant. For any vector
x E B, let ux represent a non-decreasing order of x, i.e.,
Then, for x, Y E B, we say that x Lorenz-dominates y, written x >LD Y if
:Ei=1 XO'.,(i) ~ :Ei=1 YO'II(i) for all j = 1, ... ,k, with strict inequality for at
least one [, The Lorenz map E picks the undominated elements of any set,
i.e.,
EB := {x E B: there is no y E B such that y >LD x}. (3.7)
The set of constrained egalitarian solutions for a game v is defined by con-
structing, in a recursive way, the Lorenz core L(8) for any coalition 8 ~ N.
For a singleton coalition, this is the set L(i) := {v(i)}. Consider some coali-
tion 8 ~N, and suppose that the Lorenz cores for any coalition T such that
ITI < 181has been defined. Then
L(8) := {x E Risl : x(8) = v(8), lJT C 8 and Y E EL(T) s.t. y> XT},
(3.8)
where y> XT means Y ~ XT and y i- XT. The set of constrained egalitarian
solutions is then EL(N). In general we may have EL(N) = 0. However, as
shown by Dutta (1990), for convex games the set is nonempty and consists
of a unique point. This point is the unique core point that Lorenz-dominates
every other core point, denoted CE8(v). As flow sharing games are convex,
we can use this property.
Theorem 3.5.5 The CEA-consistent solution for a flow sharing problem
coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of the corresponding flow
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sharing game.
In order to prove Theorems 3.5.4 and 3.5.5, we will use the fact that both
these solution concepts satisfy the converse reduced game property.I5 For a
game (N, v), the allocation x and the player subsets R ~ P ~ N, the value
of the reduced game (P, vP,X) ei la Davis and Maschler (1965) is given by
{
x(P)
vP,X(R) := O
maxQ~N\P{ v(R UQ) - x( Q)}
ifR=P,
if R = ø,
otherwise.
(3.9)
A solution concept (J satisfies the converse reduced game property if
xp E (J(P,vp,X) 'VP C Ns.t. IPI = 2::::} x E (J(N, v),
where Xp is the restriction of x to P. In order to prove Theorems 3.5.4 and
3.5.5, we will first show that (3.9) takes a particularly simple form when v
is a flow sharing game.
Lemma 3.5.6 If v is a flow sharing game, and x is a core allocation, then,
forR~ P ~ N,
vP,X(R) = x(P) - max net(f, P \ R).
/EF(N\P,x}
Proof.
vP,X(R) = max {v(R UQ) - x(Q)}
Q~N\P
= max {m(N) - m(N \ R \ Q) - x(Q)}
Q~N\P
= max {x(N \ Q) - m(N \ R \ Q)}
Q~N\P
= x(P) - min {m(N\ R \ Q) - x(N \ P \ Q)},
Q~N\P
15Introduced by Peleg (1986). See Driessen (1991) for an overview of consistency (re-
duced game) properties in cooperative game theory.
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where the second last equality follows from X E C(v) = C(m) ::::}x(N) =
m(N). Letting Q' := N \ p \ Q, we can show that
vP,X(R) = x(P) - min {m(P \ R UQ') - x(Q')}
Q'c.;N\P
= x(P) - min maxi net(f, P \ R) + net(f, Q') - x( Q')}
Q'c.;N\P /EF
= x(P) - max net(f, P \ R),
/EF(N\P,x)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 3.5.7 below. o
Lemma 3.5.7 Let X E X*, and S ~ p ~ N. Then
min max{net(f, S) + net(f, Q) - x(Q)} = max net(f, S). (3.10)
Qc.;N\P /EF /EF(N\P,x)
Proof. In order to prove (3.10), it is sufficient to show that there exists an
optimal solution (Q,f) to the left-hand side problem such that
(i)
(ii)
net(j, i) = Xi
Q=N\P.
In order to prove (i), let (Q,f) be optimal. We will first show that this
solution must satisfy
net(j, i) ~ Xi (3.11)
Suppose this is not the case, i.e., there exists some i E Q and
f' E argmax{net(f, S) + net(f, Q \ {i}) : net(f,S U Q) = net(!, S U Q)} (3.12)
JEF
such that
net(f', i) > Xi. (3.13)
Note that, since j is an optimal solution to the left-hand side of (3.10), the
maximal net How into su Q \ {i} cannot be larger than net(j, S UQ), and
we must therefore have
net(f',S) + net(f',Q \ {i}) = max{net(f, S) + net(f, Q \ {i})}.
/EF
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Then, because of (3.13), we must have
max{net(f, S) +net(f, Q \ {i}) - x(Q \ {i})} < max{net(f, S) +net(f, Q) - x(Q)},!EF !EF
contradicting the optimality of Q. Now, since X E X·, i.e., X corresponds
to a feasible flow, we can choose j such that the inequalities in (3.11) are
all satisfied as equalities.
In order to show (ii), we use (i) to rewrite the left-hand side of (3.10) as
min max net(f, S).
Q~N\P fEF(Q,x)
The value of the inner maximization problem will always decrease when we
add more players to Q, since F(Q U {i}, x) ~ F(Q,x) for i E N \ p \ Q.
Hence Q =N \ P will be an optimal solution. o
Now we are ready to prove Theorems 3.5.4 and 3.5.5. The proof will be
done by describing the nucleolus and the constrained egalitarian solution
for reduced games with two players, and showing that this description leads
exactly to the descriptions of the CG-consistent solution, i.e., (3.4), and
the CEA-consistent solution, i.e., (3.5). Let ({i,j},u) be a game with two
players i and j. It is easily shown that the nucleolus for this game is the
standard solution.16 A solution (Xi, X j) is the standard solution iff
(.) u(i,j)-u(i)-u(j)xi = u, + 2 . (3.14)
Under constrained egalitarianism, the allocation u(;J) is seen as the ideal
solution, but one also has to make sure that i does not get less than u(i),
and that j does not get less than u(j). This means that a solution (Xi, Xj)
will be the constrained egalitarian solution iff
Xi = {max {u(i), U(;J)} if u(j) s u(;J),
u( i, j) - u(j) otherwise
. [ {(.) u( i, j) } (..) ( .)]=mm max u,, -2- ,u '.3 - u J . (3.15)
16For two-player games, many other solutions, such as the Shapley value and the r-value,
also coincide with the standard solution.
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Proof. [Theorem 3.5.4] Peleg (1986) shows that the nucleolus satisfies the
converse reduced garne property. For a generalized bankruptcy problem, let
X E C(v) = X·. For the players i and i, the characteristic function of their
reduced game is, from Lemma 3.5.6,
{
Xi + Xj R = {i,j},
v{i,j},X(R) = Xi + Xj - dji(X) R = {i},
Xi + Xj - c4j(x) R = {j}.
(3.16)
Requiring that (Xi, Xj) should be the standard solution of the reduced game
gives the equation
Xi + Xj - [Xi + Xj - dji(X)] - [Xi + Xj - dij(X)]
Xi = Xi + Xj - dji(X) + 2
Xi + Xj - dji(x) + dij(X)-
2
¢:> 2Xi = Xi + Xj - dji(X) + dij(X)
¢:> Xi - dij(X) = Xj - dji(X),
which, if imposed for every pair of players, is equivalent to (3.4). O
Proof. [Theorem 3.5.5] Dutta (1990) shows that the constrained egalitar-
ian solution satisfies the converse reduced game property for convex garnes.
Since the generalized bankruptcy game is convex (Proposition 3.5.2), we can
use this property. We insert the values of v{i,j},x in (3.15), and get
Xi =min [max { Xi + Xj - dji(X), Xi ; Xj } ,dij(X)]
[ {X. - X.} ]¢:> O=min max Xj - dji(X), 3 2 I ,dij(X) - Xi ,
which, if imposed for every pair of players, is equivalent to (3.5). O
3.6 Convergent transfer schemes
The equation systems (3.4) and (3.5) not only describes ideal17 solutions to
the allocation problem. They also immediately suggest methods to compute
the solutions, through bilateral transfers.
17Given the respective views of fairness involved.
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where the first inequality follows from
xEX*
=>x· - d··(x) < °< ,l··(x) - x·J JI - - '-"1J I
and the second inequality follows from
Xj - V(j) = Xj - m(N) +m(N \ {j}) = m(N \ b}) - x(N \ {j})
~ ~j(x)+x(N\{i,j}) -x(N\{j})=dij(X)-Xi.
~m(N\{j} ),sincexEC(m)=X*
o
Example 3.6.2 [Figure 3.5] In order to illustrate the convergence of the
sequences, we shall consider the example shown Figure 3.5(a). Given the
allocation vector in step t, denoted xt, we compute a*(xt) :=maxi1=jaij(xt),
where the maximum occurs for the nodes i* and [", Likewise, we compute
f3*(xt) :=maxi1=jf3ij(Xt). The CG-consistent solution is
(16 2/3, 10,46 2/3,76 2/3),
and the CEA-consistent solution is
(30,20,50,50).
The a-sequence shown in Figure 3.5(b) does seem to converge to the CG-
consistent solution, as predicted by Theorem 3.6.1, although not in a finite
number of steps. The f3-sequence shown in Figure 3.5(c), on the other hand,
finds the CEA-consistent solution in only four steps.19 <J
19It is easy to find examples for which also ,B-sequencesneed an infinite number of
iterations in order to reach the limit point.
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o//~'\ 600
30 t::\V'40 50~d
I7\~O ~---.(';;\
\.!) 25 20 \V
(a)
t xi x~ x& x~ a* (xt) i* r
o 10.000 0.000 60.000 80.000 10.000 1 3
1 20.000 0.000 50.000 80.000 10.000 2 1
2 10.000 10.000 50.000 80.000 5.000 1 3
3 15.000 10.000 45.000 80.000 2.500 1 4
4 17.500 10.000 45.000 77.500 1.250 3 1
5 16.250 10.000 46.250 77.500 0.625 1 4
6 16.875 10.000 46.250 76.875 0.312 3 1
7 16.562 10.000 46.562 76.875 0.156 1 4
8 16.719 10.000 46.562 76.719 0.078 3 1
9 16.641 10.000 46.641 76.719 0.039 1 4
10 16.680 10.000 46.641 76.680 0.020 3 1
11 16.660 10.000 46.660 76.680 0.010 1 4
12 16.670 10.000 46.660 76.670 0.005 3 1
13 16.665 10.000 46.665 76.670 0.002 1 4
14 16.667 10.000 46.665 76.667 0.001 3 1
15 16.666 10.000 46.666 76.667 0.001 1 4
(b) a-sequence
t xi x~ x& x~ f3*(xt) i* r
o 10.000 0.000 60.000 80.000 20.000 1 3
1 30.000 0.000 40.000 80.000 20.000 2 3
2 30.000 20.000 20.000 80.000 30.000 3 4
3 30.000 20.000 50.000 50.000 0.000 - -
(c) ,8-sequence
Figure 3.5: Example 3.6.2
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3.7 Weighted generalization of the CEA-consistent
solution
In the previous sections we assumed that claimants are identical, except
with respect to the size of their claims. However, different claims may not
be considered equally important. Consider, e.g., the case where one claim is
put forward by a group of individuals, while another represent the claim of
one individual. In this case, the equity of various allocations could be judged
on a per-capita basis. In order to model such asymmetries, we introduce a
weight vector w E R++. In this new setting, what is a fair allocation? We
shall follow the same line of thought as in Section 3.4, i.e., we shall first define
a fair allocation principle for two-person reduced Howsharing problems, and
show that this implies a unique allocation for the n-person problem.
Let X E X·, i.e., X is a feasible allocation, and consider again the two-
person bankruptcy problem (Xi + xj,d(x)) of Section 3.4. We assume that
a fair division of Xi + Xj between i and j is to give claimant i an amount
proportionate to his relative weight, i.e., the weighted constrained equal
award solution shown in Figure 3.6.
Case GEAr GEA"!
W'(Z.+Zj) < d .. (æ) Wj(z.+Zj) < d ..(x) W.(Z.+Zj) w;(z'+Zj)
W'+Wj - IJ W'+Wj - 'JI W'+Wj W'+Wj
W.(Z.+Zj) < d"(x) Wj(z'+Zj) > d··(x) X,· + xJ· - dJ·z·(x) dJ·,·(x)W'+Wj - 'J W'+Wj - 'J'
W.(Z'+Zj) > d; ·(x) Wj(Z.+Zj) < d··(x) d.J·(x) X,· + xJ·- d,·J·(x)W'+Wj - IJ w.+w; - 31 •
Figure 3.6: The weighted constrained equal award solution for the reduced
problem (Xi + xj,d(x))
The generalization of (3.5) is easily shown to be
{i,j} C N. (3.17)
In order to relate the solution of (3.17) to the Howsharing game, we will
introduce the weighted constrained egalitarian solution, a natural general-
ization of the constrained egalitarian solution of Section 3.5. For a gener-
alization of the rather lengthy definition given in Section 3.5, we refer to
Hokari (1998) and Koster (1999). For the class of convex games, Hokari
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(1998) shows that this solution is the unique Lorenz-maximal core point,
denoted CESW(v), where the Lorenz ordering introduced in Section 3.5 is
generalized in order to take the weights of players into account as in Ebert
(1999). For x E R" take an ordering ~ of the players such that
i.e., ~ sorts the weighted elements of x in a non-decreasing order. Then,
the points defining the piece-wise linear Lorenz curve L~ : [O, 1] ~ [0,1] are
given by
i = O, ... ,n,
i.e., L~(P), for O ~ p ~ 1, is the fraction of the total amount x(N) received
by the fraction p of the richest individuals.
In Example 3.3.1, suppose the weight vector w = (2,3,1) is used. Compare
the allocations x = (20,40,40) and y = (20,60,20). The vectors ~ =
(10,13 1/3,40) and yW = (10,20,20) are obtained by dividing with the
weights, e.g. x~ = X2/W2 = 13 1/3. Since the ranking of the elements
in neither vector changes as a result of this transformation, we have u': =
U:. The corresponding Lorenz curves are shown in Figure 3.7. Notice for
example that L':(5/6) = 60/100 = 0.6, i.e., the vector x allocates 60% of
the amount to the two worst-off claimants, i.e., 1 and 2. On the other hand
we have L~(5/6) = 80/100 = 0.8, i.e., y allocates 80% of the total amount
to 1 and 2. Since L~(P) ~ L': (P) for all O s p s 1, and with strict inequality
for some p, y is considered a more egalitarian allocation than x.
In general, for x, y E RN such that x(N) = y(N), and for some weight
vector w E R++, we will say that y weakly w-Lorenz dominates x, denoted
y ~~D x, if and only if L~(p) ~ L~(p) for all O s p s 1. If x ~~D y and
not y ~~D x, then we say that y strongly w-Lorenz dominates x, written
x >~D y. Note that the Lorenz-ordering is not complete, i.e., it is not always
possible to rank allocations. E.g., the allocation z = (0,75,25), for which
the corresponding curve L~ is shown in Figure 3.7, cannot be compared to
x, since we have neither x ~~D z nor z ~~D X.
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Figure 3.7: Lorenz curves for Example 3.3.1
The Lorenz-ordering is related to the lexicographic ordering. Since the ele-
ments of xW represent the slope of the Lorenz-curve L~, we must have that
X >'tD Y => X >'tEX Y (3.18)
The lexicographic ordering imposed by >'tEX is, in contrast to the Lorenz-
ordering, complete. In the example illustrated by Figure 3.7, we have
y >'tEX x >'tEX z, A maximal, with respect to the ordering imposed
by >'tEX' element in X* will in the sequel be referred to as a lexicographi-
cally optimal solution with respect to the weight vector w. This solution is
studied by Megiddo (1974) and Megiddo (1977) for the special case where
Wi = 1 for all i E N. Fujishige (1980) utilizes polymatroid theory to solve
the problem for general weight vectors. Algorithms for solving the problem
are provided in Megiddo (1977) and Fujishige (1980).
Theorem 3.7.1 The following statements are true with respect to the system
(3.17):
(i) The system has a unique solution, which coincides with the weighted
constrained egalitarian solution of the flow sharing game and the lexi-
cographically optimal solution of the flow sharing problem.
(ii) A (3W -sequence {xt}~o, where xO E X*, will converge to the solution.
3.7 Weighted generalization of the CEA-consistent solution 71
Proof. Hokari (1998) shows that, for convex games, the weighted con-
strained egalitarian solution satisfies the converse reduced game property.
Then, in order to show that (3.17) coincides with the weighted constrained
egalitarian solution of the flow sharing game, we need to show that (3.17) is
equivalent to the solution obtained by solving all two-person reduced games.
For a two-person game ({i, j}, u), the amount allocated to player i according
to the weighted constrained egalitarian solution is given by
. [ {(.) WiU(i,j)} ( .. ) (.)]Xi = mm max u ~ , ,u~,J - u J ,
Wi +Wj
(3.19)
where a special case is (3.15). Given an allocation X E C(v), the reduced
game for {i,j} is given by (3.16), and by applying the solution (3.19) to
every two-player reduced game, (3.17) easily results.
Koster (1999) shows that the weighted constrained egalitarian solution for
a convex game exists, and consists of the unique core point that w-Lorenz
dominates every other core point. Then, since the lexicographically optimal
solution of the flow sharing problem is also unique, and since C(v) = X·
from Theorem 3.5.1, coincidence of these two solutions follows from (3.18).
In order to show (ii), first, note that, because xO E X· and Lemma 3.4.1,
everyelement of the ,sw-sequence will satisfy xt E X· = C(v). Suppose y
results from X by transferring ,8ij(x) > Ofrom j to i. I.e., Yi = Xi + .Bij(x)
and Yj = Xj - ,8ij(x), and Yk = Xk for all k =1= i,j. Then
Xj > Xi Yi > Xi Yj < Xj Yj > Yi (3.20)
Wj Wi Wi Wi Wi wi wi Wi
The first inequality implies that a ,sw-transfer will always go from a relatively
rich individual to a poor one. To see this, note that since X E X· implies
xi ~ dji(X), we must have both
Xi XiXi < dij(X) and wixi > WjXi ¢:} - > -
wi Wi
in order to have ,8ij(x) > o. The next two inequalities of (3.20) says that i is
better off, and that j is worse off, after the transfer, and the last inequality
says that the ranking of i and j has not changed as a result of the transfer.
To see why this last inequality holds, let 'Y := Wi::~:rl:i.Note that .Bij(x) >
O=} .Bij(x) =minh,dii(x) - Xi}, hence Yi ~ Xi + 'Y and Yj ~ Xj - 'Y. Then
WiYj - WjYi > wi(xi - 'Y) - Wi(Xi + 'Y) _ wixi - WiXi _ Wi + Wj _ O
- 'Y - ,
Wi +Wj - Wi +Wj Wi +Wi Wi+Wj
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from which the last inequality in (3.20) follows immediately. Since (3.20)
implies that Y >1EX x, convergence follows. o
3.8 Conclusion
The contribution of this chapter has been to relate two well-known problems.
We showed in Section 3.3 how the flow sharing problem may be seen as a
generalized bankruptcy problem, where there are more than one estate. In
Section 3.4 we formed two-person flow sharing problems, and showed that by
applying a particular principle of fairness to each two-person problem, we get
a unique solution to the n-person problem. One of the solutions studied, the
CEA-consistent solution, corresponds to the lexicographically optimalsolu-
tion, which has been studied by other authors. The CG-consistent solution
is new, and offers a different view of fairness. These two solutions can also
be obtained from the flow sharing game of Section 3.5, as the constrained
egalitarian solution and the nucleolus, respectively. We also showed, in Sec-
tion 3.6, how the solutions can be computed via transfer schemes. In Section
3.7 we generalized the CEA-consistent solution by introducing a weight for
each player.
The CG-consistent solution, which corresponds to the nucleolus of the flow
sharing game, can also be given a weighted generalization, e.g., as in Hokari
and Thomson (2000). An interesting question is whether these weighted
generalizations exhaust the core, as was the case for the standard fixed tree
games of Chapter 2. Another interesting problem is, as in Chapter 2, how
we can find weights such that the weighted versions of the CG- and CEA-
consistent solutions coincides with a given core point. In the case of the
CEA-consistent solution, this problem has already been solved by Fujishige
(1980).
Chapter 4
Cost Allocation in a Bank
ATM Networkt
4.1 Introduction
Through Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), financialorganizations (here-
after called banks) provide service, e.g. cash withdrawals, to their customers.
For various reasons, networks of ATMs have formed, consisting of several
banks, where customers of one bank may use ATMs of any bank in the
network. In such a system, there is a difference between the costs that are
incurred by a bank, and the costs that are actually caused by that bank's
customers. Such imbalances in network usage may be compensated for by
setting interchange fees.1 Every time a customer of bank i uses an ATM of
bank i, bank i has to pay a fee lij to bank j. Setting interchange fees is
equivalent to allocating the total cost arising in such a network, and the fee
structure will be the result of a negotiation process involving the participat-
ing banks.
The (transaction) costs arising in such a network depends on how transac-
tions are processed. If the ATMs of the network are not easily accessible for
the customers of the member banks, the customers will tend to use alter-
native means of processing their transactions, e.g. withdrawing cash over
the counter. Also, the cost of processing a transaction will be higher if the
tThis chapter is based on Bjørndal, Hamers and Koster (1999).
lSee Gow and Thomas (1998) for an example from the UK.
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processing involves linking computer systems of different institutions, than
if no such links are necessary. The availability, for a particular customer,
of ATMs belonging to the network to which his bank is affiliated, and in
particular, of ATMs belonging to his own bank, depends on the physicallo-
cation of the customer as well as of the various ATMs in the network, since
the customer need to be physically present at the site of an ATM in order
to be able to use it.
We model this cost allocation problem as a cooperative game with transfer-
able utility, and in doing so, we explicitly model the location of customers
(transactions) and ATMs. For examples of other applications of cooperative
game theory to cost allocation, see e.g. Littlechild (1977) and Nouweland
et al. (1996). A key question is whether there exist cost allocations that
insure against break-up of the network. Given such an allocation, it should
not be possible for any groups of banks to lower their costs by leaving the
network. This requirement is related to the core of the corresponding game.
Since finding a core allocation means checking a very large number of core
inequalities, we would like to be able to deduce such allocations directly
from the problem data, i.e., not explicitly considering the game. By relating
such "natural" allocations to other solution concepts, such as the Shapley
value (Shapley (1953)), the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)), and the .r-value
(Tijs (1981)), we can learn something about e.g. the location of the alloca-
tion within the core. Another interesting question is the properties of the
allocation method in a dynamic context. Assuming that there are benefits
resulting from cooperation, i.e., the game has a nonempty core, we would
like the allocation methods to be such that it facilitates the enlargement
of the network. When a new bank wants to join the network, the existing
members should not loose by accepting it as a new member. This is re-
lated to the concept of population monotonic allocation schemes, Sprumont
(1990).
This chapter is similar in spirit to Gow and Thomas (1998), but our approach
differs from theirs in that they do not consider explicitly the location of
ATMs and transactions. Another difference is that we do not consider fixed
costs. In fact, our cost savings game would not be influenced by the inclusion
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of fixed costs in the manner of Gow and Thomas (1998).2
In Section 4.2, we introduce the ATM-game. This cost savings game is
defined by aggregating single-location games over the set of locations. In
Section 4.3 we show that the single-location games correspond to informa-
tion market games, as defined by Muto et al. (1989) and Potters and Tijs
(1989). This correspondence yields many useful results about these games,
and makes us able to study the more general ATM-games in Section 4.4. We
introduce two allocation rules, the equal-split rule and the transaction-based
rule. Both rules involve aggregating, over the set of locations, allocations
proposed for single-location games in Section 4.3, and they only differ with
respect to locations where only one bank have ATMs. The equal-split rule
yields a core element that coincides with the r-value, but is not, in general,
a population monotonic allocation scheme. The transaction-based rule also
yields a core element, and moreover, is always population monotonic.
4.2 ATM-garnes
Let N denote the set of banks (players). We define a location to be a city
or parts thereof, and let L denote the set of locations. Let nf represent the
number of transactions of bank i E N in location l E L. Let Al be the set of
banks that have ATMs in location l. Further, let LI := {l EL: IAll = I} be
the set of locations where only one bank is represented, and let LM := {l E
L : IAl > I} be the set of locations where multiple banks are represented.
We will assume that L = LI ULM, i.e., that there are ATMs in all locations.
With regard to the behaviour of customers, we assume that, if S ~ N have
formed a network:
Al Transactions in a particular location will be processed by an ATM if
one or more members of S have an ATM there.
A2 When a customer of bank i E S performs a transaction in a location
l, and if bank i has ATMs in location l, the customer will use one of
2This would not be the case, however, if the number and location of ATMs were
endogenously determined in our model.
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the ATMs of bank i.
The transaction costs are assumed to be the same for all banks. The trans-
action cost will be a if the customer uses an ATM of his own bank. If he
uses an ATM of another bank the transaction cost will be {3, where {3 > a.
The cost of non-ATM transactions is complex, since there exist several al-
ternatives to using ATMs, such as withdrawing money over the counter,
writing a check to a third person in exchange for cash, or using a cashback
facility. In the four-bank example of Gow and Thomas (1998), the cost of
cash withdrawal over the counter is used as an approximation of this cost.
We shall assume that the cost of a non-ATM transaction is 'Y, where y > (3.
Suppose S forms a network. Assumptions Al and A2 imply, for any location
i E L, that the total amount of transaction costs in location i is given by
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A, C} {B,C} N
cf(S) 100 1500 200 400 300 500 600
Figure 4.1: The values for cf in Example 4.2.1
Example 4.2.1 [Figure 4.2] Consider a location i where the three banks
A, B, and C, have customers. The numbers of customers of these banks at
i are n~ = 100,n~ = 150, and nb = 200. Banks A and C have ATMs
at i. The cost of an ATM transaction is a = 1 for customers serviced by
their own bank, and {3= 2 otherwise. Every non-ATM transaction involves
cost 'Y = 10. In the previous terminology we have Ai = {A, C}. Then
these parameters fix the coalitional cost game cl. The cost at which the
coalition {A} is able to service all its customers is cf({A}) = an~ = 100,
since A E Ai. Similarly, we calculate cf({C}) = anb = 200. Since B fl. Ai,
we have cf( {B}) = 'Yn~ = 1500. The cost of serving the customers of A
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and B together are c({A,B}) = an~ + .ant = 100 + 300 = 400. The
customers of A and C are all serviced by the ATM of their own bank, hence
C({A, C}) = a(n~+nb) = 300. In this way we compute the cost associated
with each coalition, as shown in Figure 4.2. <I
In order to relate our game to existing literature, it will be convenient to
study the corresponding cost savings game 'Ill. Let sf := (T - .a)nf denote the
cost savings that occur if transactions of bank i E N \ Al can be processed
via an ATM of another bank. The single-location ATM-game 'Ill is given by,
for any S ~ N,
vl(S) :=L cl( {i}) _ cl(S) = { ~iES\Al sf if S n ~l =1= 0, (4.1)
iES O otherwise,
Since all the solution concepts that we will study are relatively invariant
under strategic equivalence'', all results for a cost savings game can easily
be translated into the setting of a cost game.
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
vl(S) O O O 1200 O 1200 1200
Figure 4.2: The values for 'Ill in Example 4.2.2
Example 4.2.2 [Figure 4.2] Now we return to Example 4.2.1. The coali-
tional cost savings for that example are specified in Figure 4.2. Notice that
the cost savings, i.e., the values of 'Ill, arise from transactions of banks that
do not have ATMs in location l, i.e., bank B in this case. Notice also the
zero values of single player coalitions. Single players save no costs, regardless
of whether they have ATMs or not. <I
The ATM-game v is obtained by aggregating over the set of locations, i.e.,
3A solution concept u is said to be relatively invariant under strategic equivalence iff,
whenever ti is a game with u(v) ¥- 0, a E RN, and b > 0, then u(a + bv) = a +bu(v). If c
is a cost game, and ti is the corresponding cost savings game, then X E u(c) ¢} yE u(tI),
where Yi = c({i}) - Xi for all i E N. Note that in going from the cost game c to the cost
savings game ti, we also change the interpretation (sign) of the game, and the definition
of the solution concepts must be changed accordingly, cf. Section 1.3.
~ or'ges Handelshøyskole
blblivlrk"t
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let, for every 8 ~ N,
v(8) :=L vi(8) = L i(8 \ Ai).
iEL iEL:snAl;i:0
where, for any R ~ N, si(R) := 2:iER st. In order to study some properties
and solutions of single-location ATM-games, we recall the solution concepts
core, Shapley value, and the nucleolus, defined in Section 1.3. Here we
will use an alternative definition of the Shapley value as the average of the
marginal vectors of the game. In order to define this concept, consider a
game with characteristic function 9 and player set N. Let II be the set of
all orderings of the player set. Take a player i E N and an order 7r E II.
The ith coordinate of the marginal vector m7T(v) is given by
(4.2)
mi(g) := g({7r(1), ... ,7r(k -1),7r(k)}) - g({7r(1), ... ,7r(k -1)}),
where i = 7r(k). The Shapley value is equal to the average, over the set II,
of the marginal vectors, i.e.,
<1>(g)= I~IL m7T(g).
7TEII
If the game v is convex, then we know from Shapley (1971) that C(g) =
conv{m7T(g) : 7r E II}, and hence that <1>(g)E C(g).
We will also study the r-oalue (Tijs (1981)), a compromise between the
minimum right vector m(g) and the utopia vector M(g). Note that player
i cannot get more than Mi (g) := g( N) - g( N \ {i}) in any core allocation,
since otherwise, the core inequality for N \ {i} would be violated. On the
other hand, he cannot get less than
mi(g) := ~~ (9(8) - L Mj(9))'
jES\{i}
since, for X E C(g), and for any 8 such that i E 8, we have Xi = x(8) -
x(8 \ {i}) ~ g(8) - 2:jES\{i} Mj(g). The utopia vector and the minimum
rights vector form upper and lower bounds, respectively, for the core, i.e.,
(4.3)
X E C(g) =? m(g) ~ X ~ M(g). (4.4)
The r-value of 9 is the (unique) convex combination of m(g) and M(g) that
satifies 2:iEN Ti(g) = g(N).
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4.3 Properties and solutions of single-location games
Because of (4.2), an allocation x will satisfy x E C(v) if Xi = 'EiE L xf for all
i E N, and xi E C(vi) for alIi E L. This, and the additivity of the Shapley
value, suggests that we study the games vi, i E L, in order to learn more
about the properties of the game v.
Our game can be related to the class of information market games, see Muto
et al. (1989) and Potters et al. (1989). An information market game consists
of a set of players N, where a subset I C N possesses information about
a (patented) new technology, necessary for producing a new product. The
total market for this new product can be partitioned into sub-markets, and
the profit realized by a coalition depends on which sub-markets the coalition
has access to. Let MT denote the set of sub-markets that the coalition T
has access to, and let rr denote the profit that can be realized from these
sub-markets. A coalition S can realize the profit rr if it has at least one
member with access to the sub-markets MT, i.e., S nT i= ø, as well as at
least one member with knowledge of the patented technology, i.e., SnI i= ø.
Therefore, the total profit that can be realized by the members of S is given
by
VI r(S) = { 'ET:Tns#0 rr if S n~i= ø
, O otherwise, (4.5)
thus defining the information market game (N, VI,r). Muto et al. (1989)
show that, if III = 1, then the nucleolus and the r-value coincides. If III = 1
and rr = O for all T ~ N such that ITI ~ 2, then (N,VI,r) is convex, and
the Shapley value coincides with the nucleolus and the r-value. Potters and
Tijs (1989) show that, if III ~ 2, and if rr = O for all T ~ N such that
ITI ~ 2, then the core consists of a single point.
Proposition 4.3.1 A single-location ATM-game is an information market
games.
Proof. We obtain Vi = vr,r by setting I := Ai and
rT:={sf ifT={i}CN\Ai,
O otherwise.
o
80 Cost Allocation in a Bank ATM Network
4.3.1 Locations where only one bank has ATMs
Because of Proposition 4.3.1, and since IAll = 1, this case is covered by
Muto et al. (1989). Moreover, since rr = Ofor all T ~ N such that ITI ~ 2,
we get the following result.
Proposition 4.3.2 If l E LI, then the game vi is convex.
We denote the bank having ATMs in location l by il.
Theorem 4.3.3 If l E LI, then
(i) C(vl) = conv{m7r(vl) : 1f' E IT}
(ii) C(vl) = {x E RN : x(N) = vl(N), O s xi ~ sf Vi E N \ {il}}
Proof. The convexity of vi and Shapley (1971) imply (i), and (li) follows
from Muto et al. (1989). O
Theorem 4.3.3(i) is useful here, because the vectors of marginal contributions
have a simple structure in our case. For any 1f' E IT, let
i.e., S; is the set of players that precede il in the order 1f'.
(4.6)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player i E N. If i =I- il, and i joins a coali-
tion S, then an additional cost saving of sf will be realized, but only if il is
alreadya member of S. If i = il, then i will provide cost savings for all the
players that are already in S. O
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S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
vl(S) ° ° ° 400 1000 ° 1400
(a) The game
1r m~(vl) mMvl) mc(vl)
A,B,C ° 400 1000A,C,B ° 400 1000B,A,C 400 ° 1000B,C,A 1400 ° °C,A,B 1000 400 °C,B,A 1400 ° °
Average 700 200 500
(b) Marginal vectors
(400,0,1000)
(0,0,1400)
tit,\, \, \, \, \ (0,400,1000)
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
---------------4
(1000,400,0) (0,1400,0)(1400,0,0)
(c) The core
Figure 4.3: Example 4.3.5
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Example 4.3.5 [Figure 4.3] Consider a situation where the banks A, B, and
C have customers in the location i. Let n~ = 200,n~ = 50, and nb = 125.
Also, as in Example 4.2.1, let a = 1, (3 = 2, and 'Y = 10. Only bank A has
ATMs in the location. The values of the game vl are shown in Figure 4.3(a),
and the marginal vectors are shown in Figure 4.3(b). From the picture of
the core shown in Figure 4.3(c), the coincidence of the extreme points of
the core with the marginal vectors can indeed be verified. Observe that,
although there are six different orderings of the player set, there are only
four distinct marginal vectors. Both the marginal vectors for which bank
A comes first (last) coincides, as is easily seen from (4.6). The average of
the marginal vectors, i.e., the Shapley value, is a member of the core, which
follows from Proposition 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.3(i). <I
Theorem 4.3.6 If i E LI, then iP(vl) = w, where
Wi = { (4.7)
otherwise.
Proof. By taking the average, over the set of allorderings of the players,
of the marginal vectors given by (4.6), we get the Shapley value. Note that,
if i =1= il, the number of orderings such that i precedes il equals the number
of orderings such that i comes after il, and the average payoff of i in the
l
marginals is =t. On the other hand, a player j E N\ {il} will precede il
in half the orderings, and the average cost savings that il will be rewarded
l
from the transactions of j will be 1-. The result could also have been found
by using Muto et al. (1989), and the fact that if is a convex game. O
By Theorem 4.3.3(i), the Shapley value is a core allocation of vl. Another
core allocation is the r-value, which is is related to the core characterization
of Theorem 4.3.3(ii), and is a compromise between the utopia vector M(vl)
and the minimum rights vector m(vl). If i = il, then the utopia payoff of i
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is
Mi(Vl) = vl(N) - vl(N \ {i}) = i(N \ {il}) - O
= sl(N \ {il}),
i.e., bank i can not hope to get more than the total cost savings for banks
without ATMS. On the other hand, if i =1= il, i.e., bank i does not have an
ATM in location i, then
i.e., bank i can not hope to get more than his own cost savings. If i = il,
then a lower bound on i's share of the cost savings is
mi(vl) = ~~ [vl(S) - L: Mj(Vl)]
jES\{i}
=~~[i(S\{il})-i(S\{i})] =0,
i.e., the worst-case scenario is that i does not get any part of the cost savings
at all. If i =1= il, then mi(vl) is the maximum of
~~ [vl(S) - 2: Mj(vl) - Mil (Vi)]
53i' jE5\{i,il}
~~ [i(S \ «»- sl(S \ {i,il}) - i(N \ {il})]
53il
= sf - sl(N \ {il}) = -i(N \ {i,il}) s O
and
i.e., we have mi(vl) = o. To sum up, we have
if i = il
otherwise, and
(4.8)
(4.9)
Theorem 4.3.7 If i E LI, then r(vl) ;, ~M(vl) = w, where w is given by
(4.7).
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Proof. The result follows from w = ~M(vl) ~ w(N) = vl(N). Note that
the result could have been proved by using Muto et al. (1989), but we have
included the proof here for the sake of completeness. O
Theorem 4.3.8 If.e E LI, then NU(vl) = w, where w is given by (4.7).
Proof. The result follows from Muto et al. (1989), but the proof provided
here is simpler, due to the special structure of ATM-garnes. Let
Bo := {S eN: lSI = 1 and w(S) = vl(S)},
and, for k 2:: 1,
Suppose there are p such sets, and let, for 1 :::; k :::;p, 'Dk := Uj~kBj.
Kohlberg (1971) proved that w is the nuceolus iff, for every 1 :::;k :::;p, there
exists a balanced collection C C 'Dk, i.e., there exists weights {>'}SEC such
that 2:SEC >'s = 1 for all i E N and >'s > Ofor all SEC. In order to show
S3'
that such balanced collections exists for the allocation w, we will show that,
for all SeN,
e(w, vl, S) = e(w, vl, N \ Sl. (4.10)
Hence, for any 1 :::;k :::;p, a balanced collection is given by C = {S, N \ S}
for some SE 'Dk. To see that (4.10) holds, note that, if il E S, then
e(vl, S, w) = vl(S) - Wil - w(S \ {il})
=sl(S\{il})_ sl(N~{il}) _ sl(S~{il}) =_i(~\S). (4.11)
If il fl. S, then
( l S ) _ O _ sl(S) __ sl(S)
ev, ,w - 2 - 2· (4.12)
Since il E S {:} il fl. N \ S, (4.10) follows. o
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4.3.2 Locations where multiple banks have ATMs
In order to investigate the structure of the core for this case, we compute the
utopia vector and the minimum rights vector, which form upper and lower
bounds, respectively, for core allocations. We will shown that the bounds
coincide, hence the core consists of a single point. For every i E N we have
{
O ifi E Al,
Mi{Vl) = vl{N) - vl{N \ {i}) = sf otherwise. (4.13)
If i EN \ Al, then mi{vl) is the maximum of
and
hence
(4.14)
If i E Al, then
From (4.13)-{4.15) follows that M{vl) = m{vl). This gives us useful infor-
mation about the core, which in this case turns out to consist of a single
point.
Theorem 4.3.9 If lE LM, then C{vl) = {x}, where x is given by
{
O ifiEAl,
Xi = sf otherwise. (4.16)
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Proof. Theorem 4.3.9 also follows from Proposition 4.3.1 and Potters and
Tijs (1989). In order to see that the core is nonempty, note that, for any
SC_;_N,
x(S) = l(S \ Al) ~ vl(S),
and that x(N) = sl(N \ Ai) = vl(N). Hence x E C(vl).
Uniqueness follows from (4.4) and m{vl) = x = M{vl). o
Example 4.3.10 Recall the situation described in Example 4.2.1 and Ex-
ample 4.2.2. Bank B is the only one that does not have ATMs, so the only
cost savings are those involving B's transactions. According to (4.16), B
will be allowed to keep the entire cost savings himself, and this yields the
unique core allocation (0,1200, O). The game vi is not convex, since
and the Shapley value, given by cp(vl) = (200,800,200), is not a core
element. <I
Theorem 4.3.11 If t e LM, then x = M{vl) = r(vl) = NU(vl), where x
is given by (4.16).
The result also follows from Proposition 4.3.1 and Potters and Tijs (1989).
Proof. Since x(N) = vl(N), the second equality follows from m(vl) =
M( Vi). The third equality follows since the nucleolus is always a core point,
if the core is nonempty. O
4.4 Two allocation rules for multiple-location garnes
Now we turn to the ATM-game v defined by (4.2). In Section 4.3 we pro-
posed allocation rules for single-location ATM-garnes. In the following we
will discuss two allocation rules for situations with multiple locations. These
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ru1es aggregate, over the set of locations, the allocation vectors proposed for
single locations. We shall relate the resu1ting solutions to solution concepts
such as the core and the r-value. Also, we will investigate whether these
allocations rule correspond to population monotonic allocation schemes, as
defined by Sprumont (1990). Let P(N) denote the set of nonempty subsets
ofN.
Definition 4.4.1 A vector d = (diS)iES,SEP(N) is a population monotonic
allocation scheme of the game v if and only if
L~S =v(S)
iES
diS ~ ~T
VS E P(N), (4.17)
Vi E S ~ T E P(N). (4.18)
Hence, d specifies an allocation for every game corresponding to the popu-
lation S ~ N, where the characteristic function is given by the restriction
of v to the members of S. Condition (4.17) expresses that the entire cost
v(S) shou1d be covered, and (4.18) that no player shou1d be made worse off
as new players enter the games. In the ATM network situation, population
monotonicity ensures that members of an existing network will not object
to new banks joining the network.
4.4.1 The equal-split rule
We first propose an allocation ru1e that splits the cost savings equally be-
tween owners of transactions and the owner of the ATMs. Thus, for .e E LI
we use wL given by (4.7), and for.e ELM use xL given by (4.16). This yields
the allocation Y given by, for every i EN,
Yi= Lwf+ L xf
LELl LELM
(4.19)
Since the equal-split rille adds core elements of the games vL, the following
resu1t is obvious.
Theorem 4.4.2 The equal-split rule gives a core element of the game v.
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S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
v(S) ° ° ° 1600 1000 1200 2600
(a) The game
(0,0,2600)
1\
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \,
(1400,200,1000)
I
" q,(v) "I • \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
(2600,0, O) cI----- -------0--0- ------- -4, (0,2600, O)
(1400,1200,0) (1000,1600,0)
,
z = (0, 1600,1000)
(b) The core (area enclosed by solid lines)
Figure 4.4: Example 4.4.3
Example 4.4.3 [Figure 4.4] Consider a situation with two locations, i.e.,
L := {l,2}, and three banks, i.e., N = {A, B, C}. In location 1 the banks
have 100, 150, and 200 transactions, respectively. Here, bank A and C
have ATMs. In location 2 the banks have 200, 50, and 125 transactions,
respectively, and only bank A has ATMs there. The locations correspond to
those described in Example 4.2.1 and 4.3.5, respectively. As before, et = 1,
(3 = 2, and 'Y = 10. The values of the resulting game v are shown in
Figure 4.4(a), and a picture of the core in Figure 4.4(b). In location 1,
where both bank A and C have ATMs, the equal-split rule prescribes the
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allocation (O,1200,O), and in location 2, where only bank A has ATMs,
the allocation (700,200,500). Summing the allocation vectors, we get y =
(700,1400,500). From Figure 4.4(b) it can be seen that this is a point
in the relative interior of the core. It coincides with the r-value, but not
with the Shapley value or the nucleolus, given by the allocation vectors
(900,1000,700) and (950,1150,500), respectively. <3
Theorem 4.4.4 If Y results from the equal-split rule, then y = r( v).
Proof. In general the r-value is not additive, hence we must show that
r(v) = ~LEL r{vL) holds. Theorem 4.3.7 states that r{vL) = ~M{vL) for
i ELl, and Theorem 4.3.11 that r(vL) = M{vL) for i ELM. Hence, the
r-values for single-location games depend only on the utopia vectors, for
which M{v) = ~LEL M(vL) holds. O
The equal-split does not always satisfy population monotonicity, as the fol-
lowing example illustrates.
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} N
v(S) O O O p q+p q q+2p
Figure 4.5: The game v of Example 4.4.5
Example 4.4.5 [Figure 4.4.1] Consider a situation with two locations, i.e.,
L = {1,2}, and three banks, i.e., N = {A, B, C}. A has ATMs in both
locations, B in location 1, and C in neither location. Hence, Al = {A, B},
and A2 = {A}. The number of transactions for each bank i E N and each
location i E L is
L {q if i =C and i= 1,
ni = p otherwise,
where p < q. Let 'Y - f3 = 1. The cost savings realized by the various
coalitions S ~ N, i.e., the values of the game v, are shown in Figure 4.4.1.
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Suppose that B and C have formed a network. The cost savings that they
realize are q, involving only the transactions of C in location 1, where B is
present. According to the equal-split rule, they will both get a payoff of
q
2"'
Suppose that A wants to join the network. It will provide cost savings for
both B and C in location 2, where it is the only bank present, and the total
cost savings now increase to 2p+q. The equal-split rule yields the allocation
Hence, bank B, since p < q, will have its payoff reduced, and it is therefore
likely that it will oppose A being accepted as a new participant in the
network. <I
However, there are situations in which even the equal-split rule satisfies
population monotonicity, as the next example shows.
Example 4.4.6 Consider Example 4.4.5 again, but now with the assump-
tion that p = q, i.e., all the banks have the same number of transactions,
in all locations i E L. We will check that the allocation scheme (YiS)SEP(N)
corresponding to the equal-split rule is population monotonic. If a bank
operate on its own, i.e., if lSI = 1, no cost savings will be realized, and we
have YiS = O for all i EN. If all the banks participate in the network, the
total cost savings will be 3p, and the equal-split rule yields the allocation
Since the equal-split rule always assigns positive payoffs to all banks, we
only need to check, for each SeN such that lSI = 2, that YiS ~ YiN. The
equal-split rule, when applied to the network formed by S, gives bank i E S
the payoff
{
~ if S = {A,B},
YiS = P if S = {A,C},
~ if S = {B,C},
hence population monotonicity is satisfied. <I
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4.4.2 The transaction-based rule
Suppose that banks with ATMs are given no reward for the cost savings that
they provide for the banks without ATMs. The cost savings are rewarded to
the bank owning the transactions for which the savings are realized. Thus,
for every l E L, we choose xl as defined by (4.16), and then we sum over
the set of locations. This yields the allocation vector z given by, for every
iEN,
(4.20)
Theorem 4.4.7 The transaction-based rule gives a core element of v.
Proof. We know that xl E C(vl) for all R. E L, which follows from Theorem
(4.3.3)(ii) and Theorem 4.3.9. O
Example 4.4.8 We apply (4.16) to location 1 and 2, respectively, and get
the allocations vectors (0,1200, O) and (0,400,1000). By summing these, we
get the allocation vector z = (0,1600,1000). From Figure 4.4(b) we see that
this corresponds to one of the extreme points of the core." <I
We saw in Section 4.4.1 that the equal-split rule is not necessarily population
monotonic. The transaction-based rule is better in this respect.
Theorem 4.4.9 The transaction-based rule is a population monotonic al-
location scheme.
Proof. Let LS := {l EL: S n Al =1= Ø}, and, for every i E S,
ZiS = ~lELS sf. Since sf ~ O for all i E N, S ~ T implies LS ~ LT,
i~Al
we have ZiS ~ ZiS for i E S ~ T. O
4That this is not so in general can be verified by e.g. adding a location 3 to the example,
where nf = 100 for all i E N, and A3 = {B}.
92 Cost Alloeation in a Bank ATM Network
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents a simple model of a bank ATM network. Assumptions
Al and A2 of Section 4.2 imply that the single-location games studied in
Section 4.3 are information market games, which have a particularly simple
structure. In the case where only one bank has ATMs in a location, the
core is relatively large, and several important solution concepts coincide
with a central point in the core. In the case where more than one bank
has ATMs, the core consists of a single point. By combining allocations for
single-location games via the equal-split rule of Section 4.4, we were able to
obtain r-value, which is a core point. The transaction-based rule also yields
a core point, and, in contrast to the equal-split rule, this rule is population-
mononotonic, i.e., no bank williose as a result of a new bank entering the
network.
The simplistic assumptions with respect to the behaviour of the bank cus-
tomers may be responsible for the elegant results obtained, and should be
made more realistic, e.g., by introducing distances.
Chapter 5
Lower and Upper Bounds for
Linear Production Games
5.1 Introduction
We study a model of a production economy, in which the production tech-
nology is given by linear relationships, and where every group of agents have
access to the same technology. There is a set of resources R that can be
used to produce a set of products P. The production technology is given
by a matrix A, where aij is the amount of resource i needed to produce one
unit of product i- It is assumed that an infinite amount of product j can
be sold at the price Cj, giving the price vector c. The resources available
is given by a vector b, where bi is the amount available of resource i. The
maximal profit that can be made from the resource bundle b is given by
(5.1)
where Xj denotes the amount of product j that is produced.
The resources are owned by a set N of agents, and ownership of the resources
is shared among the agents. The agents may operate on their own, or they
may combine their resources in order to increase the total profit. Assuming
that cooperation leads to an increase in the total profit, the agents need to
agree on how to share this profit among themselves, and the way in which
they do this will influence the incentives for them to cooperate or not. It
may, for example, be the case that a group of agents receives so little of
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the total profit that they will be better off by forming their own production
facility than putting their resources into the joint production facility. The
problem of finding an allocation of the profit can be modeled as a TV-
game, such as in Owen (1975), providing us with solution concepts such as
the core. Generalizations, with respect to how resources are controlled by
various subsets (coalitions) of agents, have been studied by Granot (1986)
and Curiel et al. (1989).
To describe a solution to a TV-game, we need to know not only the profit
that can be made by N, but also the corresponding values for some or all
of the subsets SeN. Since there are 2n - 1 such subsets, the amount of
computational work involved can be prohibitive. In this chapter we present
a method that provides US with lower and upper bounds on v(S) for any
S ~ N, while requiring less computational effort than actually computing
v(S). Our method is related to aggregation of columns and rows in linear
programming problems, as in Zipkin (1980b) and Zipkin (1980a), respec-
tively.
In Section 5.2 we define linear production processes and linear production
games, as well as some concepts related to cooperative game theory. Section
5.3 describes how lower and upper bounds for linear production games can be
found by aggregating columns and rows, respectively, and in Section 5.4 we
give a method to find bounds on the error resulting from the aggregation.
The method involves solving a mixed integer programming problem, and
the solution from this problem also suggests how the weight matrix of the
aggregated game may be updated in order to improve the bound. Finally, in
Section 5.5, we investigate, using numerical examples, how the performance
of the aggregation approach depends on the structure of the problem data.
5.2 Linear production games
The set of agents (players) is denoted by N, the set of resources by R, and
the set of products by P, where n := 1Nl, r := IRI, and p := IPI. The
production technology is described by the matrix A E RRXP, where aij
is the amount of resource i needed to produce one unit of product i- The
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profit per unit sold ofproduct j is Cj, making up the column! vector c ERP.
The ownership of the resources is described by the vector-valued functiorr'
b: 2N ~ RH, where bi(S) is the amount of resource i that the subset S ~ N
controls.
Definition 5.2.1 The triple (A, b,c) is a linear production process if
(i) aij ~ O for all i E Rand j EP,
(ii) bi(S) ~ O for all i E Rand SE 2N,
(iii) if Cj > O, then there exists some resource i such that aij > O.
The above assumptions ensures that that the linear programs that we will
define below have finite optimal solutions. For a linear production process
(A, b,c), and for every S E 2N, the maximal profit that the agents in S can
obtain by pooling their resources is given by
V(A,b,c)(S) :=max {eT x: Ax:::; b(S), x ER~}. (5.2)
We will refer to the LP-problem given by (5.2) as LP(A,b,c,S), or, ifthis is
unambiguous, just LP(S). From the Duality Theorem of Linear Program-
ming follows that we can also compute the value of LP(S) from
For every linear production process (A, b,c) we define a linear production
game (N, v(A,b,c»), where N is the set of players, and v(A,b,c) : 2N ~ R is the
characteristic function. We will mostly skip the superscript and just write
v for the characteristic function.
Several variations on linear production games, with respect to how the func-
tion b is defined, exist in the literature. Owen (1975) studies the situation
where the resources are controlled by individual players, where bik denotes
the amount of resource i controlled by player k. Owen assumes that a group
of players can pool their resources by simply adding the individual amounts,
i.e., bi(S) = EkES bik· In this case, an allocation in the core can be deduced
l ff nothing else is stated, a vector is assumed to consist of one column.
2Let 2N denote the set of all subsets of N.
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from an optimal solution to the dual of LP(N). If u is such an optimal
dual solution then y is in the core of v, where Yk := LiER bikui for every
kEN. Gellekom et al. (1999) provide alternative characterizations of this
allocation rule.
Granot (1986) generalizes this model, and studies the core of the linear
production game (N, v(A,b,c)) by looking at the resource garnes (N, bil, i E
R. li the cores of all the resource games are nonempty, then the core of
(N, v(A,b,c)) is also nonempty. Moreover, if ti is a core allocation for the
resource game (N, bi) for every i E R, and u is an optimal dual solution
to LP(N), then a core allocation for the game (N, v(A,b,c)) is given by the
vector y, where the amount allocated to player k is Yk := LiER t1Ui.
Curiel et al. (1989) assumes that each resource i E R is divided into ~
portions. The amount of resource i belonging to portion q, 1 ~ q ~ di, is bl.
Portion q of resource i is controlled by a committee R ~ N, meaning that
a coalition S ~ N can only use this portion if it contains R. Formally, this
is modeled using a simple game3 (N,wl), where wl(S) = 1 only if R ~ S.
The amount of resource i E R controlled by coalition S is given by bi (S) :=
L~lb1w1(S). Curiel et al. show that the core of a linear production game
is nonempty if all the games wl, where i E Rand q E {I, ... ,~}, have
nonempty cores. Moreover, if zi is in the core of the game (N,wl) for every
i E Rand q E {I, ... ,~}, and if u is an optimal dual solution to LP(N),
then y is a core allocatin for (N, v(A,b,c)), where Yk := LiER UiL:~lb1(z£)k
for every kEN.
5.3 Aggregation of columns and rows
Reducing the size of (each of) the linear programs that must be solved in
order to compute v can be done by aggregating over columns or rows (or
both), as in Zipkin (1980b) and Zipkin (1980a), respectively.
In Zipkin (1980b), column aggregation is performed by specifying a partition
of the set of columns. The columns belonging to each partition member are
combined using a pre-specified weight vector. After the aggregated problem
3A game (N,g) is simple if g(N) = 1 and g(S) E {O,I} for every S S;;; N.
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has been solved, a feasible solution to the original problem can be obtained
by disaggregating using the same weight vectors. Our approach is a general-
ization" of that of Zipkin, and the aggregation is performed by multiplying
A and c with the matrix G E R~xP, where P is the set of "products" of the
resulting linear production process (AG, b, GT c). Our purpose is to reduce
the size of the LP-problems to be solved when computing the values of the
linear production game, so in most cases we will have p < p. The values
of the resulting linear production game, which we label vG, is given by, for
every S ~ N,
vG(S) := v(AG,b,GTc)(S) = max {cTGX: AGX ~ b(S), X E R~}. (5.4)
The linear program to be solved by coalition S will be denoted LpG(S) =
LP{AG, b,GT c, S). In order to distinguish between the solutions of the
original and the aggregated LP-problem, we will use uppercase letters to
denote solutions to the latter problem. In order to illustrate how vG is
constructed, we provide an example.
Example 5.3.1 [Figures 5.1 and 5.2] There are four products (p = 4) and
two resources (r = 2), and the production technology and the profits that
can be made are given by
The resources are controlled by three players (n = 3), and, as in Owen
(1975), we assume that b(S) :=Bef for every S ~ N, where
[ 9 O 6]B= 1 8 3 .
4In Zipkin (1980b), column aggregation is performed by specifying a partition u =
{Pic : k = 1, ... ,K} of P, and a weight vector gle for each member of this partition.
To illustrate how our approach relates to that of Zipkin, consider an example with four
products, where u = {{l, 2}, {3, 4}}, and where g~ = g~ = g~ = g~ = 0.5. In our case this
corresponds to the matrix
[
0.5 O lG = 0.5 O
O 0.5
O 0.5
Note that our approach is more general than that of Zipkin, in that aggregation is done
with respect to coverings of the set of columns, since each row of G can have more than
one nonzero element (see Section 4 of Zipkin (1980b».
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The value of coalition 8 is computed as
v(8) = max 6XI+ 6X2 + 8X3 + 5X4
s.t. 2XI+ 1x2 + 3X3 + 1X4 +Sl = bl(8)
lXI + 2X2 + 2X3 + 1x4 + s2 = ~(8)
Xj ~ O for j = 1,2,3,4
Si ~ O for i = 1, 2
and the (unique) optimal solutions of the primal problems are shown in
Figure 5.1.
8 Xl X2 X3 X4 Sl S2 v(8) vG(8) vG (8)
1 1 O O O 7 O 6 5.25 6
2 O O O O O 8 O O O
3 3 O O O O O 18 15.75 18
1 2 O O O 9 O O 45 37.8 45
1 3 4 O O O 7 O 24 21 24
2 3 O 5 O 1 O O 35 25.2 30
1 2 3 3 O O 9 O O 63 63 63
Figure 5.1: Optimal primal solutions for Example 5.3.1
Suppose now that we combine the columns of A using one of the solutions
shown in Figure 5.1. Choosing the solution corresponding to the grand
coalition, i.e.,
gives the new linear production process (AG, b, GT c), where
Since the aggregated game has a single column, its value for a particular
coalition can be computed by solving a continuous knapsack problem, e.g.,
for the grand coalition the value is
vG(N) =max{63X : 15X s 15, 12X s 12, X E R~}
{
15 12}= 63 x min 15' 12 = 63 = v(N).
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Not surprisingly, for the grand coalition, from which we obtained the ag-
gregation weights, the game vG coincides with v. For the other coalitions,
having smaller amounts of resources than N, the value of the aggregated
game is obtained by scaling down the value of the grand coalition. E.g., for
coalition {l,3},
vG{1,3) = max{63X : 15X s 15, 12X ~ 4, X E R~}
= 63 x min { ~:' t2} = 21 < v{l, 3) = 24.
We note that for all coalitions, the game vG forms a lower bound for v.
Had we instead chosen the weight matrix
G' = [~ ~]O O '
9 O
i.e., the columns of G' correspond to the optimal solutions of LP{l, 2) and
LP{1,3), the game vG', also shown in Figure 5.1, would result. The games
v and vG' coincide for all but one coalition, namely {2,3}. An interesting
point is that coincidence occurs even for coalitions for which we did not
include the optimal solution in G'. We will show, in Proposition 5.3.2{iii)
that coincidence will occur for a coalition S if and only if the optimal solution
for LP{S) can be obtained as a linear combination of the columns of G'. In
the example, the optimal solution for the grand coalition can be obtained''
5Jn fact, the two problems LP(N) and LP(l, 2) have the same optimal basis, hence the
solution of both problems could have been obtained using the corresponding basis matrix.
For any coalition S we can write the primal of LP(S) as
v(S) = max eTx
s.t Ax + Is = b(S)
x ~ O, s ~ O,
where s is a vector of slack variables. Letting
(5.5)
dT := [eT OT], v= [ : ] , and C := [A 1],
we can rewrite (5.5) as
max dTy
s.t Cy = b(S)
y~O
(5.6)
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by combining the solutions for {l,2} and {l,3} as
[3 O O 9]=~[4 O O 0]+1·[0 O O 9],
hence we will have vG'(N) = v(N). The weights in this expression corre-
spond to the optimal primal solution of LpG' (N), i.e., Xi = iand X2 = 1.
<I
Proposition 5.3.2 Let (A, b,c) be a linear production process, and G E
R~xP. Then the following statements are true:
(i) (AG, b,GTc) is a linear production process.
(ii) vG(S) ~ v(S) for every S ~ N.
(iii) vG(S) = v(S) if and only if there exists X E RP such that GX is an
optimal primal solution of LP(S).
Proof. (i) Since A and G have non-negative elements, the elements of
AG must also be non-negative. Also, if (GTc); = 'EkEP ckgkj > Ofor some
j E P, then there must exist some k E P such that Ck> Oand gkj > o.
Then, since (A, b,c) E C, there must exist some i E R such that aik > O,
and hence (AG)ij = 'E,EPailg'j ~ aikgkj > O.
(ii) For S ~ N and an optimal solution X to the primal of LpG(S), we
have AGX ~ b(S), implying that GX is a feasible solution to the primal of
LP(S), hence we must have v(S) ~ cTGX = vG(S).
The optimal basis matrix B E RRXR, not to be confused with the matrix describing
ownership of the resources, determines the solutions of the primal and dual, respectively,
as
Ye =B-lb(S) and u· = (d~B-l)T.
Hence, if B is an optimal basis also for some other coalition R i= S, then B-lb(R) is an
optimal primal solution to LP(R).
In the example, an optimal basis for coalitions N and {I, 2} corresponds to columns 1
and 4 of the matrix A, i.e., the basis matrix
B [2 1] d its i B-1 [1 -1]= 1 2 an Its inverse = -1 2 .
The optimal solution for LP(N) and LP(l, 2) are, respectively,
B-lb(N) =B-1 [ ~~] = [ ~ ] and B-lb(l, 2) =B-1 [ ~ ] = [ ~ ] .
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(iii) If GX is optimal in LP(S), then
The optimality of GX in LP(S) implies AGX ~ b(S), i.e., X is feasible
in the primal of LpG(S), hence the first inequality. The second inequality
follows from (ii).
Suppose vG(S) = cTax = v(S), where X E RP is an optimal primal solu-
tion to LpG(S). Then clearly, GX E RP is feasible in LP(S), since GX ~ O
and AGX ~ b(S). Then, since v(S) = cTGX, the solution GX must be op-
timal in LP(S). O
(0,0,63)
•
(63,0,0) (0,63,0)
Figure 5.2: Core of v and vG in Example 5.3.1
From Proposition 5.3.2(iii), we know that by including in G an optimal
solution for the grand coalition, we can make vG(N) = v(N). Also, since
vG ~ v, by Proposition 5.3.2(ii), the core of vG will contain the core of v.
This is illustrated by Figure 5.2, where the solid lines represent the game v,
and the dashed lines the game vG.
102 Lower and Upper Bounds for Linear Production Games
We may also aggregate over the rows (resource constraints) of the LP-
problem, as in Zipkin (1980a). Let il be the set of "resources" in the
aggregated problem. Then, take some H E R!XR and define, for every
8~N,
vH(8) := v(HA,bH,c)(8) =max {eT x: HAx s bH(8), x E R~}
==IUTHb(8): UTHA ~ eT, UER!},
where bH (8) := Hb(8) for every 8 ~ N. The linear program to be solved
by coalition 8 will be denoted LpH(8) = LP(HA,bH,e,8).
Example 5.3.3 [Figures 5.3 and 5.4] There are two products (p = 2) and
four resources (r = 4), and the production technology and the profits that
can be made are given by
The resources are controlled by three players(n = 3), and b(8) = Be~ for
every 8 ~N, where
The value of coalition 8 can be obtained as
v(8) = min ulbl(8) + u2b:!(8) + u3~(8) +U4b4(8)
s.t. 2U2+ 1u2 + 3U3+ 1u4 - Sl = 6
lUI + 2U2+ 2U3+ 1u4 - S2 = 6
Ui ~ Ofor i = 1,2,3,4
Sj ~ Ofor j = 1,2
and the optimal solutions of the dual problems are shown in Figure 5.3.
The weight matrix could e.g. be constructed from the dual solution for the
grand coalition, i.e.,
H = [O 1.5 1.5 O],
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8 'Ul 'U2 'U3 'U4 Sl S2 v(8) vH(8) vH (8) vH" (8)
1 O 1.5 1.5 O O O 6 6 6 6
O 6 O O O 6
2 6 O O O 6 O O 18 12 O
3 2 2 O O O O 12 15 15 15
1 2 O O 3 O 3 O 21 24 21 24
1 3 O 1.5 1.5 O O O 21 21 21 21
2 3 6 O O O 6 O 18 33 33 18
1 2 3 O 1.5 1.5 O O O 39 39 39 39
Figure 5.3: Optimal dual solutions for Example 5.3.3
which produces the new linear production process'' (HA,Hb,c), where
HA = [6 6] and HB = [6 18 15].
The dual of LpH (N) can now easily be solved as a continuous knapsack
problem
vH (N) = min{39U : 6U ~ 6, 6U ~ 6, U ER~}
=39 xmax{~,~} =39=v(N).
Again, as for column-aggregation, the value of vH for the grand coalition,
which we used to generate H, coincides with the value of the original game.
For other coalitions we get an upper bound on v, e.g.,
vH (2) = min{18U: 6U ~ 6, 6U ~ 6, U E R~}
= 18 x max { ~, ~} = 18 ~ v(2).
Note also that, since the dual constraints are the same for all coalitions, and
they all have positive amounts of the single resource, U* = 1 will be the
optimal solution for all of them, and we have the additive structure given by
vH(8) = L,kEs(HB)k, i.e., the value for a coalition 8 is given by the total
value of the resources owned by 8, where the value is computed using the
price vector included in H.
6It is not obvious that the aggregation actually yields a linear production process, since
we may use H such that for a product j for which ej > O, we have (HA)ij = Ofor all
i E R.
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A slightly better bound is obtained by using
H'=[O 6 O OJO O 3 O '
i.e., we use the dual solutions corresponding to the coalitions {l} and {l, 2}.
Note that we have v(N) = vH' (N), even though the optimal dual solution
for the grand coalition is not included in H'. However, as we shall prove
in Proposition 5.3.4(iii) below, coincidence follows from the fact that the
optimal dual solution of LP(N) can be written as a linear combination of
the two row vectors of H', i.e.,
[O 1.5 1.5 O] = ~ [O 6 O O] + ~ [O O 3 O].
The weights correspond to the optimal dual solution of LpH' (N), i.e., Ui =
1/4 and U; = 1/2. <I
Proposition 5.3.4 Let (A, b,c) be a linear production process, and H E
RH.XR+ .
(i) If (HA, bH, c) is a linear production process, then vH(8) ;:::v(8) for
every 8 ~ N.
(ii) If, for some 8 ~ N, there exists U E RH. such that HTU is optimal in
the dual of LP(8), then (HA, bH,c) is a linear production process.
(iii) vH (8) = v(8) if and only if there exists U E RH. such that HTU is
optimal in the dual of LP(8).
Proof. (i) Take 8 ~ N and an optimal solution U to the dual of LpH (8).
Then, since the optimality of U implies urHA;::: cT, urH must be feasible
in the dual of LP(8), which implies vH (8) = urHb(8) ;:::v(8).
(ii) Since the elements of A and H, as well as the values returned by the
function b, are non-negative, this must also be the case for the elements of
HA, as well as the values returned by bH. Also, since HTU is optimal in
the dual of LP(8), we must have EiEH.Ui(HA)ij ;:::Cj for all j E P. So if
Cj > O, there must exist some i E It such that (HA)ij > O.
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(iii) Ifuro is optimal in the dual of LP(S), then
v(S) = UTHb(S) ~ vH (S) ~ v(S) => vH (S) = v(S).
The optimality of HTU implies UTHA ~ eT and HTU ~ O, hence U must
be feasible in the dual of LpH (S), which implies the first inequality. The
second inequality follows from (i).
Suppose vH(S) = uTHb(S) = v(S), where U E RH is optimal in the dual
of LpH(S). Then uTH ~ Oand uTHA ~ eT implies that HTU is feasible
in the dual of LP(S), and optimality follows from v(S) = UTHb(S). O
(0,0,39)
•
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Figure 5.4: Core of v and vH in Example 5.3.3
The cores of v and vH in Example 5.3.3 are illustrated in Figure 5.4, where
the solid (dashed) lines are hyperplanes corresponding to v (vH). Since vH
is an upper bound for v, the core of vH is contained in the core of v. Note
that the core of vH consists of the single point
[6 18 15] =HB,
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i.e., the allocation where the resources of the players are valued at the price
vector corresponding to the dual solution of LP(N).
Proposition 5.3.5 Let u be an optimal dual solution to LP(Q) for some
Q ~ N such that v(Q) > O. Then, if H = uT, we have vH(S) = uTb(S) for
every S ~ N.
Proof. Since the aggregated problem contains only one row, i.e., f = 1,
the value of the game can be computed, for any S, as
vH(S):= min {UuTb(S) : UuT A ~ eT, U E R~}
= uTb(S)· max ;3
A
"" (5.7)
jEP u 3
u.T Ai >0
Note that the feasibility of u, for any Q ~ N, implies that uT Aj ~ ej holds
for every j E P. Moreover, since v(Q) > O, it must be optimal for the
coalition Q to produce at least ane product, hence we must have uT Aj = ej
for at least ane j E P. Then vH (S) = uTb(S) follows from (5.7). O
5.4 Error bounds and €-cores
The aggregated games presented in Section 5.3 enable us to analyze the orig-
inal game with less computational effort. However, aggregation introduces
a possible error, and the purpose of this section is to give an estimate of this
error.
First, we need to make clear what we mean by "error". Since the core is
one of the most widely used solution concepts for TU-games, it is natural
to discuss error bounds relative to it. Suppose we use the game vG as
an approximation to the game v, where we have chosen G, according to
Proposition 5.3.2, such that the core of v is contained in the core of vG.
Knowing that a pre-imputation z belongs to C(vG) thus does not guarantee
that it also belongs to C(v), hence there might exist some coalition S that
receives less than its stand-alone value, i.e., z(S) < v(S). We shall use as a
"distance measure" the excess e(v, S, z) = v(S) - z(S).
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Suppose we know that
C(vG) ~ CE(v) = {x E I*(v) : e(v, S, x) ~ f 'VS eN}
for some e, Since z E CE(v), we know that no coalition has an excess of more
than e, hence no coalition receives less than v(S) - e. We would like to find
the smallest e-core containing C(vG), i.e., we need to solve
(5.8)
Since making e sufficiently high always makes CE(v) nonempty, (5.8) always
has a solution.
Proposition 5.4.1 Let (A, b,c) be a linear production process, and v be
the corresponding linear production game. Let G be a matrix constructed
according to Proposition 5.3.2 such that C(v) ~ C(vG), and let
(5.9)
Proof. If z E C(vG), and Q C N, then
o
In Example 5.3.1, (5.9) gives f = 9.8 = v(2,3) -vG({2,3}), and Figure 5.5
illustrates that CE(v) ~ C(vG). The solid lines correspond to the sets
HHv) := {z E I*(v) : z(S) = v(S) - e},
and CE(v) is represented by the hatched area enclosed by these lines. The
cores of v and vG are given by the thick solid line and the shaded area,
respectively.
Likewise, consider the games v and vH, and suppose we know that
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(0,0,63)
•
(63,0,0) (0,63,0)
Figure 5.5: Cores of v and vG, and the s-core for f = 12.4, in Example 5.3.1
for some e. By using vH instead of v, we may exclude from consideration
some elements of the core of v. However, we are certain to include all the
points in CE(v), i.e., those with an excess less than or equal to e. Of course,
for e = 0, we exclude no core imputations, and in this ease it follows that
the cores of v and vH coincide. We would like to find the largest e-core that
is contained in C(vH), i.e., we solve
(5.10)
Whereas (5.8) always has a solution, (5.10) does not, since CE(v) is empty
for small enough values of e.
Proposition 5.4.2 Let (A, b, c) be a linear production process, and v the
corresponding linear production game. Let H be a matrix constructed ac-
cording to Proposition 5.3.4 such that C(vH) ~ C(v), and let
f:= min {v(S) -vH(S)}.
SE2N\{N,0}
Then, ijCE(v) =I 0, we have CE(v) ~ C(vH).
(5.11)
Proof. If z E CE(v), and Qc N, then
v(Q) - z(Q) ~ f ~ v(Q) - vH(Q) => z(Q) ~ vH (Q).
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o
In Example 5.3.3, if the weight matrix
H" = [O 1.5 1.5 O]
6 O O O
is used, then (5.11) gives f = -3 = v(1,2) - vH' (1,2) = v(3) - vH' (3). In
Figure 5.6 the cores of v and vH" are given by the shaded area and the thick
solid line, respectively. The e-core of v is represented by the white solid line,
and we see that CE(v) ~ C(vHII). Note that we deliberately chose H" here
in order to make the s-core of nonempty, given that e satisfies (5.11).
(0,0,39)
•
{1,2}
{3}
•
(39,0,0)
•
(0,39,0)
Figure 5.6: Cores of v and vH", and the s-core, for Example 5.3.3
How can we find the error bounds given by (5.9) and (5.11) in practice? In
the general case, there is not much to say about this issue, and we therefore
choose to consider Owen's (1975) model. Here, player k controls bik units
of resource i, where bik correspond to row i and column k of the matrix
B E R!X N. The coalition S pool their resources by simply summing them,
i.e., they control the resource vector b(S) := Be~. In what follows, we will
let (A,B, c) denote a linear production process, where the matrix B has
replaced the function b.
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Problem (5.9) may be formulated as
S integer
(5.12)
(5.13)
(5.14)
(5.15)
(5.16)
(5.17)
(5.18)
x,u,s
subject to Ax $ Bs
uT AG ~ cTG
x~O
u~O
O$s$l
In a solution (z, u, s) to (5.12)-(5.18), x E RP is a solution to the primal
of LP(S), and u E R" is a solution to the dual of LpG(S). The coalition
S corresponding to the solution is given by S = {k EN: Sk = 1}. The
objective function (5.12) maximizes the difference between the optimal val-
ues of the two problems. Primal feasibility of LP(S) is ensured by (5.13)
and (5.15), and dual feasibility of LpG(S) by (5.14) and (5.16). Problem
(5.12)-(5.18) may be rewritten as:
max L CjXj - LL bikUiSk
jEP iERkEN
subject to L aijXj sL bikSk
jEP kEN
L UiL aij9jt ~ L Cj9tj
iER jEP jEP
Xj ~ O
Ui ~ O
0$ Sk s 1
(5.19)
Vi ER (5.20)
(5.21)
Vj EP
Vi ER
VkEN
(5.22)
(5.23)
(5.24)
(5.25)S integer
Finding a solution to (5.19)-(5.25) is made more difficult by the fact that
(5.19) is non-concave, and because of the integrality condition (5.25). Meth-
ods to linearize such problems are given by Petersen (1971), Glover (1975),
and Adams and Sherali (1990). In Petersen (1971) the product term 'UiSk is
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replaced by the variable Wik, and the following constraints are added:
Ui - ut(l- Sk) ~ Wik ~ utSk
Wik ~ O
'Vi E R, kEN
'Vi E R, kEN
'Vi E R, kEN
(5.26)
(5.27)
(5.28)
The constant ut is an upper bound on the value of the variable Uio If Sk = 1,
then the first inequality of (5.26), together with (5.28) imply Ui ~ Wik ~ Uio
In the case where Sk =O,the second inequality of (5.26) together with (5.27)
imply O ~ Wik ~ O. Hence the equality Wik = UiSk always holds, and we
may replace the objective function (5.19) by
max L CjXj - L L bikWik·
jEP iERkEN
(5.29)
Problem (5.19)-(5.25) is equivalent to the mixed-integer programming prob-
lem given by (5.20)-(5.29), hereafter referred to as MIpG. Note that in an
optimal solution, either we have Ui = Ofor all i E R, or at least one of the
constraints (5.21) is binding. Hence the upper bounds for the variable u can
be set to
'Vi E R.
Problem (5.11) may be formulated as
S integer,
(5.30)
(5.31)
(5.32)
(5.33)
(5.34)
(5.35)
(5.36)
x,u,s
subject to HAx sHBs
uTA ~ cT
x~O
u~O
O~s~l
which, in a manner similar to that applied to (5.12)-(5.18), can be formulated
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as
max LCjXj - L L bikWik (5.37)
jeP ieRkeN
subject to L Xj L htiaij s L Sk L htibik Vi E il (5.38)
jeP ieR keN ieR
L Uiaij ~ Cj Vj E P (5.39)
ieR
Xj ~ O Vj E P (5.40)
Ui ~ O Vi E R (5.41)
Os Sk s 1 Vk E N (5.42)
S integer (5.43)
Ui - ut (1 - Sk) ~ Wik ~ ut Sk Vi E R, kEN (5.44)
Wik ~ O Vi E R, kEN (5.45)
Wik ~ Ui Vi E R, kEN, (5.46)
where
ut := max {rp.ax Cj ,O}
,eP aij
aij'FO
Vi ER.
The mixed integer programming problem given by (5.37)-(5.46) will here-
after be referred to as M I pH.
Example 5.4.3 [Figure 5.7] The data of this example is given by n = 5,
p = 5, r = 10,
7 3 5 2 1 4 O 15 O O
6 9 9 5 10 O 22 18 O O
6 3 3 4 3 53 9 O 11 O O9 5 4 2 1 57 O 17 O 5 O3 6 10 2 4 19 O O 7 OA= 4 5 1 3 8 ' c= 49 , and B = O 13 O 9 O
4 3 4 2 3 34 2 O O O 15
7 9 1 1 7 41 O 22 O O 4
5 8 9 3 2 12 O O O 16
2 6 3 10 2 O 23 O O O
The value of the grand coalition is v(N) = 241.046. We aggregate rows
using the matrix
H := [0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0],
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r .n a· u·
1 226.6 O 1 1 1 O 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 220.5 O 1 1 O 1 0.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 123.7 O 1 O 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.11
4 88.5 1 O 1 1 1 13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 69.0 1 1 O O 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 2.9 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
6 46.3 1 1 1 O 1 9.6 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 21.8 1 1 O 1 1 0.0 3.3 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.0
8 0.0
Figure 5.7: Solutions of M/pH for Example 504.3
corresponding to the optimal dual solution of LP(N). Solving M/pH yields
fH = 226.576, corresponding to the coalition {2, 3, 4}. By adding the opti-
mal dual solution to LP(2, 3, 4), which is available as u", we obtain the new
weight matrix
H'= [0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0]
. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000 17.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 '
and by solving M/pH again we obtain fH = 220.549, corresponding to the
coalition {2, 3, 5}. Continuing in this manner, new rows can be added to H
until the value of fH is small enough. In Figure 5.7, the solutions of M/pH,
as new rows are added, are shown. After nine rows have been added, we
have fH = O, implying that vH = v. <I
5.5 Numerical results
The purpose of this section is to investigate how the performance of the
aggregation approach introduced in Section 5.3 depends on properties of the
problem data. The analysis will be based on Owen's (1975) model, where
the ownership of the resources is given by the matrix B. In our analysis, we
will especially focus on the density of A, and the degree to which ownership
is concentrated/dispersed, i.e., the structure of B.
A number of data sets with n = 5 were generated in a random manner.
The nonzero elements of A were drawn from a uniform discrete distribution
in the interval 1, '" ,10. The density of A, i.e., the probability that a
particular element Ai; is nonzero, was set equal to the values 0.1, 004, 0.7,
or l.0. After A had been determined, we set e; := 'EiER Ai; for all j EP.
The total amount of resource i was initially set to biN := 'E;EP Ai;, which
was then distributed among the players according to the ownership profiles
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shown in Figure 5.8, where the x's indicate" which players are allocated
positive amounts of each resource. For resource i denote these players by
Ni. Let f3ik '" U(O, 1) be a random number corresponding to resource i and
player k. Then the amount of resource i given to player k is given by
[b Pik liN
~lENi Pil
Player Player
Rows 1 2 3 4 5 Rows 1 2 3 4 5
1 1-10 x x x x x 1 1-10 x x
2 11-20 x x x x x 2 11-20 x x
3 21-30 x x x x x 3 21-30 x x
4 31-40 x x x x x 4 31-40 x x
5 41-50 x x x x x 5 41-50 x x
6 51-60 x x x x x 6 51-60 x x
7 61-70 x x x x x 7 61-70 x x
8 71-80 x x x x x 8 71-80 x x
9 81-90 x x x x x 9 81-90 x x
10 91-100 x x x x x 10 91-100 x x
(a) Profile 1 (b) Profile 2
Player
Rows 1 2 3 4 5
1 1-10 x x
2 11-20 x x
3 21-30 x x
4 31-40 x x
5 41-50 x x
6 51-60 x x
7 61-70 x
8 71-80 x x
9 81-90 x x
10 91-100 x
Player
Rows 1 2 3 4 5
1 1-10 x
2 11-20 x
3 21-30 x
4 31-40 x
5 41-50 x
6 51-60 x
7 61-70 x
8 71-80 x
9 81-90 x
10 91-100 x
(c) Profile 3 (d) Profile 4
Figure 5.8: Ownership distribution profiles
7Row numbers from 1-10 refer to data sets with r = 10, and row numbers 1-100 to
datasats with r = 100.
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Profile 1 implies a relativelyeven distribution of the resources among the
players, and may be seen as an extreme case. At the other extreme we
find profile 4, where the entire amount of each resource is given to a single
player. In the former case, the increased profits resulting from cooperation
are modest, while in the latter cooperation is essential. Profiles 2 and 3 are
located somewhere in between the two extremes. Note that according to
these profiles, the resource bundles of player 1 and 2 are complements, and
this is also the case for 3-5. Profile 3 differs from profile 2 in that player
4 does not own anything of resource 7 (61-70), and that player 4 does not
own anything of resource 10 (91-100). Hence, profile 3 should, a priori, give
greater benefits from cooperation than does profile 2.
Some properties/special cases regarding the data sets should be mentioned.
First, note that if the ownership of resources is highly concentrated, and the
density of A is high, we will have zero profits for many coalitions. In the
extreme case of profile 4, where each resource has a single owner, we will
have
v(S) = O 'Vs -=f N, (5.47)
if all entries of A are nonzero. Hence, positive profits can only be made if
all the players pool their resources. In Figures 5.9 and 5.11, a "*" after the
problem name indicates that (5.47) is satisfied.
On the other hand, in the case where A is sparse, the game v will in many
cases be additive, i.e.,
v(S) + v(T) = v(S U T) 'VS,T C N s.t. SnT = 0. (5.48)
To see why this is the case, consider the special case where every column of
A has at most one nonzero entry. Then a unit of resource i should be used to
produce the product that gives the highest profit contribution per unit that
it consumes of resource i, i.e., the product, among those for which Aij > O,
such that :;.C is greatest. Assuming that there is at least on product such
1J
that Aij > O, the value of one unit of resource i is the constant
c·
W··- max _,_s·-. A'
JEP ij
Aij>O
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and this constant is independent of who the owner of resource i is. Hence,
the total profit that can be made by a coalition S can be found by simply
summing the value of its resources, i.e.,
iER iERkES
which clearly satisfies (5.48). For additive games, the core consists of a
single point. If u* is an optimal solution to the dual of LP(N), we know
from Owen (1975) that the entire core is given by the point (u*)T B. In
Figures 5.9 and 5.11, a "o" after the problem name indicates that (5.47) is
satisfied.
For the data sets shown in Figure 5.9, where p = 100 and r = 10, column
aggregation was performed. Initially, the weight matrix G consists of a single
column corresponding to an optimal primal solution of LP(N), and new
columns were added by repeatedly solving M I pG, where p* is the number
of columns needed in order to have fG =maxseN, s#ø{ v(S) - vG (S)} = 0,
i.e., in order for the games v and vG to coincide. Note that the number of
coalitions is 2n -1 = 31, which is an upper bound on the number of columns
needed. In the table of Figure 5.9 is also reported et, the value of fG /v(N)
when t columns have been added to G.
The results in Figure 5.9 indicate that the effect on p* of varying the density
of A is ambiguous. If ownership is concentrated, as in profile 4, increasing
density has a negative effect on p*, whereas when ownership is dispersed,
the effect is positive. Figure 5.10 can help explain this phenomenon. Let
O(G) denote the set of coalitions that correspond to an optimal solution of
M I pG at some stage in the formation of G. For four of the data sets, we
solved the aggregated problem LpG(S) for all S fl. O(G). Since v = vG,
we know from Proposition 5.3.2(iii) that for any S fl. O(G), it is possible to
express an optimal solution to LP(S) as a linear combination of the columns
of G. Each row in Figure 5.10 corresponds to a coalition, and the coalitions
have been sorted according to their size, as indicated by the numbers to
the left of the diagrams. The I's indicate nonzero entries of (GX)T for each
S fl. O(G), where X is an optimal primal solution to LpG(S). Also, the .'s
indicate nonzero elements of each column of G, i.e., the primal solutions for
the coalitions in O(G).
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Profile Problem d p. el es elO e20 e30
PIDI0A o 0.1 15 0.361 0.180 0.122 0.000 0.000
PIDI0B o 0.1 14 0.391 0.224 0.133 0.000 0.000
PIDlOC o 0.1 17 0.418 0.151 0.069 0.000 0.000
PID40A o 0.4 13 0.394 0.306 0.137 0.000 0.000
PID40B o 0.4 18 0.348 0.212 0.130 0.000 0.000
1 PID40C o 0.4 11 0.339 0.172 0.069 0.000 0.000
PID70A 0.7 16 0.237 0.154 0.122 0.000 0.000
PID70B 0.7 18 0.333 0.159 0.086 0.000 0.000
PID70C 0.7 21 0.446 0.197 0.134 0.009 0.000
PIDI00A 1.0 31 0.456 0.180 0.131 0.068 0.003
PIDlOOB 1.0 30 0.367 0.199 0.104 0.042 0.000
PIDlOOC 1.0 26 0.281 0.151 0.088 0.018 0.000
P2DlOA o 0.1 23 0.780 0.593 0.463 0.207 0.000
P2DlOB o 0.1 25 0.747 0.620 0.481 0.219 0.000
P2DI0C o 0.1 23 0.630 0.602 0.439 0.213 0.000
P2D4OA 0.4 26 0.715 0.575 0.456 0.147 0.000
P2D40B 0.4 26 0.627 0.574 0.435 0.127 0.000
2 P2D40C 0.4 27 0.704 0.596 0.459 0.136 0.000
P2D70A 0.7 25 0.752 0.573 0.294 0.039 0.000
P2D70B 0.7 26 0.774 0.639 0.418 0.080 0.000
P2D70C 0.7 24 0.679 0.512 0.275 0.041 0.000
P2DI00A 1.0 11 0.502 0.304 0.019 0.000 0.000
P2DlOOB 1.0 7 0.606 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000
P2DI00C 1.0 11 0.385 0.200 0.004 0.000 0.000
P3DI0A o 0.1 25 0.713 0.639 0.500 0.282 0.000
P3DlOB o 0.1 25 0.868 0.607 0.494 0.202 0.000
P3DlOC o 0.1 25 0.735 0.627 0.475 0.265 0.000
P3D4OA 0.4 29 0.838 0.652 0.547 0.299 0.000
P3D40B 0.4 29 0.850 0.636 0.497 0.258 0.000
3 P3D4OC 0.4 30 0.800 0.671 0.525 0.232 0.000
P3D70A 0.7 21 0.796 0.540 0.347 0.101 0.000
P3D70B 0.7 22 0.837 0.518 0.410 0.114 0.000
P3D70C 0.7 21 0.707 0.483 0.271 0.039 0.000
P3DlOOA 1.0 8 0.631 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.000
P3DI00B 1.0 5 0.586 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P3DI00C 1.0 8 0.509 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000
P4DI0A 0.1 31 0.880 0.721 0.619 0.405 0.042
P4DI0B o 0.1 31 0.849 0.718 0.620 0.416 0.151
P4DI0C o 0.1 31 0.876 0.733 0.609 0.412 0.124
P4D40A 0.4 30 0.812 0.792 0.596 0.360 0.000
P4D4OB DA 27 0.832 0.772 0.589 0.253 0.000
4 P4D40C 0.4 27 0.815 0.787 0.590 0.327 0.000
P4D70A 0.7 11 0.789 0.660 0.203 0.000 0.000
P4D70B 0.7 12 0.813 0.689 0.276 0.000 0.000
P4D70C 0.7 8 0.819 0.649 0.000 0.000 0.000
P4DI00A * 1.0 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000P4DlOOB * 1.0 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000P4DI00C * 1.0 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Figure 5.9: Results for column aggregation, with n = 5, p = 100, and r = 10
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Figure 5.10: Nonzero elements of primal solutions
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We see that increased density
(i) leads to more variation among the production plans of the various
coalitions, and
(li) makes it more difficult for small coalitions to produce anything at all,
i.e., there are fewer nonzero entries for small coalitions.
When ownership is dispersed, such as for profile 1, effect (i) is dominant.
Proposition 5.3.2(iii) indicates that greater variation among the primal so-
lutions of various coalitions makes the column aggregation approach less
successful. When ownership is relatively concentrated, as for profile 3, ef-
fect (ii) dominates. If a coalition B cannot produce anything, we will have
v(B) = O, hence O ~ vG(B) ~ v(B) => vG(B) = v(B) = Ofor any choice of
the weight matrix G E Rrxp.
For the data sets of Figure 5.11, where n = 5, p = 10, and r = 100, row
aggregation was performed. Initially, H consisted of one row corresponding
to an optimal dual solution of LP(N), and new rowswere added by repeat-
edly solving M I pH. The number r* indicates the number of rows that had
to be included in H in order to make v = vH. We also report Et, the value
of fH /v(N) when t rows have been added to H.
The results in Figure 5.11 indicate that increased density of A makes the row
aggregation approach more successful, i.e., r* decreases, except for profile 1,
where r* is close to or at the upper bound 2n - 1. In order to explain this
phenomenon, the problems LpH (B) were solved for all B fl. O(H) for four of
the datasets, where O(H) is the set of coalitions corresponding to the rows
of H. In Figure 5.12, we indicate by I's the nonzero values of urH for each
coalition B fl. O(H), where U is an optimal dual solution to LpH (B). For
all coalitions in O(H), the nonzero elements of the the corresponding row of
H are indicated by .'s. We see that increased density of A, for the examples
shown in Figure 5.12, has the effect of decreasing the number of nonzero
entries. To see why this is the case, note that a relatively dense A-matrix
makes decisions on different products/resources more interdependent. The
number of bottlenecks, and hence the number of positive dual prices, will
be fewer, as seen for dataset P2D 100D and P4D100D. This makes it easier
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Profile Problem Density r· Cl c5 clO c20 c30
P1D10D 0.1 31 0.218 0.097 0.040 0.026 0.006
P1D10E 0.1 31 0.153 0.088 0.050 0.020 0.001
P1D10F 0.1 31 0.155 0.085 0.043 0.020 0.003
P1D40D 0.4 31 0.282 0.167 0.081 0.036 0.011
P1D40E 0.4 31 0.319 0.177 0.076 0.040 0.005
1 P1D40F 0.4 31 0.337 0.197 0.094 0.039 0.003
P1D70D 0.7 31 0.303 0.186 0.083 0.047 0.017
P1D70E 0.7 31 0.342 0.210 0.140 0.050 0.007
P1D70F 0.7 31 0.382 0.202 0.141 0.046 0.009
P1D100D 1.0 30 0.328 0.239 0.141 0.065 0.000
P1D100E 1.0 31 0.317 0.208 0.118 0.046 0.002
P1D100F 1.0 31 0.509 0.201 0.133 0.043 0.002
P2D10D 0.1 20 0.646 0.404 0.156 0.000 0.000
P2DlOE 0.1 21 0.646 0.332 0.119 0.014 0.000
P2D10F 0.1 17 0.707 0.484 0.205 0.000 0.000
P2D40D 0.4 17 0.816 0.502 0.104 0.000 0.000
P2D40E 0.4 17 0.865 0.443 0.065 0.000 0.000
2 P2D40F 0.4 17 0.734 0.457 0.311 0.000 0.000
P2D70D 0.7 15 0.852 0.572 0.053 0.000 0.000
P2D70E 0.7 15 0.867 0.581 0.063 0.000 0.000
P2D70F 0.7 16 0.844 0.437 0.055 0.000 0.000
P2D100D 1.0 14 0.927 0.492 0.010 0.000 0.000
P2D100E 1.0 14 0.791 0.713 0.015 0.000 0.000
P2D100F 1.0 12 0.942 .0.397 0.002 0.000 0.000
P3D10D 0.1 17 0.715 0.246 0.111 0.000 0.000
P3DlOE 0.1 18 0.639 0.403 0.135 0.000 0.000
P3D10F 0.1 18 0.725 0.275 0.178 0.000 0.000
P3D4OD 0.4 11 0.743 0.540 0.017 0.000 0.000
P3D40E 0.4 10 0.869 0.481 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 P3D40F 0.4 16 0.811 0.390 0.257 0.000 0.000
P3D70D 0.7 9 0.880 0.464 0.000 0.000 0.000
P3D70E 0.7 9 0.889 0.510 0.000 0.000 0.000
P3D70F 0.7 11 0.889 0.492 0.045 0.000 0.000
P3D100D 1.0 8 0.918 0.398 0.000 0.000 0.000
P3D100E 1.0 9 0.959 0.589 0.000 0.000 0.000
P3D100F 1.0 10 0.857 0.563 0.000 0.000 0.000
P4DlOD 0.1 12 1.000 0.337 0.060 0.000 0.000
P4D10E 0.1 9 0.928 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.000
P4D10F 0.1 10 0.935 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000
P4D40D * 0.4 6 1.000 0.507 0.000 0.000 0.000P4D40E * 0.4 6 0.836 0.732 0.000 0.000 0.0004 P4D40F * 0.4 6 0.859 0.730 0.000 0.000 0.000P4D70D * 0.7 6 1.000 0.521 0.000 0.000 0.000P4D70E * 0.7 6 0.950 0.527 0.000 0.000 0.000P4D70F * 0.7 6 1.000 0.383 0.000 0.000 0.000P4D100D * 1.0 6 0.996 0.211 0.000 0.000 0.000P4D100E * 1.0 6 1.000 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000P4D100F * 1.0 6 0.989 0.620 0.000 0.000 0.000
Figure 5.11: Results for row aggregation, with n = 5, p = 10, and r = 100
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Figure 5.12: Nonzero elements of dual solutions
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to express the dual solutions of all coalitions as combinations of the dual
solutions of a relatively small subset of the coalitions.
More concentrated ownership seems to work in the same direction as in-
creased density of A, but we have no good explanation for this phenomenon
at present.
5.6 Conclusion
We have shown how the dimensions of linear production games may be
reduced by aggregating over columns or rows. In Section 5.3 we showed
that by choosing weights corresponding to optimal solutions of the primal
(dual) corresponding to particular coalitions, we can make the aggregated
games coincide with the original games for those coalitions. This can be
used to create a new game, easier to handle computationally, whose core
form a superset (subset) of the original core. This introduces a possible
error, and in Section 5.4 we provide a method, by solving a mixed integer
programming problem, for quantifying this error in the special case where
the players pool their resources by simply adding them. The solution of this
problem can also be used to improve the bound on the original game, by
adding a new column (row) to the weight matrix, and suggests a procedure
by which the bound can successively be improved. In section 5.5 we test this
procedure on a number of examples. The examples differ with respect to
how concentrated the ownership of the resources are, and the density of the
technology matrix A. The results indicate that for column aggregation, the
aggregation approach is suitable for problems where ownership is relatively
concentrated (dispersed) and A is dense (sparse). Row aggregation seems
to be suitable for cases where ownership is relatively concentrated and A is
dense.
We know from Owen (1975) that some core points can be obtained from the
dual solution corresponding to the grand coalition. An interesting question
is, if we have constructed H such that vH = v, the dual solutions included
in H can be given an interpretation in relation to the core of the original
game.
Chapter 6
On the Computation of the
Pre-N ucleolus
6.1 Introduction
This chapter has a double purpose. First, in Section 6.2, we describe Kopelo-
witz's (1967) procedure for computing the pre-nucleolus", in which an LP-
problem is repeatedly solved, and where the excess values of some coalitions
are fixed in every iteration. A modified version of this procedure will also
be used in Chapter 7, where we compute a restricted nucleolus. Second,
in Section 6.3, we discuss how the coalitions whose excess values are to
be fixed in a particular iteration, corresponding to active constraints, can
be identified using the optimal dual prices of the LP-problem. If we solve
the LP-problems using a extreme-point method, we may not be able to
identifyall the active constraints, since the dual may have multiple optimal
solutions. If, however, we use an interior-point method, we get all the active
constraints. This point is illustrated in Section 6.4 via an example, and
in Section 6.5 we show how the computational results change when the
constraints of the LP-problem have not been specified in advance.
1See Section 1.3 for a definition.
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6.2 Kopelowitz's procedure
The procedure/ is based on repeatedly solving an LP-problem until a unique
solution of the problem is found. The first problem, P(l), seeks to maximize
the smallest, with respect to the set of coalitions, of the excess values, i.e.,
maxr
subject to x(S) + r ~ c(S)
x(N) = c(N),
VSE EO
where EO := {S eN: S =1= Ø}. Problem P(l) has the optimal value rI and
the set of optimal solutions Xl. If the solution is not unique, a new problem
is formed where we :fix the excess values of those coalitions corresponding to
active constraints, i.e., the setEI:= {S E EO: x(S) = c(S) - rk Vx E Xl}.
The next problem to be solved, P(2), is
maxr
subject to x(S) = c(S) - rI
x(S) + r ~ c(S)
x(N) = c(N),
where El := EO\ El. The optimal value of P(2) is r2, and the set of optimal
solutions is X2• Again we identify E2 := {S E El : x(S) = c(S) - r2 Vx E
X2}, and the procedure continues in this manner until the LP-problem has
a unique solution. In iteration k, problem P(k) is given by
subject to x(S) = c(S) - rj
x(S) + r ~ c(S)
x(N) = c(N),
VS E Ej,j = 1,...,k-1
VS E Ek-l
(6.1)
(6.2)
(6.3)
(6.4)
max r
and the entire procedure is summarized as Algorithm 6.2.1 below.
2The procedure was introduced by Kopelowitz (1967), and its properties are discussed
by Maschler et al. (1979).
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Algorithm 6.2.1
Begin
~o := {S eN: S =1= ø, N}
k :=0
Repeat
k:= k+ 1
Solve P(k) and store the optimal value as rk
x» := {x E Rn: x is an optimalsolution to P(k)}
~k ;= {S E ~k-l ; x(S) = c(S) - rk 'Vx E Xk}
~k := ~k-l \ ~k
until IXk I = 1
end
6.3 On identifying the active constraints
In order to identify the active constraints in Algorithm 6.2.1, i.e., the set
~k, we may use the dualsolution. The dual to (6.1)-(6.4) is given hy
min ~sc(S) + I: ~s[c(S) - rj] (6.5)
SE'£j
j=l, ...,k-l
s.t. L~S =0 'Vi EN (6.6)
S3i
L ~s=l
SE,£k-l
~s ~o
(6.7)
'Vs E ~k-l (6.8)
A solution (x,r,~) is optimal if and only ifit satifies (6.1)-(6.4), (6.5)-(6.8),
as well as the complementarity condition
~S[c(S) - x(S) - r] = O (6.9)
Condition (6.9) implies'' that if [z", r", ~*) is optimal, then, for any S E
~k-l ,
~s> O ~ c(S) - x(S) - rk = O
3Suppose that the statement is not true, i.e., there exists some other optimal solution
(x',r',I") such that c(S) - x'(S) - r' > O. Since the set of optimal solutions is convex,
the solution Hx*, r* ,1'") + ~(x' , r', 1") must also be optimal. But this is a contradiction,
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Note that a positive dual price is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition
for a constraint to be active, i.e., we may have /.Ls = O even though the
corresponding constraint is binding for all optimal solutions. Hence the set
will, if there are multiple optima in the dual, be a strict subset of Ek.
By imposing the additional restriction that the optimal solution should be
strictly complementary, i.e., it should satisfy
/.Ls+ [c(S) - x(S) - r] > O (6.10)
we avoid this problem. For, ifthe solution (x*,r*,/.L*) satisfies (6.10), then
we must have, for any S E Ek-l, that
/.Ls > O <= c(S) - x(S) - rk = O
Strictly complementary solutions can be obtained by interior-point meth-
ods.? The next section presents an example illustrating how the choice of
solution methods for the LP-problems can influence the number of iterations
needed in Algorithm 6.2.1.
6.4 An example - vehicle routing
The vehicle routing game was discussed by Gothe-Lundgren et al. (1996),
and our example, illustrated by Figure 6.1, is identical to Example E2 in
their article. There are n customers, each with a demand of di units, and
the customers must be served from a central depot by one or more vehicles.
The cost of making a trip from point i to point j is Cij, where O~ i,j ~ n,
and where point Ois the location of the central depot. The total cost of the
transportation plan is to be minimized, subject to the restriction that the
entire demand of the customers should be met, and that the capacity of the
vehicle(s), given by the number Q, should not be violated. Because of the
capacity constraints, the optimal plan may involve more than one vehicle.
since
~ ([c(S) - x*(S) - r*] + [c(S) - x'(S) - r']) > O and ~ (ISs + IS~) > O
violates (6.9).
4See e.g. Wright (1997).
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n=6 Q=30d=[8 24 22 6 14 10]
O 24 19 20 27 16 12
24 O 17 31 44 36 23
19 17 O 16 29 35 25
c= 20 31 16 O 15 34 28
27 44 29 15 O 40 37
16 36 35 34 40 O 13
12 23 25 28 37 13 O
(a) The data
(b) Optimal solution for the
grand coalition
s C(S) S C(S) S c(S)
{l} 48 {1,3} 75 {4,5 } 83
{2} 38 {1,4} 96 {4,6 } 76
{3} 40 {1,5} 76 {5,6 } 41
{4} 54 {1,6} 59 {1,4,5} 123
{5} 32 {2,4} 75 {1,4,6} 106
{6} 24 {3,4} 62 {4,5,6} 92
(c) Feasible coalitions/subroutes
Figure 6.1:Example E2 of Gothe-Lundgren et al. (1996)
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The data of our example, which involves n = 6 customers, are shown in
Figure 6.1(a), and the optimal plan for the grand coalition is shown in
6.1(b). The optimal route configuration has a total cost of
c(N) = 189= c(1) + c(2) + c(3, 4) + c(5, 6) = 189,
and consists of four feasible subrouies, i.e., customer sets (coalitions) that
can be served by a single vehicle. All the feasible subroutes/coalitions are
listed in Figure 6.1(c). The vehicle routing problem may be seen as finding
the combination of feasible subroutes such that each customer is covered by
one subroute, i.e., solving the integer programming problem''
min {L CtYt: LYtait = 1 'Vi E N, Yt E {O,1} 'Vt E T},
tET tET
(6.11)
where T is the set of feasible subroutes, and ct is the cost of subroute tET.
The parameter ait is equal to 1 if customer i is covered by route t, and °
otherwise. The stand-alone cost of any coalition S ~ N is the minimum
cost of covering the customers belonging to S, i.e., the value
c(S) = min {L ctYt : LYtait = 1 'Vi E S, Yt E {O,1} 'Vt E T} . (6.12)
tET tET
With n = 6, there are 26 - 1 = 63 nonempty coalitions, and the value of
all these coalitions must be computed in advance. The pre-nucleolus is the
vector6
(
1 1 2 1 1)473,38,263,353,293,123 '
and the computational details of Algorithm 6.2.1 are shown in Figure 6.2.
The dual of all the LP-problems solved had multiple optima, and therefore
an extreme-point method" identifies only a few active constraints in every
iteration, and the algorithm terminates with a unique solution after 15 it-
erations. Using an interior-point method'", on the other hand, we are able
to identify all active constraints from one dual solution, and we use only 3
iterations.
liThis is the formulation used by Go the-Lundgren et al. (1996). For a discussion of
solution methods for the vehicle routing problem, see Laporte (1998).
6This is not the same solution as in Gothe-Lundgren et al. (1996), where only the
feasible coalitions were used. A sufficient condition for their procedure to yield the pre-
nucleolus is that the core is nonempty, cf. Huberman (1980). See also Chardaire (2001).
7The dual Simplex-algorithm of CPLEX 7.0.
8The barrier algorithm of CPLEX 7.0.
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k SEE" xl rio c(S)
1 12345 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 176
1234 6 159
56 41
2 1 2 6 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 97
3456 103
3 1 6 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 59
23456 141
4 1 5 47.3 38.0 27.7 34.3 29.3 12.3 -0.667 76
5 1 345 47.3 38.0 27.7 34.3 29.3 12.3 -0.667 138
6 2 56 47.3 38.0 27.7 34.3 29.3 12.3 -0.667 79
7 12 5 47.3 38.0 27.7 34.3 29.3 12.3 -0.667 114
8 1 34 6 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 121
9 1 56 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 89
10 1 3456 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 151
11 12 56 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 127
12 34 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 62
13 2 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 38
14 234 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 100
15 1 3 56 47.3 38.0 26.3 35.7 29.3 12.3 0.667 116
2 456 116
(a) Simplex-method
k SEE" xi rio c(S)
1 1 5 47.3 38.0 26.7 35.3 29.3 12.3 -0.667 76
12 5 114
1 345 138
12345 176
1 6 59
12 6 97
1 34 6 121
1234 6 159
56 41
2 56 79
3456 103
23456 141
2 2 47.3 38.0 26.2 35.8 29.3 12.3 0.000 38
34 62
234 100
1 56 89
1 2 56 127
1 3456 151
3 1 47.3 38.0 26.3 35.7 29.3 12.3 0.667 48
1 2 86
1 34 110
123 4 148
12 45 151
12 4 6 134
1 3 56 116
123 56 154
2 456 116
(b) Interior-point method
Figure 6.2: Results from algorithm 6.2.1
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6.5 Constraint generation
Problem P(k) has 2n - 1 constraints. Not only will the size of the problem
be prohibitive even for moderate values of n, but we also need to compute
c(S) for every constraint (coalition). By using constraint generation9, we
can reduce the size of the LP-problems to be solved.
Let O be some subset of the coalitions. The first LP-problem, P(l, O), is
max r
subject to x(S) + r ~ c(S)
x(N) = c(N)
Given an optimal solution (æ", r"), we need to check whether there are coali-
tions outside O whose constraints are violated, i.e., we compute'P
z" = min {c(S) - x*(S)},
s¢nu{N,0}
(6.18)
and, if z* < r", we should add the coalition S* corresponding to the optimal
solution of (6.18) to O. Then we solve P(l, O), now including an inequality
constraint for S*. The process of adding new constraints to P(l, O) continues
until z" ~ r", at which point we can proceed to stage 2 of Algorithm 6.2.1.
That is, we identify the active constraints, i.e., the set El, and form the
new problem P(2, O). This procedure continues until the solution of the
9See Gilmore and Gomory (1962). Gothe-Lundgren et al. (1996) apply constraint
generation to the problem of computing the pre-nucleolus.
lOIn general (6.18) is a difficult problem, but for our smaIl example, for which all the
feasible coalitions have been listed in Figure 6.1(c), we use (6.13)-(6.17), where 8; equals
one if i is a member of the optimal coalition S·, and zero otherwise. Constraint (6.14)
requires each member of S· to be covered by the selected routes, while (6.15) limits the
search to those coalitions that have not previously been included in the LP-problem.
min LCtYt - L xi8;
tET iEN
subject to L ait = 8i
tET
(6.13)
"liEN (6.14)
L 8i +L(l - 8i) ~ 1
i~S iES
VS E fl U {N,0} (6.15)
8i E {O,l}
YtE{O,l}
Vi E N
VtE T
(6.16)
(6.17)
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LP-problem is unique. The constraint generation approach is summarized
as Algorithm 6.5.1 below.
Algorithm 6.5.1
Begin
EO := {S eN: S =I- ø,N}
k:= 1
Choose O C EO
Repeat
Solve P(k, O) and store the optimal solution as (z", r")
Solve PS(O, z") and store the optimal solution as (z*, S*)
O := O U {S*}
Ifz* ~ r* or Ek-l \ O = ø then
x» := {x E Rn : x is an optimal solution to P(k, O)}
Ek := {S E Ek-1 no: x(S) = c(S) - rk 'Ix E Xk}
Ek := Ek-1 \ Ek
k:= k+ 1
endif
untillXk-11 = 1
end
The LP-problem of the kth (major) iteration of the procedure, denoted
P(k, O), is defined by (6.1), (6.2), (6.4), and
x(S) + r ~ c(S) (6.19)
and the sub-problem PS(O, æ"), to be solved in order to identify constraints
that are violated given the solution z", is given by (6.18). Since, in most ap-
plications, the sub-problem PS(O,x*) is hard to solve, we choose to include
the coalition S* in O in every iteration, even for those where z* ~ r".
Computational details from Algorithm 6.5.1 for our example are shown in
Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Initially, O was set equal to the set of feasible coalitions,
i.e., those shown in Figure 6.1(c). We see that the difference, with respect
to the number of iterations needed, between using an extreme-point method
and an interior-point method is still significant, although not as dramatic
as when all coalitions where included in the LP-problem initially.
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Iteration S* x*
1 12345
2 23456
3 2 456
4 2 56
5 3456
47.1 38.3 25.3 37.0 29.1 12.1
46.8 38.4 25.4 37.0 28.8 12.6
47.3 37.3 24.3 38.3 29.3 12.3
47.3 38.7 25.0 36.3 29.3 12.3
47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3
-0.286
-0.400
-0.667
-0.667
-0.667
~l = {{1,6},{1,2,3,4,5},{2,3,4,5,6}}
r* z*
-0.857
-1.200
-1.333
-1.333
-0.667
6 1 234 6 47.3 38.3 25.3 37.0 28.7 12.3 -0.333 -1.333
7 1 3 4 6 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
~2 = {{1,5},{1,2,3,4,6}}
~3 = {{2,5,6},{1,3,4,6}}
8 1 2 4 6 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
9 1 2 6 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
~4 = {{5,6}}
~5 = {{l, 2, 6}}
10 1 2 4 5 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
11 1 3 4 5 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
~6 = {{3, 4, 5, 6}}
12 1 2 5 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
~7 = {{l, 3, 4, 5}}
13 1 2 4 5 6 47.3 38.0 25.0 37.0 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.000
~8 = {{l, 2, 5}}
14 234 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 0.000
~9 = {{2}}
15 0.000 0.0001 2 56 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3
~lO = {{2, 3, 4}}
16 0.000 0.0001 56 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3
~ll = {{l, 2, 5, 6}}
17 1 3456 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3
~12 = {{l, 5, 6}}
0.000 0.000
18 0.000 0.6671 2 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3
~13 = {{1,3,4,5,6}}
19 0.000 0.6671 234 47.3 38.0 25.7 36.3 29.3 12.3
~14 = {{3,4}}
20 0.667 0.6671 23 56 47.3 38.0 26.3 35.7 29.3 12.3
~15 = {{l, 2,3, 4}}
21 0.667 0.6671 34 47.3 38.0 26.3 35.7 29.3 12.3
~16 = {{l, 2,4, 5}, {l, 2, 3, 5,6}}
Figure 6.3: Results for Algorithm 6.5.1 when the LP-problems are solved
using the Simplex-method
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Iteration S* x* r* z"
1 12345 47.1 38.3 27.8 34.5 29.1 12.1 -0.286 -0.857
2 23456 46.8 38.4 28.0 34.4 28.8 12.6 -0.400 -1.200
3 1234 6 47.3 38.4 27.9 34.4 28.6 12.3 -0.667 -1.358
4 3456 47.3 38.0 27.3 34.7 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.691
5 2 56 47.3 38.2 27.1 34.7 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.835
6 12 6 47.3 38.0 26.9 35.1 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
tl = {{1,5},{1,6},{5,6},{1,2,3,4,5},{2,3,4,5,6},
{1,2,3,4,6},{3,4,5,6},{2,5,6}}
7 12 5 47.3 38.0 26.5 35.5 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
t2 = Hl, 2, 6}}
8 1 34 6 47.3 38.0 26.5 35.5 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
t3 = Hl, 2, 5}}
9 1 345 47.3 38.0 26.5 35.5 29.3 12.3 -0.667 -0.667
t4 = Hl,3,4,6}}
10 12 56 47.3 38.0 26.5 35.5 29.3 12.3 -0.667 0.000
ts = Hl, 3, 4, 5}}
11 234 47.3 38.0 26.7 35.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 0.000
t6 = {{2}, {3,4}, {1,2,5,6}}
12 1 56 47.3 38.0 26.7 35.3 29.3 12.3 0.000 0.000
t7 = H2, 3, 4}}
13 1 3456 47.3 38.0 26.7 35.329.3 12.3 0.000 0.000
ts = Hl, 5, 6}}
14 123 56 47.3 38.0 26.8 35.2 29.3 12.3 0.000 0.231
t9 = Hl, 3, 4,5, 6}}
15 12 4 6 47.3 38.0 26.0 36.0 29.3 12.3 0.667 0.359
16 2 456 47.3 38.0 26.3 35.7 29.3 12.3 0.667 0.667
tlO = {{1},{1,2,3,5,6},{1,2,4,6}}
Figure 6.4: Results for Algorithm 6.5.1 when the LP-problems are solved
using an interior-point method
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6.6 Conclusion
We have shown, via an example, that the number of iterations needed by
Kopelowitz's (1967) procedure can be reduced by utilizing an interior-point
method instead of an extreme-point method. When, in Section 6.4, all the
coalition values were specified in advance, the difference in the number of
iterations needed was dramatic. In Section 6.5, when the constraints of
the LP-problem had to be generated in the course of the procedure, the
difference was less significant.
The pre-nucleolus is indeed an interior-point of the core, if such a point
exists. To illustrate this, note that P(1) is equivalent to finding the least
corell, i.e., finding the smallest nonempty s-core:
maxjs : ø -=1= Ge(c) ~ G(c)}
The primal solutions from an interior-point method will probably be a better
"guess" as to what the final solution (the pre-nucleolus) will be. Ifwe have to
resort to constraint generation, this may be useful, since having a solution
that is close to the final solution will probably prevent the generation of
some unnecessary constraints.
llMaschler et al. (1979).
Chapter 7
Allocation of Fixed
Transmission Costs in
Electricity Networks
7.1 Introduction
Prior to 1988, most countries had electric power systems characterized by
vertical integration and little competition. Under this regime, a single com-
pany controlled the entire production, transmission, and distribution system
for a fixed geographic area. Starting with the deregulation of the British
power system, many countries have created systems where production is
subject to competition, but where transmission and distribution are still
performed by monopoly entities. In order to facilitate competition in pro-
duction, methods for allocating the cost of the transmission and distribution
systems among the system users are needed.
We will in this chapter study the allocation of the cost of a transmission
system. The system, as well as providing basic transmission services, i.e.,
transporting power from producers to consumers, also needs to provide an-
cillary services, such as the provision of operating reserves in order to handle
generator failures, reactive support in order to maintain voltage levels within
acceptable limits, and congestion management. We will focus on the basic
transmission services, hence the most important part of the system cost is
the cost of installing the transmission capacity, e.g. the power lines.
136 Allocation of Fixed '1ransmission Costs in Electricity Networks
Existing and proposed allocation methods for allocating transmission costs
can! be classified as belonging to one of the following groups:
(i) Embedded cost methods.
(ii) Incremental/marginal cost methods.
(iii) Combinations of (i) and (ii).
The embedded cost methods'' allocate the total cost among the network
users in proportion to some measure of the extent to which they make use
of the network. This measure may e.g. be the amount of power transacted
(the postage-stamp rate method), not taking into account the distance over
which the power travels in the network. This method, popular in practice be-
cause of its simplicity, thus may lead to cross-subsidization of long-distance
transactions by short-distance transactions. The contract path method also
considers distances, but in a very crude way, assuming that the power flow
follows the single shortest path between the seller and the buyer. Since
power does not flow over a single patlr', the contract path method may
also result in cross-subsidization. To alleviate this problem, the MW-mile
method (Shirmohammadi et al. (1989).), measures the power flow that a
transaction causes on every line in the system. Multiplying this flow with
the length of the line, and summing over all lines, we get a measure of the
transaction's use of the system.
While embedded cost methods allocate the system cost among all transac-
tions in the system, the incremental/marginal cost methods take the view
that a new transaction should cover the additional cost that it causes. An
incremental approach would then be to calculate the total cost with and
without the transaction, and let the transaction cover the difference. A
marginal approach would be to multiply the amount of transacted power by
the cost of an extra unit of power (e.g. the cost of an extra unit of power
injected at some location in the network, obtained as the dual from the so-
lution of a cost minimizing optimization problem). Note that, in contrast
lMarangon Lima (1996) and Shirmohammadi et al. (1996).
2See Pan et al. (2000) for an overview.
3This phenomenon is called "loop flow", and is illustrated by Example 7.2.1.
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with the embedded cost methods, incremental/marginal methods may not
recover the total system cost." Also, the resulting allocations may depend
on the ordering of the transactions.
Much of the literature on transmission cost allocation concentrates on pre-
senting new methodology, especially new methods designed to measure a
transaction's extent of usage of the system. We do not present a cost al-
location method that returns a single-point solution. Rahter we present a
model that can be used to evaluate cost allocations resulting from existing
methods, using the core of a cooperative game. The network is given, i.e.,
we do not allow the construction of new lines or the closing down of ex-
isting lines. The transmission network connects a set of regional electricity
markets, and the producers and consumers of a region have a choice as to
whether they want to make use of the network or just trade in the local
market. Given that a subset of the regions trade with each other through
the network, equilibrium production and consumption quantities are deter-
mined from the demand and supply functions of the regions, as well as the
capacities of the network.
Due to loop flow and limited line capacities, the combined surplus of produc-
ers/consumera will sometimes decrease when the inhabitants of a regional
market (or several local markets) join the other markets via the network,
although this will never happen if we also take into account the capacity
charges collected by the network owner.5 We will use the change in surplus
when a set (coalition) of regions join the network as an upper bound on the
amount that the network owner can charge these regions in order to cover the
transmission cost. In adding payments from several regions together, we are
assuming that sidepayments can be made between inhabitants of different
regions. In Section 7.3, we formulate a cooperative game with transferable
utility, and show that the core of this game is nonempty if there are no bind-
ing capacity constraints for the grand coalition. In Section 7.5, we illustrate,
using examples, how existing cost allocation methods (postage-stamp rate
methods and distribution factors a la Rudnick et al. (1995)) may fail to yield
4See e.g. Perez-Arriaga et al. (1995) .
5This statement refers to (7.10), where it is assumed that the equilibrium corresponds
to an optimal solution of (7.6)-(7.9). In practice this may not be the case, e.g., if zonal
pricing (Bjørndal and Jornsten (2001» is used .
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core elements. By combining several cost allocation methods, however, we
may be able to produce core allocations, and in Section 7.6 we describe an
LP-based procedure for doing this.
7.2 Regional electricity markets
We consider an electric power network that supports alternating currents
(AC). The current follows a sinusoidal wave form, and the instantaneous
current (at some node in the network) at time t is given by
i(t) = Imax cos(wt),
where Imax is the amplitude of the current, and w is its frequency measured
in radians per second. The voltage may lag/lead the current by some phase
angle å, thus the instantaneous voltage is given by
v(t) = Vmax cos(wt + å)
Instantaneous power is then given by the product
i(t)v(t)
We shall in this chapter be concerned with average (real) power flows in a
network with n nodes. Let Vi and Oi be the voltage amplitude and voltage
angle, respectively, at node i, measured relative to some reference node.
Also, let rij and Xij be the resistance and reactance, respectively, of the line
between i and i, and define6 Gij := -rij/(rlj+x~j) and Bij := xij/(rlj+x~j).
It can be shown7 that the average power How from node i to node i, by
applying Kirchoff's laws, is given by
6Gii and Bii are known as the conductance and susceptance, respectively, of the line
between i and i, and determine the elements of the complex admittance matrix Y, where
}Iii := Gii + jBii, and where j = r-I. The elements of the diagonal are determined by
setting G« := Ei#i -Gii and Bii := Ei;;6i -Bii·
7In Bergen and Vittal (1986), page 326, the average power injected into the system via
node i is written
nL ViVj(Gii COS(6i- £li)+Bii sin(6i - £li))
i=l
7.2 Regional electricity markets 139
When modeling the effect of capacity constraints, as in Wu et al. (1996),
resistances are often assumed to be zero, resulting in Gij = O. Note that
this assumption gives a lossless system, where qij = -qji. Furthermore,
since the angle difference 8i - 8j is usually small, it is often assumed that
sin(8i - 8j) ~ 8i - 8j. Hence (7.1) reduces to the linear expression
(7.2)
where Bij = l/xij, and where we have assumed, without loss of generality,
that quantities are normalized'' so that Vi = Vj = 1. The angles 81, ... , 8n are
unknowns, and can be determined from the power injections/withdrawals in
the nodes. Let the demand for power in node i be given by qf, the supply
by q[, and let qi := q[ - qf. Then, assuming that (7.2) properly represents
line flows, the voltage angles can be determined'' from
n n
qi =Lqij =LBij(8i - 8j)
j=l j=l
1~ i ~n. (7.3)
A large current flowing through a line will cause the temperature of the line
to rise. Since very high temperatures will damage the line, the line flow
cannot exceed a certain level, hereafter referred to as the (thermal) capacity
of the line. If the capacity of line (i, j) is C APij, this constraint is given by
q .. < CAP.··I) _ I) 1~ i,j ~ n.
Example 7.2.1 [Figure 7.1] Here, n = 3, and all line reactances are equal
to one, i.e., Xij = 1 for all i and [, One MW of power is injected in node 1,
and the same amount of power is withdrawn in node 3, as indicated next to
the nodes. There is no net injection/withdrawal of power in node 2. From
In order to find line flows, we rewrite
Vl(Gii COS(Bi - Bi) + Bi; sin(Bi - Bi)) +L Vil-j(Gij cos(Bi - Bj) + Bij Sin(Bi - Bj))
j#i
= - Vi2LGij +L Vil-j(Gij COS(Bi - Bj) + Bij sin(Bi - Bj)),
#i #i
where we have used cos(O) = 1, sin(O) = O, and Gu = L#i -Gij.
8See Section 5.5 in Bergen and Vittal (1986).
9In fact, only angle differences matter, so we may arbitrarily fix anyone of the voltage
angles, e.g. Bl = O.
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Figure 7.1: Example 7.2.1
(7.3), and by using the fact that this is a lossless system, i.e., qij = -qji, we
get the three equations of (7.4).
q12 + q13 = 1
-q12 +q23 = O
-q13 - q23 = -1
(7.4)
q13 = q12 + Q23· (7.5)
The equations in (7.4) correspond, in terms of power flows, to Kirchoff's
junction rule, whereas (7.5) represents Kirchoff's loop rule. Solving (7.4)
and (7.5) yields q12 = q23 = 1/3 and q13 = 2/3.
We see that the power flow over the path consisting of the lines (1,2) and
(2,3) cannot be determined independently of the flow over line (1,3). If there
is a capacity constraint limiting the flow over line (1,3) to 1/2, then the loop
rule will reduce the power flow over the route consisting of (1,2) and (2,3) to
1/4. After the introduction of the capacity constraint, we cannot transport
more than 1/2 + 1/4 = 3/4 units of power from node 1 to node 3. Hence,
even though there is surplus capacity over the lines (1,2) and (2,3), we are
not able to utilize this capacity due to the loop rule. <l
In Example 7.2.1 the net injections/withdrawals of power were specified
exogenously. In the sequel we will assume that the demand for real (average)
power in node i is described by the (non-increasing) demand function pf(q),
and the supply is likewise described by the (non-decreasing) supply function
pt(q). A market equilibrium can be determined by solving the following
7.2 Regional electricity markets 141
(convex) problem:
n [{rtf (lf; lmaximize?: Jo pf(q)dq - Jo pHq)dq
.=1 o o
(7.6)
subject to
n n
qi - qf = Lqij = L Bij(Oi - Oj)
j=l j=l
Bij(Oi - OJ) ~ CAI{j
(7.7)
1 ~ i,j s n (7.8)
In all our examples, we will use the linear demand and supply functions
pf(q) = ai - biq and pHq) = ciq, where ai, bi, ei > O. Moreover, if nothing
else is stated explicitly in our examples, all reactances will be equal to one,
i.e., Xij = Bij = 1 for all i =f: j.
We shall study situations in which only a subset of the nodes use the network.
Let N := {1, ... ,n}. When only the consumers and producers of S ~ N use
the network, we will assume that the inhabitants of the remaining nodes
N \ S trade only among themselves, i.e., (7.6) - (7.8) will be solved subject
to the additional constraint
i E N\ S. (7.9)
Let ql(S), qf(S), and Pi(S) represent optimal values for node i in a solution
to (7.6) - (7.9), and let IT(S) be the corresponding value of (7.6). Note that
because of the capacity constraints in (7.8), the equilibrium prices of two
different nodes may differ.
The total surplus will always be higher when more nodes use the network,
i.e., we have
IT(R) ~ IT(S) for all R, S such that R ~ S ~ N, (7.10)
since the only effect of adding node i to S is to remove one of the constraints
in (7.9). The structure of (7.6) allows us to define the surplus of each
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individual node i as
TIj(S) := consumer surplus + producer surplus
[
rrt!(S) l [ r= l= Jo p1(q)dq - Pi (S)qf(S) + pi(S)qf(S) - Jo pf(q)dq
rrt!(S) r=
= Jo p1(q)dq - Jo pf(q)dq +Pi(S) [qf(S) - q1(S)]. (7.11)
The first two terms of (7.11) represent the area under the demand and
supply curve, respectively, in node i. The last term is the net income from
sale of surplus power, and may be negative. Hence the value of (7.6) may
be written as
TI(S) = LTIi(S) + LPi(S) [q1(S) - qf(S)] := LTIi(S) + TIno(S).
iEN iEN iEN
The number TIno(S) is the merchandizing surplus, as defined by Wu et al.
(1996), and can be interpreted as short-term capacity charges collected by
the network owner. This interpretation becomes clearer from the following
relationships, as shown by Wu et al. (1996),
1 n n n n
TIno(S) = 2" L L fpj(S) - Pi (S)] qij(S) = L LJLij(S)CAPij, (7.12)
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
where JLij(S) is the dual price for line (i,j). It also follows1o from Wu et al.
(1996) that TIno(S) ~ Ofor all S ~ N.
Example 7.2.2 [Figure 7.2] In this example, the demand functions are
identical in all the three nodes, with ai = 20 and bi = 0.05. The parame-
ters of the supply functions (£:i) are 0.1, 0.2, and 0.4 in node 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, as indicated next to the nodes in part (a) of the figure. Re-
actances are all equal to one, and the capacities of all three lines are 30.
In the equilibrium solution, there is a surplus of power in node 1, exactly
matched by deficits in nodes 2 and 3. This results in a power flow from node
1 to the other two nodes. The amount that can be exported is limited by
the capacity of line (1,3). Because of the binding capacity constraint, the
equilibrium prices varies over the set of nodes.
10This is because the equilibrium solution (P(S), qd(S), qØ(S)) is an optimal solution to
(7.6)-(7.9). In practice (see e.g. Bjørndal and Jornsten (2001)) this may not be the case.
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C2 = 0.2
®
20.841(3i \159 (30)
0------+0
30 (30)
Cl = 0.1 C3 = 0.4
(a) Market equilibrium when all nodes use the network.
i qf qf Pi
1 150.280 99.439 15.028
2 77.664 89.346 15.533
3 40.093 79.252 16.037
®
1.018(3i ~035 (30)
o 7.018 (30) 0
i qf qf Pi
1 133.333 133.333 13.333
2 84.211 63.158 16.842
3 42.105 63.158 16.842
(b) Market equilibrium when only 2 and 3 use the network.
S III (S) I12(S) I13(S) LIIi(S) I1no(S) I1(S)
iEN
1 1333.333 800.000 444.444 2577.778 0.000 2577.778
2 1333.333 800.000 444.444 2577.778 0.000 2577.778
3 1333.333 800.000 444.444 2577.778 0.000 2577.778
1 2 1355.372 826.446 444.444 2626.263 0.000 2626.263
1 3 1367.083 800.000 489.444 2656.528 42.500 2699.028
2 3 1333.333 808.864 454.294 2596.491 0.000 2596.491
1 2 3 1376.414 802.730 478.520 2657.664 45.420 2703.084
(c) Surpluses for node inhabitants and the network owner.
Figure 7.2: Example 7.2.2
144 Allocation of Fixed Transmission Costs in Electricity Networks
Although society as a whole, i.e., the node inhabitants and the network
owner combined, are always better off as more nodes start using the network,
this is not necessarily true for individual nodes. If node 1 stops using the
network, we get the equilibrium shown in part (b) of the figure. The surplus
of 1 drops from 1376.414 (= II1(1, 2, 3)) to 1333.333 (= IIl(2,3)). Node
2 experiences an increase in surplus from 802.730 to 808.864, whereas the
inhabitants of node 3 see their surplus drop from 478.520 to 454.294. In total,
the surplus of all node inhabitants decreases from 2657.664 to 2596.491. The
network owner looses 45.420 when node 1 stops using the network, since the
network will no longer be congested. <I
Example 7.2.3 [Figure 7.3] In Example 7.2.2, although the surplus of in-
dividual nodes in some cases increased when new users left the network, the
combined surplus of the node inhabitants (EiEN IIi) always decreased. To
construct an example where this is not the case, let ai = 20 for all i, and let
the other characteristics of the network as well as the node inhabitants be as
described in Figure 7.3(a). By comparing the situation in (a) and (b), we see
that node 3, by using the network, causes congestion on line (1,3). Hence,
if the inhabitants of node 3 does not use the network, the total surplus of
all node inhabitants increases from 2670.284 to 2953.488, i.e., an increase
of 283.204. Since the network owner looses 410.929, the effect on the total
surplus is negative. <I
7.3 The cost allocation problem and its game
We will now consider the allocation of (fixed) transmission network costs
among the users of the network. Some of the network cost is covered
through short-term capacity charges, i.e., through the revenue that the net-
work owner gets from regulating the short-term flow of the network. This
revenue is given by IIno(N) if the inhabitants of all nodes are using the net-
work. Typically+, this income falls short of the total cost of the network,
and the residual C has to be covered through additional fees.
11According to Påres-Arriga et al. (1995), one should not expect more than 30% of total
network cost to be recovered from short-term capacity charges.
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~=0.1
C2 = 0.1
CD
68.263(loot ~.263 (100)
(0+------0
bl = 0.0250 (50) b3 = 0.1
Cl = 0.6 C3 = 0.1
z qf qf Pi
1 28.443 146.707 17.066
2 143.263 56.737 14.326
3 115.868 84.132 11.587
(a) Market equilibrium when all nodes use the network.
CD
89.922(loot ~.961 (100)
CD 44.961 (50) CD
i qf qf Pi
1 27.907 162.791 16.744
2 167.442 32.558 16.744
3 100.000 100.000 10.000
(b) Market equilibrium when only 1 and 2 use the network.
S III (S) I12(S) I13(S) L I1i(S) I1no(S) I1(S)
iEN
1 322.581 1000.000 1000.000 2322.581 0.000 2322.581
2 322.581 1000.000 1000.000 2322.581 0.000 2322.581
3 322.581 1000.000 1000.000 2322.581 0.000 2322.581
1 2 498.648 1454.840 1000.000 2953.488 0.000 2953.488
1 3 377.016 1000.000 1140.625 2517.641 311.492 2829.133
2 3 322.581 1000.000 1000.000 2322.581 0.000 2322.581
1 2 3 457.931 1187.172 1025.180 2670.284 410.929 3081.213
(c) Surpluses for node inhabitants and the network owner.
Figure 7.3: Example 7.2.3
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By a cost allocation we will understand a vector X E RN, where Xi is the
amount to be paid by the inhabitants of node i. Let x(B) := EiES Xi
represent the total cost allocated to the members of B. Because (7.10)
implies that total surplus is maximized when all node inhabitants use the
network, we would like the cost allocation to be such that all users are
encouraged to use the network. Suppose a cost allocation X is such that
x(B) >L [IIi(N) - IIi(N \ B)] .
iEN
(7.13)
The left-hand side of of (7.13) is the amount paid by the coalition B to
the network owner, while the right-hand side is the change in the total
surplus, excluding the surplus of the network owner, that would occur if the
members of B stopped using the network. We will in the sequel assume that
sidepayments are possible between the node inhabitants, but not between
the network owner and node inhabitants. Hence, (7.13) implies that it would
be better for society as a whole, except the network owner, if B left the
network, meaning that the inhabitants of the set of nodes B will buy and
sell power only in their local markets. Thus, a reasonable requirement for a
cost allocation is that
x(B) sL [IIi(N) - IIi(N \ B)]
iEN
'VB e N. (7.14)
The owner of the network wants to recover the total cost of the network,
given by the number C, i.e., he seeks an allocation vector such that12
x(N) = C. (7.15)
The requirements (7.14) and (7.15) corresponds to the core restrictions for
the (cost) game vc, where
BeN,
(7.16)
B=N.
12Wewill in the following assume that
ieN
If this was not the case, the grand coalition would prefer not to use the network when
faced with a cost allocation x that satisfies (7.15).
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In order to analyze the game vc, we shall split it into two parts. Let vC :=
vI + v2, where, for any S ~ N,
vl(S) :=L [II,;(N) - IIi(N \ S)]
iES
and
v2(S):= L [IIi(N) - IIi(N \ S)] .
iEN\S
The number vl(S) can be interpreted as the value, for the members of S, of
joining the network. Note that IIi(N \ S) = IIi(0) for all i EN \ S, since, if
node i does not use the network, the surplus that i gets does not depend on
which of the other nodes are currently using the network. Hence we have
vl(S) =L [IIi(N) - IIi(0)],
iES
showing that vI corresponds to an additive game, with a unique core allo-
cation where player i E N is allocated the amount IIi(N) - IIi(0).
On the other hand, v2(S) measures the increased surplus that the members
of N \ S get when S joins. Note that v2(N) = O.
The games of Example 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 are shown in Figure 7.4. For Example
7.2.2 we also show the excess values for the allocation+'
y = (54.545,0.568,24.773),
all of which are nonnegative, hence y is a member of the core. Thus, the
core is nonempty. For Example 7.2.3, the allocation
z = (177.703, 160, 10)
is not a core member, since some of the excess values are negative. If node
3 left the network, then node 1 and 2 would gain -v2(3) = 308.385, and
node 3 would loose vl(3) - X3 = 25.180 - 10 = 15.180, giving a total gain
of 308.385 - 15.180 = 293.205. Note that it would not be in the interest of
the network owner to have the users of node 3 leave the network, since the
13This is the nucleolus of the game, see Chapter 1.
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S V1(S) V:.!(S) VV(S) e(S, y)
1 43.080 18.092 61.172 6.628
2 2.730 -1.594 1.136 0.568
3 34.076 -2.675 31.401 6.628
1 2 45.810 34.076 79.886 24.773
1 3 77.156 2.730 79.886 0.568
2 3 36.805 43.080 79.886 54.545
1 2 3 79.886 0.000 79.886 0.000
(a) Example 7.2.2
S V1(S) V:.!(S) VV·(S) e(S, z)
1 135.351 212.353 347.703 170.000
2 187.172 -34.529 152.643 -7.357
3 25.180 -308.385 -283.204 -293.204
1 2 322.523 25.180 347.703 10.000
1 3 160.531 187.172 347.703 160.000
2 3 212.353 135.351 347.703 177.703
1 2 3 347.703 0.000 347.703 0.000
(b) Example 7.2.3
Figure 7.4: Examples of the game vC
network would no longer be congested. If the users of node 3 left, he would
loose llno(N) + X3 = 410.929 + 10 = 510.929 in revenue. The loss of the
network owner caused by node 3 leaving thus more than outweighs the gain
of the node inhabitants.
In Example 7.2.3, the core is actually empty. To see this, note that if X is
to be a core allocation, we need
X3 ~ vC (3) = -283.204 and Xl + X2 + X3 = vC (N) = 347.703.
Combining these two conditions, we get
Xl + X2 = 347.703 - X3 ~ 347.703+ 283.204 = 630.907,
which contradicts the core inequalities
Xl s vC(l) = 347.703 and X2 s vC(2) = 152.643.
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Theorem 7.3.1 Suppose C ~ vl(N). If, for S = N, an optimal solution
to (7.6)-(7.9) is still optimal when we remove the capacity constmints, s.e.,
when we set C~j = 00 for all i,j E N, then the core ofvG is nonempty.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 below. o
Lemma 7.3.2 Suppose C < vl(N). If v2 > O, then the core of vG is
nonempty.
Proof. Since vG(S) = vl(S) + v2(S) ~ vl(S) for all SeN, and since
vG(N) = C ~ vl(N), we can find a core allocation X for vG by scaling the
(unique) core allocation for vI down in the following manner:
C
Xi := [IIi(N) - IIi(0)] v1(N)
o
According to Lemma 7.3.2, if existing users of the network always welcome
new users, i.e., if v2(S) ~ O for every SeN, then the core of the game vG
is nonempty.
Lemma 7.3.3 If, for S = N, an optimal solution to (7.6)-(7.9) is still
optimal when we remove the capacity constmints, then v2 ~ o.
Proof. The statement v2 ~ O, by using the definition of v2, is equivalent
to
L IIi(N) ~ L IIi(S)
iES iES
for all S ~ N. (7.17)
In order to prove 7.17, define f1:(S) as the value of (7.6) subject to (7.7) and
(7.9), i.e., we remove all capacity constraints. Note that since qij = -qji
and hence E:=l qij =O, condition (7.7) implies
L(qi - qf) = O.
iEN
(7.18)
If qS and if' satisfy (7.18), we can always find a set of voltage angles that
satisfies (7.7), hence in the absence of capacity constraints we may replace
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(7.7) by (7.18). By substituting (7.9) in (7.18), we get, for any R ~ N,
TI(R) = max {L fi(qf, qf) : L(ql- qf) = o} + L TIi(0), (7.19)
iER iER iEN\R
where
(iff r~
fi(qf, qf) := Jo • p1(q)dq - Jo • p1(q)dq
is the part of the objective function (7.6) corresponding to node i, and where
TIi(0) = max{fi(ql, qf) : ql = qf} is the social surplus in node i when the
local market has to be cleared separately. Since
TI(R) = L TIi(R) + L TIi(0) + rrno(R),
iER iEN\R
and since TIno(R) = O, by the absence of capacity constraints, we can write
L TIi(R) =max {L fi(ql, qf) : L(qf - qf) = o}
åER iER iER
= mlnn;}ax {L!i(qt,qf) + A L(qf - qf)}
q ,qB iER iER (7.20)
=~ Ln;}a; {!i(qf,qf) + A(ql- q1)}
iER qi ,q;
:= m_tn L9i(A)
iER
The second equality of 7.20 follows from duality and, since demand (supply)
functions are non-increasing (non-decreasing), the function fi is concave.
Let A(R) be the optimal multiplier in (7.20).
In order to prove (7.17), we shall show that, for any S ~ N, we have
iES iES iES iES
The equality in (7.21) follows from the assumption in the lemma. The first
inequality follows from (7.20), which states that ~iES TIi(N) = ~iES 9i(A(N))
and ~iES TIi(S) = ~iES 9i(A(S)). Note that
iES iES
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follows from the fact that A(8) is the optimal multiplier with respect to the
coalition 8.
The second inequality in (7.21) will be shown by noting that
11(8) = L:l1i(8) + L: l1i(0) + I1no(8)
iES iEN\S
TI(8) = L:TIi(8) + L: TIi(0)
iES iEN\S
(7.22)
(7.23)
Since adding capacity constraints to (7.6)-(7.9) cannot increase the opti-
mal objective function value, we must have 11(8) ~ TI(8). Also note that
l1i(0) = TIi(0) for all i EN, thus the second term in (7.22) equals the second
term in (7.23). Then, since I1no(8) ~ O, and since 11(8) ~ TI(8), we must
have 1:iES TIi(8) ~ 1:iES l1i(8). O
Note that it is possible to have v2(8) < O for some 8 C N, and still have
a nonempty core, as is illustrated by Example 7.2.2, for which the game is
shown in Figure 7.4.
Even though the assumption in Theorem 7.3.1 holds, i.e., the grand coali-
tion does not experience any capacity problems, this may not be the case for
the sub-coalitions. This is illustrated by the next example. This example
also illustrates the fact that, even though line capacities have been chosen
so as to satisfy the needs of the grand coalition, changes in the produc-
tion/ consumption patterns may cause the core to become empty.
Example 7.3.4 [Figure 7.5] All the nodes have identical demand functions,
with ai := 20 and bi := 0.05 for all i E N. Cost parameters and line
capacities are indicated in part (a) of Figure 7.5, and the line flows for the
grand coalition in part (b). Line capacities have initially been set so as to
accomodate the network flow corresponding to the grand coalition+", and
the cost of the network is C := v1(N) = 54.152. Then, since there are no
binding capacity constraints for the grand coalition, the core is nonempty, by
Theorem 7.3.1. This does not, however, mean that capacity constraints are
not binding for sub-coalitions, i.e., if the inhabitants of some nodes choose
14Capacities have been set by rounding upwards (the absolute values of) the power flows
corresponding to unconstrained dispatch for the grand coalition.
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(a) Initial line capac-
ities and production
costs.
(c) Line flows for the
coalition {l,4, 5}
with the initial
parameter values.
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(b) Line flows for the
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the initial parameter
values
0.2 7 (0.610) 0.30-----------·0
"" 11.6824.682/
~0.5/
13.682 0 2.682
/ ;',/2 ~~~"®~--------~--'@
0.8 4 (2.827) 0.2
(d) Optimal power
flows for the grand
coalition when the
cost of production in
node 4 is reduced.
Figure 7.5: Example 7.3.4
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S V1(S) V:.!(S) VV(S) e(S,nucl)
1 20.949 12.266 33.215 13.594
2 6.086 5.616 11.702 4.497
3 0.003 0.879 0.882 -3.059
4 0.220 -9.896 -9.676 -4.670
5 9.115 11.020 20.135 9.858
1 2 27.034 6.889 33.924 7.099
1 3 20.951 12.972 33.924 10.363
2 3 6.089 6.807 12.896 1.750
1 4 21.169 6.022 27.191 12.577
2 4 6.306 2.060 8.366 6.168
3 4 0.223 1.381 1.604 2.669
1 5 30.063 5.452 35.516 5.619
2 5 15.201 10.782 25.983 8.502
3 5 9.118 8.258 17.376 3.158
4 5 9.335 10.379 19.714 14.444
1 2 3 27.037 6.887 33.924 3.158
1 2 4 27.255 2.644 29.898 8.080
1 3 4 21.172 12.975 34.147 15.592
2 3 4 6.309 12.652 18.961 12.821
1 2 5 36.149 -2.107 34.042 -3.059
1 3 5 30.066 5.521 35.588 1.750
2 3 5 15.204 21.169 36.372 14.951
1 4 5 30.284 1.673 31.957 7.066
2 4 5 15.421 13.815 29.236 16.761
3 4 5 9.338 17.421 26.759 17.547
1 2 3 4 27.258 9.115 36.372 10.613
1 2 3 5 36.152 0.220 36.372 -4.670
1 2 4 5 36.370 0.003 36.372 4.277
1 3 4 5 30.286 6.086 36.372 7.541
2 3 4 5 15.424 20.949 36.372 19.956
1 2 3 4 5 36.372 0.000 36.036 0.000
Figure 7.6: The game, and excess values corresponding to the nucleolus, of
Example 7.3.4 when the cost of production in node 4 is reduced
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not to use the network, as is illustrated by part Figure 7.5(c), where the line
flows corresponding to the coaliton {l, 4, 5} are shown, and where we see
that the flows of the lines (2,4), (2,5), and (4,5) are at their upper limit, as
indicated by the dashed lines. Using the dual prices shown in parentheses,
we can calculate the merchandizing surplus, using (7.12), as
IIno(l, 4, 5) = 2 . 2.253+ 6 . 2.454 = 19.23.
After line capacities have been chosen, changes in the production and/or
consumption pattern may take place. Suppose that C4 drops from 0.4 to
0.2, i.e., production in node 4 becomes cheaper. After the change, the line
flows are as shown in Figure 7.5(c), where the binding line capacities are
indicated by dashed lines, and dual prices are shown in parentheses. If the
grand coalition forms, the network owner will be able to collect
IIno(N) = 7·0.610 + 2 . 1.269+ 4 . 2.827 = 18.116
in short-term capacity charges. Assuming that C is the residual amount
that needs to be covered after the short-term charges have been collected,
his claim will now be reduced to 36.036 (= 54.152 - 18.116). Note that the
reduced claim is smaller than v1(N) = 36.372, i.e., the value for the grand
coalition of using the network is larger than the network owner's claim. The
resulting game vC is shown in Figure 7.6. The nucleolus is given by the
allocation vector
(19.620,7.204,3.941, -5.006, 10.276),
and the corresponding excess values are shown in Figure 7.6. Since the
nucleolus is always a core element if the core is nonempty, and since some
of the excess values are negative, the core must be empty. <I
7.4 Possible responses to the problem of an empty
core
When the core of vC is empty, the network owner may find it difficult to
allocate the entire cost C in such a way that no subset of network users will
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find it profitable to discontinue using the network. In this section we will
discuss briefly how the network owner could handle such a situation.
One option for the network owner is to reduce his claim C in order to make
the core of vC nonempty. In order to find the maximal value of C that
guarantees a nonempty core, he needs to solve the LP-problem:
max x(N)
subject to x(S) ~ vC (S) for all SeN
(7.24)
(7.25)
In Example 7.3.4, the solution of (7.24)-(7.25) is given by the allocation
vector
x = (33.042,0.000,0.882, -9.676, 1.000),
which corresponds to a total claim of 25.249.
Another approach would be to punish those players that leave. The punish-
ment can e.g. be in the form of a tax that those that choose not to join the
network have to pay. Suppose, in Example 7.3.4, that such a tax is based
on the amount of power produced/consumed in nodes that do not connect
themselves to the network. If all the node markets are cleared separately,
the following quantities will be observed:
q = (86.473,34.876,57.195,80.664,22.372)
If a tax of e is charged per unit of power, each node that chooses not to
use the network will have to pay an amount of €qi. Thus the increased
payment from the node inhabitants to the network owner when node i joins
the network is
where x is the allocation of the network cost. For the node inhabitants as a
collective, it will be profitable to include the coalition S in the network if
x(S) - €q(S) ~ vC (S).
What is the lowest tax rate that makes it profitable for all node inhabitants
to use the network, and at the same time allows the network owner to cover
156 Allocation of Fixed Transmission Costs in Electricity Networks
the network cost C? This is the solution to the LP-problem:
subject to x(S) - €q(S) ~ vG (S)
x(N) = vG(N)
for all SeN
(7.26)
(7.27)
(7.28)
min €
The solution to (7.26)-(7.28) is given by the allocation vector
x = (36.355, 1.336,3.073, -6.585, 1.857)
and the tax rate e = 0.038311. The approach followed here is similar to that
of Tijs and Driessen (1986).
7.5 Other cost allocation methods and the core
The practical implementation of a tariff system must satisfy additional re-
quirements such as:
(i) The cost allocation must be based on information that is available to
all participants, i.e., both the network users and the network owner.
(ii) The procedure used to compute the cost allocation must not involve
excessive computational costs.
(iii) The participants may have mental barriers excluding certain types of
tariff systems from consideration. Negative contributions from any
participants may e.g. be unacceptable.
An example of information that is private, i.e., not satisfying requirement
(i), are the cost and demand parameters of producers and consumers. Here
we will assume that the only information that satisfies requirement (i) are
• production and consumption quantities
• line flows
• physical characteristics of the network
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Denote the observed production and consumption quantities of node i by ii:
and iit, respectively, and the power flow over line (i,j) by iiij.
So-called postage-stamp rate methods allocates the fixed cost in proportion
to nodal (production and consumption) quantities. If the cost is allocated in
proportion to gross production in the nodes, we obtain the allocation vector
x8, where
8._ -8 C
Xi .- qi " -8·
LJiEN qi
If gross consumption is used, we obtain xd, where
Another approach would be to allocate the cost on basis of net quantities.
Let, for node i, net injection/withdrawal of energy be denoted by
z+ .- (-8 -d O) d --.- (=tI. -8 O)qi .- max qi - qi , an qi·- max fli - qi' .
Allocating costs in proportion to net injection/withdrawal gives the alloca-
tions x+ and æ>, respectively, where
C
and xi:= iii ~ __.
iENqi
In e.g. the tariff system of the Norwegian central network, a combination of
æ", xd, x+, and æ; is used.P
Alternatively, a cost allocation method may use information on how the
power flows over the lines. This is the approach suggested by Rudnick et al.
(1995). From the linear DC approximation we can find the (traditional) dis-
tribution factors, where a~Jis the flow over line (i, j) caused by injecting one
unit of power in node k and withdrawing one unit of power in (the reference)
node r. These distribution factors depend on the choice of reference node,
i.e., we have to specify the withdrawal as well as the injection node. Rud-
Dicket al. (1995) suggest a cost allocation method that is independent of the
15The production quantities used are actually available production capacities, and are
in the hydropower-based Norwegian system based on average inflow of water registered
over a number of years. The consumption quantities used are based on registered maximal
consumption, usually corresponding to the coldest day of the year. See Statnett (2000)
and Statnett (2002).
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choice of reference node, using Generalized Generation (Load) Distribution
Factors, first defined by Ng (1981).
For the case where network costs are to be allocated among producers (gen-
erators), let {3~denote the amount offlow over line (i,j) caused by injecting
one unit of power in node k. These distribution factors can be determined
by solving the linear equation system 16
1s i < j ~ n, (7.29)
1~i<j~n kEN\{r}. (7.30)
While (7.29) requires that the distribution factors should explain the actual
flowover the lines, (7.30) expresses the following: Injecting one unit of power
in node k, which causes the flow {3~ over line (i,j), is equivalent to
(i) injecting one unit of power in node k, to be withdrawn in node r (off),
(ii) and injecting one unit of power in node r ({3rj).
When using these factors to allocate costs, Rudnick et al. (1995) propose to
charge a producer for the use of a line only if that producer contributes to
the positive flow over the line, i.e., using the modified distribution factors
ør. := {{3~ {3~iiij > O,
J o otherwise.
If the cost of line (i, j) is Cij, then the amount to be paid by the producers
in node k is
Cij Ai·
L:iEN {3ijiii
16The system (7.29)-(7.30) implies that if the production in node r changes by D.ij:,
then the change D.ii'J in the consumption of any node j E N will satisfy
D.q:. D.q'j
ijø = ii1 '
where ijø := EleeN ij', i.e., the relative change in consumption will be the same in all
nodes. A proof can be found in Ng (1981). A similar result holds for the load distribution
factors defined by (7.31)-(7.32), i.e., if consumption in node r changes by D.i/!, then the
change D.ijj in the production in node j E N will satisfy
D.q; ~ijj
ijd = ijJ '
h -d " -dW ere q := LJleeN qle'
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The total amount to be paid by the producers in node k is then
{jAk-8
GDF+ '" ijqk
X k := L- eij At -8'
i<j ~tEN {3ijqt
ITproducers that creates counterflows are credited accordingly, we get an
allocation where producers in node k are charged the amount
Distribution factors for consumers (load) are defined in a similar manner,
i.e., using the equation system 17
(7.31)
kEN\{r}. (7.32)
The equation system (7.32) says that withdrawing one unit of power in node
k, thereby creating the How'Ytj over line (i,j), is equivalent to
(i) withdrawing one unit of power in node r hij)'
(ii) and injecting one unit of power in node r, to be withdrawn in node k
(ar})·
In the case where consumers are not given credit for flows going in the
opposite direction of the observed line How,we use the modified distribution
factors
Ak ._ {'rt 'rtqij > 0,'ri' .-
J O otherwise.
The total amount to be paid by consumers in node k will then be
or, if credit for counterflows is given,
k::d
LDF '" 'rijfJk
Xk :=L- Cij _.I. ::d'
i<j ~tEN 'TijfJl
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b2 = 0.04
C2 = 0.2o
16.279(7 \605 (19)
o 0
bl = 0.1 34.884 (35) b3 = 0.04
Cl = 0.2
i q: q't Pi
1 83.721 32.558 16.744
2 83.721 81.395 16.744
3 27.907 81.395 16.744
C3 = 0.6
(a) Market equilibrium when all nodes use the network
+o
0.251 \0.333
T,\ ~i3'
_ \.:.J 0.083 \V
o
0.081 '\.333
CD 0.250 0+
(b) Generalized Generation Distribution Factors
+o;I \0.429
o ~0+ 0.429 -
(c) Generalized Load Distribution Factors
i xi Xi X: xt xrUI'T x~WF X~UI'T xLDF"~
1 134.859 0.000 60.424 23.498 89.566 141.840 3.080 -31.662
2 6.130 0.000 60.424 58.745 49.313 27.091 46.394 32.406
3 0.000 140.988 20.141 58.745 2.110 -27.942 91.514 140.244
(d) Cost allocations
s vc.;(S)
1 112.221
2 5.520
3 108.476
1 2 140.989
1 3 140.989
2 3 140.989
1 2 3 140.989
(e) The game
Figure 7.7: Example 7.5.1
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{1,2}
(a) The core
x
{l,2}
.XGDF
(b) The €-core, where e =
-10.327
Figure 7.8: Example 7.5.1
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Example 7.5.1 [Figures 7.7 and 7.8.] In this three-node example (see
Figure 7.7(a)), production is cheapest in node 1 and 2. Different slopes
(bi) of the demand functions can be interpreted as markets of different size,
where a steep demand curve corresponds to a relatively small market, hence
the largest markets are in node 2 and 3. Line capacities have been set by
rounding upwards the line flows corresponding to unconstrained dispatch
for the grand coalition. In the cost allocation problem, we assume that
C = v1(N). The line costs are assumed to be proportional to line capacities,
i.e.,
,",.,_ C CA~j
~J .- •
L.k,iEN:k<l CAPki
In a situation where all the three markets are connected via the network,
node 1 (3) will have a considerable net export (import) of power. If net
injection is used as a basis for cost allocation, i.e., the allocation x+ in
Figure 7.7(d), that node 1 will be paying a large share of the total cost. In
net withdrawals (x-) is used, node 3 will be paying the entire cost, since
this node is the only one that has a net import of power. The use of gross
production/ consumption as basis for cost allocation give allocations that are
less extreme.
The distribution factors øt, satisfying (7.29)-(7.30), are shown in Figure
7.7(b), where +'s indicate node k, i.e., the node for which production is
increased. The heavy lines indicate whether øt have the same sign as qij.
For line (1,2), the contributions to the total line flow q12 = 16.279 from
producers 1, 2, and 3, respectively, are
qi2 = Øi2qf = 0.417 . 83.721 ~ 34.884,
q?2= Ø?2q~= -0.250· 83.721 ~ -20.930, and
q~2= ~2q~ = 0.083 . 27.907 ~ 2.326.
The cost of line (1,2) is
CAP12 17
C12= C· CAP12 + CAPt3 + CAP23 = 140.989· 17 + 19 + 35 = 33.758.
If no credit for counterflows is given, the producers in 1 and 3 will pay for
this line alone, i.e., they will pay
34.884 2.326
33.758 . 34.884 + 2.326 = 31.648 and 33.758· 34.884 + 2.326 = 2.110,
17Note that ot~= _Q~rIJ IJ •
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respectively. According to xGDF+, node 1 pays most of the total cost, since
it is contributing heavily to the flow on line (1,2) and (1,3). Node 3 is only
contributing to the flow along line (1,2), so it pays a small share of the total
cost. If credit for counterflows is given, as in the allocation xGDF, node 3
will in fact be paid to use the network, since it contributes negatively to
flows along some lines! For allocations xLDF+ and xLDF, corresponding to
the distribution factors determined by (7.31)-(7.32) and shown in Figure
7.7(c), the situation is reversed. The consumers in node 3, which has the
largest net import of power, pays most of the total cost.
The game vC is shown in Figure 7.7(c), and the core is illustrated in Figure
7.8(a) (the hatched area). We see that none of the eight cost allocations
belong to the core. However, by combining some of them, core points may
be obtained. E.g. the allocation
1 + 1-x +-x2 2
belongs to the core. It is easily seen from Figure 7.8 that, in order to obtain
core allocations, we need to combine x- with x+ and/or xGDF. <I
7.6 Composite methods
Even though, as in Example 7.6.1, allocation methods based on a single
measure (e.g. net injections) does not give a core allocation, it may be pos-
sible to find allocations that are in, or at least closer to, the core by allowing
combinations of measures. An interesting question is then, how close to the
core can we get, given the cost measures that we are considering? In Exam-
ple 7.5.1, if we want to cover network costs solely by charging consumers,
we may e.g. consider the four measures corresponding to the allocations »:,
xd, xLDF +, and xLDF. By allowing combinations, we can obtain all cost
allocations that belong to the convex hull of these four allocations, shown
as the grey area in Figure 7.8(b). Since the intersection of this area and the
core (the black area) is empty, it is not possible to find a core allocation us-
ing only these four measures. However, we can find allocations in the strong
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s-eere of vc, given by
CE(VC)= {x E I*(vc) : LXi + E ~ vc(S) 'Vs eN},
iES
by making E small enough. If E = 0, then CE(vC) is just the usual core of
vc. Also, if CE(vC) I- ø for some E ~ 0, then the core is nonempty. What is
the largest value of E for which
CE(vC) nconv(x-,xd,xLDF+,xLDF) l- Ø?
For Example 7.5.1, by setting E := -10.327, the intersection consists of only
one point, namely
I.e., 73% of the cost should be covered through a charge on net withdrawals,
and 27% through a charge on gross consumption.
In order to find an "optimal" combination of various cost measures in the
general case, denote the set of available measures by A, and let yi be the
allocation vector corresponding to measure j E A. We seek a convex combi-
nation of the vectors in A that is in (or as close as possible to) the core of vc,
i.e., we solve the following LP-problem, which is similar to the LP-problems
of Algorithm 6.2.1.
subject to E ~ vc(S) - LXi
iES
Xi= LWjy{
iEA
LWi=l
iEA
wi ~O
Øl-SeN
(7.33)
(7.34)
maximize E
iEN (7.35)
(7.36)
JEA (7.37)
In the same manner as when computing the pre-nucleolus, we maximize
the smallest excess value, given by (7.33) and (7.34). The only difference
between (7.33)-(7.37) and problem P(l) of Algorithm 6.2.1 is that the re-
striction
(7.38)
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has been replaced by (7.35)-(7.37). Note that (7.38) is implied by (7.35)-
(7.37), since each of the allocation vectors yj satisfies ~iEN y{ = vC (N).
We will therefore refer to allocation vectors resulting from (7.33)-(7.37) as
restricted nucleoli. If (7.33)-(7.37) does not have a unique solution, we fix
the value of the coalition(s) corresponding to the lowest excess value and
solve the problem again. In the same manner as in Algorithm 6.2.1, we
continue fixing the excess value of coalitions until the problem has a unique
solution.
Note that the number of constraints in (7.34) would be 2n - 2, a very large
number even for moderate values of n. In order to overcome the compu-
tational difficulties, a solution method could use constraint generation, as
described in Section 6.5.18
Example 1.6.1 [Figures 7.9-7.11] For all five nodes, the constant terms of
the demand functions are equal to 20. The largest market is that of node 5,
while the smallest market is in node 1. Production is most expensive in node
5, and least expensive in node 1. Line capacities and costs have been set in
the same manner as in Example 7.5.1. We assume that the grand coalition
has formed, i.e., all the nodes are currently using the network, hence the
line flows and nodal quantities shown in part (b) and (c) of Figure 7.9 will
be used for computing the allocations presented earlier in this section. The
values ofthese allocations are presented in part (d) of Figure 7.9. Since node
1 and 5 in some sense are extreme cases, where node 1 has a relatively large
production and node 5 a large consumption, the various allocations differ
especially in the way that these two nodes are treated. If cost allocation is
based on net injection, gross production, or generation distribution factors,
node 1 pays a relatively large share of the total cost, while if it is based on
net withdrawal, gross consumption, or load distribution factors, node 5 pays
a relatively large share.
The game vC is shown in Figure 7.10, and since there are no binding capacity
18RepIace (7.34) by
40 s vc(S) -2:>.
'ES
Se fl, (7.39)
where fl is a subset of the set of possible coalitions, Suppose (40*, z", w*) is an optimal
solution of (7.33), (7.35)-(7.37) and (7.39). In order to check whether any of the constraints
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constraints for the grand coalition, we know from Theorem 7.3.1 that the
core is nonempty. To see whether the allocations presented in Figure 7.9(d)
belong to the core, we compute the excess values shown in Figure 7.10. It
turns out that none of the computed allocations belong to the core, since
corresponding to coalitions not in fl violates (7.34), we need to solve
min [vc (S) - Ex:] <«.
SfnU{N,0} ieS
By the definition of vC in (7.16), this is equivalent to solving
S ~inN" [EIIi(N)- EIIi(N\S)- Ex:]
f {,} ieN ieN ieS
=E IIi(N)- S l:G~" [E IIi(N\ S) +Ex:]
ieN f {,} ieN ieS
(7.40)
Since
II(N\ S)=E IIi(N\ S)+ IIno(N\ S)
ieN
where IIno(N\ S) ~ O, an upper bound to the maximization problem in (7.40) is given by
max [II(N\ S) +Ex:] ,SfnU{N,0} ieS
which, by (7.6)-(7.9), can be written as
Sfl:G~,0} [tfi(q"qf) + ~x:]
s" ,qd ,8 1=1 leS
n
subject to q: - qt = EBij(9i - 9j)
j=1
Bij(9i -9j):::; CA~j
qi-qt=O
(7.41)
(7.42)
1:::; i,i :::;n
i E S
(7.43)
(7.44)
By letting 8i, i E N, be binary variables indicating whether i is included in S or not, we
can formulate this as a nonlinear integer problem by replacing (7.41) and (7.44) by
[tfi(q:,qt) +E8iX:]
i=1 ieS
- M(l - 8i) :::;q: - qt :::;M(l - 8i)
(7.45)
i EN, (7.46)
respectively, where M is a sufficiently large number. We also add the constraints
E8i+ E (1 - 8i) ~ 1
ieS ieN\S
8iE{0,1}
SEflU{N,0} (7.47)
i EN, (7.48)
where constraint (7.47) eliminates coalitions already in fl from consideration.
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there is at least one negative excess value for each of them.
Some results from the procedure based on (7.33)-{7.37) are shown in Fig-
ure 7.11, where we combine some or all of the eight cost allocation meth-
ods presented in Section 7.5. For example, as shown in (a), if we re-
strict the attention to combinations of the four postage-stamp rate methods
(x+, »: ,xs, xd), it is possible to obtain the core allocation xl, where 35.1%
of the cost is recovered through a charge based on net injections (z "), and
64.9% through a charge based on net withdrawals (x-). Of course, if we
include more candidates for combination, we get better core allocations, i.e.,
higher excess values (lexicographically). The allocation x5, where combina-
tions of all 8 methods were allowed, has the same minimal excess value as
xl (0.557), but the second lowest excess value (5.355) is higher than the
second lowest value for xl (0.764). Note that it is not possible to obtain
core allocations solely based on distribution factors (x2), nor by considering
only production-oriented (x3) or consumption-oriented (x4) measures. <I
7.7 Conclusion
Our model takes into account both the behaviour of humans, i.e., the pro-
ducers and consumers, and the electrons flowing through the electricity net-
work, as described in Section 7.2. The cost allocation problem is modeled
using a game-theoretic framework in Section 7.3, where the consumer and
producer surpluses of the nodes are used to form an upper bound on the
amount that the network owner can charge a coalition. Our game differs
from other cost sharing games in that the characteristic function does not
measure the stand-alone cost of coalitions. In forming the game, we also
made the assumption that sidepayments can be made between all players,
not only those forming part of a coalition. The main result of Section 7.3 is
that the core is nonempty whenever the line capacities does not constrain
the grand coalition. In Section 7.4 we show how the network owner may
handle the problem of an empty core, either by lowering the total payments
collected, or by taxing individuals that choose not to make use of the net-
work. Section 7.5 illustrates, using a numerical example, how commonly
used cost allocation methods, such as the postage-stamp rate methods, may
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fail to yield core elements. However, by combining several methods, core
points may be obtained, as is shown in Section 7.6. An LP-based procedure
for computing core points, given that the points must be a combination of
existing cost allocation methods, is presented.
The model could be made more realistic by introducing uncertainty, e.g.,
with respect to demand variations or line failures. Also, the optimization
problem (7.6)-(7.8) may not be a realistic description of the market for
electricity. E.g., in the Norwegian spot market+", a zonal pricing system is
used, where a sub-optimal solution of (7.6)-(7.8) is chosen.
Problem instances of a more realistic size would be difficult to handle com-
putationally, and the LP-based procedure described in Section 7.6 could be
revised by introducing constraint generation (see footnote 18 on page 165).
19SeeBjørndal and Jornsten (2001).
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(0.06;0.2) (0.04;0.3)
CD 10 CD
"'Zyø (0.05;0.5) 9
/a® 10
(0.03;0.8)
28
CD 9.553 CD~25/
27.988 0 8.766
~06
® 9.669 @ø
(0.05;0.4)
(a) Line capacities
and demand/ cost
parameters (bi; q).
(b) Line flows for the
grand coalition.
i qf qf Pi
1 89.090 36.368 17.818
2 35.636 43.641 17.818
3 59.393 54.551 17.818
4 44.545 43.641 17.818
5 22.272 72.735 17.818
(c) Nodal equilibrium quanti-
ties for the grand coalition.
i xT Xi X: x~ X':'lll'·+ X?DF x~Ul'·+ xfDF
l 92.743 0.000 36.515 14.906 57.716 92.602 2.146 -22.895
2 0.000 14.082 14.606 17.887 11.059 -4.847 18.503 23.823
3 8.517 0.000 24.343 22.359 22.910 39.010 11.049 -13.471
4 1.590 0.000 18.257 17.887 10.361 -4.550 21.695 22.345
5 0.000 88.768 9.129 29.812 0.804 -19.364 49.457 93.049
(d) Postage-stamp rate allocations and allocations based on distribution
factors.
Figure 7.9: Example 7.6.1
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Candidates Solution
x+,x , x·, x" Xl = 0.351x+ + 0.649x
xGDF+,xGDF,xLDF+,xLDF x2 = 0.572xGDF + 0.428xLDF
x+,xB,xGDF+,xGDF x3 = 0.686x+ + O.056xB + 0.258xGDF+
x-,xd,XLDF+,XLDF x4 = 0.485x- + 0.515xd
aU8 x5 = 0.383x+ + 0.557x- + 0.015xGDF+ + 0.045xGDF
(a)
i nucl, x~ x~ xt xi xi
1 53.959 32.517 43.181 80.549 7.684 40.546
2 11.110 9.145 7.421 3.674 16.043 7.665
3 5.355 2.986 16.554 13.121 11.526 10.153
4 0.557 0.557 6.958 4.788 9.220 0.557
5 31.868 57.645 28.736 0.718 58.377 43.929
(b)
S e(nucl) e(xl) e(x~) e(x") e(x4) e(xD)
1 32.144 53.587 42.922 5.554 78.420 45.558
2 13.758 15.724 17.448 21.194 8.825 17.077
3 5.355 7.724 -5.843 -2.410 -0.815 5.355
4 0.551 0.551 -5.843 -3.613 -8.106 0.551
5 33.702 7.925 36.835 64.853 7.194 16.970
1 2 25.902 49.311 40.369 6.748 67.244 42.634
1 3 31.454 55.266 31.033 -2.902 71.559 44.867
2 3 10.759 15.094 3.251 10.430 -0.344 14.078
1 4 27.147 48.590 31.524 -3.613 64.760 40.561
2 4 13.372 15.337 10.661 16.577 -0.225 16.690
3 4 15.715 18.084 -1.884 3.719 0.881 15.715
1 5 15.170 10.835 29.079 19.730 34.936 11.851
2 5 41.063 17.250 47.884 79.649 9.621 27.649
3 5 24.173 0.764 16.106 47.557 -8.506 7.441
4 5 33.577 7.799 30.308 60.496 -1.595 16.845
1 2 3 24.173 49.950 27.441 -2.747 59.344 40.905
1 2 4 26.822 50.230 34.888 3.437 59.501 43.554
1 3 4 34.913 58.725 28.091 -3.673 66.355 48.326
2 3 4 11.260 15.595 -2.649 6.700 -8.506 14.579
1 2 5 5.806 3.436 23.405 17.802 20.639 5.806
1 3 5 10.759 8.794 13.470 7.554 24.356 7.441
2 3 5 39.839 18.396 35.463 70.660 2.227 26.426
1 4 5 14.695 10.360 22.204 15.024 25.798 11.376
2 4 5 45.434 21.622 45.855 79.790 5.329 32.021
3 4 5 38.686 15.277 24.219 57.840 -2.656 21.954
1 2 3 4 31.868 57.646 28.736 0.718 58.377 48.600
1 2 3 5 0.551 0.551 6.958 4.788 9.220 0.551
1 2 4 5 5.355 2.986 16.554 13.121 11.526 5.355
1 3 4 5 11.110 9.145 7.421 3.674 16.043 7.791
2 3 4 5 53.959 32.516 43.182 80.549 7.684 40.546
(c)
Figure 7.11: The nucleolus and restricted nucleoli for Example 7.6.1
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